

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE

Department of Economics

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GENDER: Male

CITIZENSHIP: Colombian

EDUCATION:

2015	Visiting Research Scholar, <i>Stanford University</i> , US. Sponsor: <i>Liran Einav</i> .
2014	Price Theory Scholar, <i>University of Chicago</i> , US.
2011-2013	MRes in Economics (Merit), <i>London School of Economics</i> , UK.
2005-2007	MA in Economics (GPA: 4.72/5), <i>UniAndes</i> , Colombia.
2004-2006	MSc in Economics (GPA: 4.6/5), <i>Universidad Javeriana</i> , Colombia.
1999-2003	B.A in Economics, <i>USTA</i> , Colombia.

DOCTORAL STUDIES: London School of Economics

DATES: October 2013 - present

THESIS TITLE: Firm Boundaries and Knowledge

EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE: May 2017

REFERENCES:

Professor *Luis Garicano*
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Sir John Hicks Professor *John Sutton*
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DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:

Primary Fields: Industrial Organization, Organizational Economics.

Secondary Fields: Labor Economics, Political Economy.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

Only LSE

2016	EC 201 Microeconomics Principles (Undergraduate).
2014,2016	EC 341 Industrial Organization and Introduction to Competition Policy (Undergraduate).
2013-2015	EC 400 Introductory Course in Mathematics and Statistics (Graduate).
2013-2014	MG 430 Strategy, Organization and Innovation (Graduate).
2012-2014	EC 313 Industrial Economics (Undergraduate).

I have taught Microeconomic Theory, Mathematical Economics and Industrial Organization, among other courses, in Colombian Universities. For more information, see [here](#). For the most recent teaching evaluation see [here](#).

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD:

2015-present	Project Officer, Executive Global Master in Management (LSE).
2015-present	Teaching Fellow, Department of Economics (LSE).
2013-2014	Research Assistant, Professor Luis Garicano and Professor Luis Rayo.
2009-2010	Adjunct Professor, Department of Economics (UniAndes)

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS:

2015-2017	LSE Teaching Fellowship.
2016	Best Research Paper Award, IOEA.
2016	STICERD Research Grant.
2016	IOEA Full Scholarship.
2011-2015	LSE Economics Department Scholarship.
2014	Price Theory Scholar, University of Chicago.
2014	Full Scholarship for 25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory.
2014	Nominated for LSESU Student Led Teaching Excellence Award.
2013	RES-York Summer School Award.
2013	Scholarship for University of Chicago Price Theory Summer Camp.
2011-2013	Colfuturo Scholarship.
2012	SSME Full Fellowship, Centro di Ricerca Matematica Ennio De Giorgi.
2010	Scholarship for 1SPSAS, Game Theory Society.
2009	Most Promising Alumni Award, USTA.
2009	LACEA-LAMES Scholarship.
2009	X JOLATE Scholarship.
1998-2008	10 years Colombian Government Scholarship for under and graduate studies.
2007	SSPD Research Grant.
2004	Full Tuition Merit Award, USTA.
2003	Dean's list, USTA.
1995	Colombian Mathematical Olympiad Honorable mention.

COMPLETED PAPERS

Job Market Paper:

[Sourcing of Expertise and the Boundaries of the Firm: The Case of Lobbyists](#)

This paper proposes and tests a theory of vertical integration with knowledge workers. Outsourcing allows firms to solve hard problems at the cost of transmitting firm-specific knowledge. By hiring someone internally, firms save on these communication costs, with the downside of incurring costs of acquiring knowledge. Exploiting the increasing returns to the use of knowledge implies conducting easy and frequent activities in-house and harder and less frequent tasks in the external market. The economy saves communication costs when firms with large firm-specific knowledge conduct activities in-house. I confirm the empirical validity of this theory using data from a knowledge-intensive industry: US Federal Lobbying. First, using information at both the industry and bill levels, I validate the main theoretical predictions using client fixed-effects estimations. Second, I exploit the 2010 BP oil spill as an exogenous increase in the difficulty of the lobbying activities for the oil and gas extracting industry, and I show it led to a disproportionate increase in the use of external lobbyists for the affected industry. Lastly, I argue that the 2007 Open Government Act modified both the distribution of problems that firms faced and the technology to acquire knowledge. Estimating the underlying parameters of the integration decision, I explain how these two changes modified the integration patterns of the industry.

This paper received the 2016 IOEA First Prize Award.

Published Papers:

[Representations and Identities for Homogeneous Technologies](#), *The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics*, with H. Vallejo & P. Bonaldi, Vol. 9: Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 29, 2009.

