Collusion and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Andrew J. Coe
University of Southern California

Jane Vaynman*
George Washington University

Abstract

We develop and test a theory of the origins and enforcement of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, based on a game-theoretic model of proliferation. The theory synthesizes the popular, but incomplete, views of the regime as either a grand bargain or a cartel. Widespread nonproliferation is only possible if the superpowers collude to coerce some states into compliance, as in the cartel view; but this enforcement is only affordable if most states voluntarily comply under a grand bargain. The necessary collusion arises from the superpowers’ early experience of proliferation and its disruptive effects on intra-alliance politics. We document explicit collusion in the negotiation and enforcement of the NPT, and find support for the theory’s predictions in a dataset of superpower reactions to states’ failure to join or comply with the NPT during the Cold War. Our theory implies that the regime has substantially reduced proliferation, in contrast to previous studies’ findings.

*We thank Jeffry Frieden, Alastair Iain Johnston, Scott Sagan, and participants of the 2008 Comparative Foreign and Security Policy Workshop, the 2009 Research Workshop in International Relations at Harvard University, and the 2013 Nuclear Studies Research Initiative Workshop for their comments on earlier drafts. We are especially grateful to Francis Gavin for pointing us to several relevant sources that we had missed. We also thank the Stanton Foundation for its support of this research through its Nuclear Security Fellowships, and the Council on Foreign Relations for hosting the authors during their fellowships. Any errors remain the authors’ responsibility.
Introduction

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) requires of most of its members a remarkable concession of sovereignty: they must eschew a highly effective means of self-defense, in exchange for relatively modest benefits. And yet, over the course of the Cold War, more than 130 states signed the treaty, none left it despite an article enabling them to do so easily, and almost all abided by it. What accounts for this remarkable success?

Recently, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria are alleged to have pursued nuclear weapons in violation of their treaty commitments. Attempts to strengthen the larger nonproliferation regime in response have sometimes failed. Policy-makers’ responses to these setbacks ought to be informed by an understanding of why they have occurred and how they might be most effectively dealt with. In turn, explaining these setbacks would be easier if we understood why the nonproliferation regime was established and why it apparently worked so well during the Cold War.

To this end, we develop and test a theory of the origins and enforcement of the nonproliferation regime, based on our analysis of a game-theoretic model of proliferation and its effects on international politics. Our model implies that widespread nonproliferation could only be possible if the superpowers colluded to enforce it. Their enforcement would be effective because of the power and influence they possessed over most other states; collusion would be necessary because otherwise one superpower might exploit and undermine the other’s attempt to stop an aspirant.\(^1\)

Despite the ability of the superpowers to enforce nonproliferation, we show that their willingness to do so depends critically on their perceptions of the consequences of proliferation. The origins of the regime can then be traced to a shift in these perceptions documented by

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\(^1\)We use “collusion” rather than “cooperation” throughout the paper because, as we will document, the superpowers came to this understanding in private and sometimes acted to disguise it in public, and because, as we will explain, their cooperation was designed to come at the expense of certain states.
historians. Initially, each superpower saw the spread of nuclear weapons to certain of its own clients as a way to strengthen its side against the other’s. Our model demonstrates that the superpowers cannot collude to enforce nonproliferation while they hold these views. In time, experience taught the superpowers that states could also substitute nuclear weapons for their patronage, and subsequently gain autonomy. We show that, under the right conditions, this revised conception can motivate the superpowers to jointly try to stop proliferation.

These conditions are that the necessary enforcement cannot be too expensive for the superpowers, and that the monitoring of states’ nuclear programs and of the superpowers’ own fidelity to collusion must be reliable enough. We argue that enforcement is affordable only if many states support nonproliferation and do not have to be coerced into compliance with it, and, consistent with this requirement, we document that many states did freely join the regime. Under this theory, the NPT’s roles are to bolster the superpowers’ monitoring abilities, to signal that the needed enforcement will be modest, and to coordinate states’ expectations and behavior on nonproliferation, rather than the widespread proliferation that might otherwise result.

We proceed to test three observable implications of our theory. First, we should actually observe the superpowers colluding with each other on nonproliferation concerns, and pressing each other to uphold their side of collusion. We examine the declassified record of private superpower interactions, both during the NPT negotiations and on occasions when a new nuclear aspirant surfaced, and find ample evidence of the expected collusion.

Second, the superpowers should apply pressure as needed to induce states to join the NPT. We present a new dataset of all those states judged by the superpowers to be at risk of pursuing nuclear weapons, with information on the measures (if any) the superpowers used to pressure these states to join the treaty. Consistent with the theory, though the superpowers’ efforts were not always successful, they generally applied pressure when states did not join the treaty, and we found no evidence of any attempt by either superpower to
undermine the other’s pressure.

Third, upon discovering a state’s nuclear weapons program, the superpowers should attempt to coerce that state back into compliance. We present data on all known cases in which a state’s possible transgression was detected, measure the superpowers’ responses to these cases, and also assess instances in which a superpower assisted such a nuclear aspirant state or exploited the other’s pressure. The data generally support the theory: in most cases, the superpowers intervened forcefully to correct errant states. In no case did a superpower assist a state with a nuclear weapons program, and we again found no evidence of any attempt by either superpower to undermine the other’s pressure.

We are aware of two other general theories of the nonproliferation regime and the NPT. The “cartel” theory holds that the nuclear haves coerced or bribed the nuclear have-nots into nonproliferation in order to maintain their nuclear oligopoly and preeminence (Swango, 2009; Verdier, 2008). The more common “grand bargain” theory argues that the NPT represents a deal between the nuclear haves and have-nots, wherein the former offered promises of nuclear energy assistance and eventual nuclear disarmament in exchange for the latter promising not to seek nuclear weapons (Weiss, 2012).²

Neither theory is in accord with the evidence we present. If the cartel theory is right, then the superpowers should have had to coerce many more states than the few in our dataset— why would so many states willingly go along with an instrument that only served to hold them down? If the grand bargain theory is right, many more nuclear have-nots should have attempted to defect from the nonproliferation regime, since the nuclear haves were widely viewed as reneging on their promises to disarm and facilitate access to nuclear energy.

Moreover, each of these views leaves important questions unanswered. Given that coercing states into nonproliferation would be costly, why would the superpowers do it? If the

²Our formulation appears consistent with the way the grand bargain is usually discussed, but a precise definition of it is rarely offered in the literature, and we are unsure of the original author(s) of this theory.
benefits of enforcing nonproliferation were worth the costs, why did the superpowers not do it sooner, before China and France had obtained nuclear weapons? Alternatively, how exactly would the grand bargain be enforced, should some nuclear have-not decide it favored obtaining nuclear weapons, even at the cost of access to nuclear energy assistance?

Our theory provides a synthesis of the cartel and grand bargain views that is consistent with the evidence and that answers these questions. Most states voluntarily adhered to the regime because they preferred widespread nonproliferation to widespread proliferation, in line with the grand bargain theory. The few that would have risked widespread proliferation in order to get their own nuclear weapons were prevented by the superpowers from “spoiling” the regime, in line with the cartel theory. But the superpowers were willing to collude and bear the costs of enforcement only because there were relatively few spoilers that had to be coerced, and only belatedly, once they had realized that widespread proliferation would be injurious to their interests.

An important implication of our theory is that the nonproliferation regime substantially reduced proliferation, relative to what would have occurred in its absence (that is, the absence of collusive superpower enforcement). Recent analyses of states’ decisions whether to seek nuclear weapons find that the regime has had little or no effect (Sagan, 2011). However, these findings may derive from the use of inappropriate measures of the regime, such as whether a state is a member of the NPT or the proportion of states that are NPT members. Our theory implies that the appropriate measure is instead to compare proliferation before and after the regime’s establishment. While our evidence is not conclusive on the efficacy of the regime, it renders a judgment of “no effect” difficult to sustain.

The next section describes our theory and elaborates on its synthesis of previous views. We then turn to the empirical evidence and the results of our tests. The final section discusses the broader implications of our results.
A Theory of the Nonproliferation Regime

We will first describe the assumptions of the model we use to formalize states’ interactions over proliferation. We then establish the conditions for a nonproliferation regime to exist in equilibrium, showing that it must entail the superpowers colluding to stop certain states from getting nuclear weapons. These conditions enable us to synthesize the cartel and grand bargain views of the NPT, to explain why the NPT came about when it did, and finally to elucidate the specific roles it plays in the viability of the nonproliferation regime. Proofs of the propositions can be found in the online appendix.

Model Setup

Two superpowers $US$ and $SU$ and a finite set of other states $S$, which includes clients of the United States ($S_{US} \subset S$) and of the Soviet Union ($S_{SU} \subset S$), interact repeatedly over time. In the first period, all of the states simultaneously decide whether to initiate a nuclear weapons program, and the period ends. In the next and all future periods, a state’s choice to start a program in the last period is revealed with probability $\sigma$. Each superpower then simultaneously decides whether to allow each revealed state (if there is any) to continue its program, paying a cost $c > 0$ for each state it tries to stop. A superpower’s choice to allow a state to continue is revealed with probability $\tau$, but is otherwise known only to the superpower and that state. All of the states that do not currently have an ongoing nuclear weapons program then simultaneously decide whether to start one. If any state began a program in the previous period, and it went undetected in this period, or was detected but either superpower chose to allow it, then its program now succeeds and that state is observed to acquire nuclear weapons, which it retains permanently. If instead both superpowers tried to stop the state, then its program ends and the state loses the value of the resources invested. 