Using up to nine different ways to represent homogeneous technologies with decreasing returns to scale, this article presents and proves identities between those different representations of such technologies, outlining the homogeneity properties of each representation. These identities, which allow to shift from one representation of a technology to another -- and which are summarized in a matrix of identities -- can be useful since they provide a tool to obtain explicit functional forms for homogeneous technologies. They can also be useful to simplify computational procedures when different representations of a technology are needed. Finally, the article also refers explicitly to some aspects of producer theory that are often neglected or treated in a marginal way in the literature, such as the inverse supply, the non-conditional cost and the inverse input demands functions.

[Identities for Homogeneous Utility Functions](#), *Economics Bulletin*, with J. Prada, Vol. 32 No. 3 pp. 2026-2034, 2012.

Using a homogeneous and continuous utility function to represent household's preferences, we show explicit algebraic ways to go from the indirect utility function to the expenditure function and from the Marshallian demand to the Hicksian demand and vice versa, without the need of any other function. This greatly simplifies the integrability problem, avoiding the use of differential equations. In order to get this result, we prove explicit identities between most of the different objects that arise from the utility maximization and the expenditure minimization problems.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

Market Structure and Lobbying: Rides are not free, perhaps they are just cheap.

The collective action literature predicts that agents belonging to groups with fewer members exert more effort. Using both US federal and state level lobbying data, I provide empirical evidence at odds with this prediction: holding constant industries' size, more concentrated industries spend less on lobbying. I explain this puzzle by introducing an excludability component in the returns to the lobbying activities.

Routineness and Vertical Integration: Incentives and Increasing Returns to the use of Knowledge.

Routine tasks tend to have two characteristics with respect to non-routine tasks: 1.They are less knowledge-intensive and 2. Their performance is easier to measure. Multi-tasking theories predict that firms should outsource easier-to-measure tasks and keep in-house difficult-to-measure tasks. In my JM paper, I show that firms should outsource knowledge-intensive activities and conduct easy activities in-house. In this paper, I provide a model that joins these two previous insights and I predict under which circumstances routine tasks should be outsourced as opposed to being conducted in-house.

Violence against Civilians in a Two-way Irregular Conflict, with Luis Martinez (UChicago)

Paramilitaries (non-state counterinsurgent groups) are a common feature in many internal conflicts. In this paper, we argue that paramilitarism is a technological solution to the problem posed by insurgent groups waging an unconventional war. We propose a two-sided model of tactical choice to study how the counterinsurgent's choice between military forces (which are more effective in a conventional conflict) and paramilitary forces (which can target civilians in an unconventional conflict) responds to - and affects - a potential rebel group's choice over peace, conventional war or unconventional war. We use sub-national data from Colombia to provide empirical evidence in support of the main predictions of the model.

Pollsters' Political Slant, with Oleg Rubanov (UBonn)

We theoretically study the effect of opinion polls on election outcomes. The electorate's voting behavior can be influenced by opinion polls. Opinion polls are conducted and reported by pollsters, who care about their reputation and political preferences. We study how pollsters modify opinion poll results to alter politicians' chances of winning.

WORKING PAPERS (SELECTED)

This is a not-extensive list of old working papers. For a full list see [here](#).

An Analysis of the Concordance of Journal Rankings in Economics, with Javier Birchenall (UCSB).

Research on measuring journals' quality has focused on the construction of rankings. We show that under several scenarios, it is more important the sample of journals than the methodology to rank them.

The use of Mathematics in Economics and its Effect on Scholars Academic Career, MPRA Paper 41363 with C. Rondon (UND) and M. Romero (UCSD).

Building a novel database, we provide statistical evidence on both the mathematization of the Economics science and the effect of the use of mathematics on the likelihood of being awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics.

Selected Blog Appearances: [DaveGiles](#), [Pieria](#), [MostlyEconomics](#), [Quartz](#), [EconomicLogic](#).

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Referee: RAND Journal of Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization (IJIO), European Economic Review, Journal of Mathematical Economics, B.E Journal of Theoretical Economics, LABOUR.

Summer Schools: Summer School of Mathematics for Economics and Social Sciences (2012), University of Chicago Price Theory Summer Camp (2013), Royal Economic Society Summer School on Game Theory (2013), 25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory (2014).

LANGUAGES AND COMPUTER SKILLS

Languages: Spanish: Mother tongue, English: Fluent.

Experienced IT: MS Office, LaTeX, Stata, Eviews, SPSS, UltraEdit-32, MatLab, Python and R.

Basic IT: Mathematica, CrystalBall.