\footnote{We assume that either all states’ programs are revealed, or none of them are, in a given period. This simplifies the conditions for equilibrium but does not qualitatively alter the results.}
in it, worth \( d > 0 \). Payoffs are realized and the period ends.

The structure of the game assumes that the superpowers—and only the superpowers—are capable of stopping a state that has chosen to seek nuclear weapons from getting them.\(^4\) This capability derives from the unique power and influence the superpowers wield over other nations. Each can more easily detect and more severely punish a proliferant than any non-superpower or even group of such states, and at lower relative cost. Each is capable of persuading or compelling many other states to support a proliferant’s punishment, rendering it even more severe. This capability would be most formidable when dealing with each superpower’s own clients: preferential trade arrangements, diplomatic support, assistance with nuclear technology, transfers of arms, stationing of the superpower’s own forces in-country, and even guarantees of security could all be ended as punishment for seeking nuclear weapons. The empirical record of superpower attempts to stop proliferation, described in the next section, shows that the threat of these punishments was usually effective.

However, the game’s structure also presumes that neither superpower can stop proliferation unilaterally. The same power and influence that makes a superpower a superb punisher also renders it uniquely able to undermine other states’ attempts at punishment. A superpower can replace much of what a state might lose due to other states’ attempts to punish it, whether markets for trade, diplomatic recognition, arms transfers, or even a security guarantee. It could assist the proliferant with its nuclear programs or even defend it from preventive attack. Even if a state’s punishment came at the hands of its patron superpower, the other superpower could simply offer its own services to the newly-needy state and thereby replace its former patron. Thus, the superpowers must collude if a state is to be stopped from getting nuclear weapons.

A state seeking nuclear weapons, and a superpower enabling it to do so, would obviously

\(^4\)The results of our analysis would not be qualitatively different if we instead allowed for both superpowers’ efforts to fail, as long as such failures were rare.
have strong incentives to conceal their actions, so as to prevent others from reacting adversely. The possibility that these might go undetected is why the states’ and the superpowers’ decisions are each treated as simultaneous, and revealed only with some probability. Each state must decide whether to pursue nuclear weapons, not knowing whether other states are at that moment choosing to do so. It might learn of another state’s program before it succeeds, giving it a chance to react accordingly, or it might remain in the dark until that state’s program succeeded and it revealed the new capability. Similarly, a superpower must react to the discovery of a state’s program, not knowing how the other superpower is reacting.

All players discount the future by $\delta > 0$, and all payoffs are common knowledge. Let $S^t_N$ be the set of states that have nuclear weapons at the end of period $t$. The per-period payoff of each state $j \in S$ is $v_j(S^t_N)$. We assume that, for any $j \in S$, $T \subset S$, and $k \neq j$, $v_j(T) \geq v_j(T \cup \{k\})$: for any given state, the spread of nuclear weapons to other states is (weakly) bad. We also make the following “breakdown” assumption: if any state gets nuclear weapons, and the superpowers will not collude to prevent any other state from following, then all states that do not have nuclear weapons will seek them immediately, and $S_N = S$ will be the unique equilibrium outcome. In effect, if proliferation gets started and is not stopped, then it will snowball.\textsuperscript{5} This nuclear domino theory was and is widely believed, at least among US policymakers, and there is now substantial evidence for it (Miller, 2014).

The per-period payoffs of the superpowers are $v_{US} = p(S^t_N) + \alpha [i(S^t_N) - l_{US}(S^t_N)]$ and $v_{SU} = -p(S^t_N) + \alpha [-i(S^t_N) - l_{SU}(S^t_N)]$. These payoffs represent the two different effects that proliferation can have on the superpowers’ interests, termed inter- and intra-alliance effects, with the importance of the latter relative to the former governed by $\alpha$. First, proliferation may alter the balance of power between the two superpowers’ alliances, represented by $p(\cdot)$.

\textsuperscript{5}Assuming that this snowballing will not end until all states have nuclear weapons simplifies the exposition, but the results would be qualitatively the same if instead a subset of states could refrain from seeking nuclear weapons even as all others acquired them.
Because nuclear-armed clients would be militarily stronger, the spread of nuclear weapons to a superpower’s clients might strengthen its side relative to the other superpower’s. The change in the sign of $p(\cdot)$ between the two superpowers reflects the fact that what strengthens one side’s relative power must weaken the other’s. We assume that, for any $T \subset S$ and $j \notin T$, $p(T \cup \{j\}) \geq p(T)$ if $j \in S_{US}$, and $p(T \cup \{j\}) \leq p(T)$ if $j \in S_{SU}$. In other words, the spread of nuclear weapons to one superpower’s ally (weakly) shifts the inter-alliance balance of power in that superpower’s favor.

The second effect of proliferation is to alter the balance of power within each superpower’s alliance, represented by the bracketed terms in the superpowers’ payoffs. A client that got nuclear weapons would no longer need to rely so heavily on its superpower patron, as its nuclear arms would be at least a partial substitute for a patron’s protection. Thus, a nuclear-armed client might be more assertive of its interests within the alliance or seek more autonomy from it. On the one hand, the patron’s loss of influence over a newly nuclear-armed client would be good for the other superpower, who would face a less-cohesive opposing alliance and possibly find common interests with the erstwhile client. This is represented by $i(\cdot)$, which can be thought of as the total US influence over all states with respect to issues where US and Soviet interests are directly opposed. The sign of $i(\cdot)$ changes between the superpowers because one’s loss of influence on such issues must be the other’s gain. We assume that, for any $T \subset S$ and $j \notin T$, $i(T \cup \{j\}) \leq i(T)$ if $j \in S_{US}$, and $i(T \cup \{j\}) \geq i(T)$ if $j \in S_{SU}$. That is, the spread of nuclear weapons to one superpower’s ally is (weakly) bad for that superpower and (weakly) good for the other, as the newly autonomous ally may act less consistently with the interests of its patron superpower and more consistently with those of the other superpower.

On the other hand, the patron’s loss of influence is not fully recouped by the other superpower, because newly autonomous clients might pursue interests that neither superpower supports. Proliferation can thus shift influence, not just from one superpower to the other,
but from the superpowers to the other states. This possibility is represented by the functions $l_{US}(\cdot)$ and $l_{SU}(\cdot)$, which can be thought of as each superpower’s loss of influence over nuclear-armed states on issues where the superpowers’ interests are not opposed. For any $T \subset S$ and $j \notin T$, $l_{US}(T \cup \{j\}) \geq l_{US}(T)$ and $l_{SU}(T \cup \{j\}) \geq l_{SU}(T)$, so that these losses (weakly) grow as nuclear weapons spread to more states.

For convenience, we normalize $p(\emptyset)$, $i(\emptyset)$, $l_{US}(\emptyset)$, and $l_{SU}(\emptyset)$ to zero. We also assume that $p(S) = i(S) = 0$ and $l_{US}(S) = l_{SU}(S)$. This means that, if proliferation goes from zero to universal, the many resulting gains and losses in power and competitive influence for each superpower will cancel out, and each will suffer the same loss of non-competitive influence.

**Collusion and Nonproliferation**

To analyze the model, we first present the conditions under which widespread nonproliferation is in equilibrium. We then discuss how these conditions relate to the grand bargain and cartel views of the nonproliferation regime. The conditions then allow us to explain why the NPT was not established earlier and the ways in which it bolsters the regime.

We look for a universal nonproliferation equilibrium, in which no state seeks nuclear weapons. The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, but with one additional refinement. We require that no individual state has an incentive to deviate from nonproliferation, as is standard, but also that no coalition of states drawn from $S$ and either superpower has an incentive to deviate together. A regime that managed to keep individual states in line, but could not prevent a concerted breakout by a group of willing “spoilers,” possibly aided by a superpower, would not last long. Let $S^1$ be composed of every state $j \in S$ such that $v_j(j) + \delta [\sigma v_j(S) + (1 - \sigma)v_j(j)] + \frac{\delta^2}{1 - \delta} v_j(S) \geq \frac{1}{1 - \delta} v_j(\emptyset)$. As we will explain, $S^1$ is the set of potential spoilers.

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6The conditions for an equilibrium in which some subset of states adheres to nonproliferation, while the rest get nuclear weapons, are qualitatively the same as those we present here.
Proposition 1. There is a universal nonproliferation equilibrium if and only if, for all $j \in S^1$, $T \subset S^1$, and $a \in \{US, SU\}$:

1. $\sigma d \geq (1 - \sigma) \left[ (1 + \delta)v_j(j) + \frac{\delta^2}{1 - \delta}v_j(S) - \frac{1}{1 - \delta}v_j(\emptyset) \right]$;

2. $\frac{1}{1 - \delta}v_a(\emptyset) - |T|c \geq v_a(T) + \delta (1 - \tau)^{|T|}v_a(T) + \delta \left[ 1 - (1 - \tau)^{|T|} \right] v_a(S) + \frac{\delta^2}{1 - \delta}v_a(S)$.

If this equilibrium exists, it is enforced by superpower collusion.

Under this equilibrium, each state is deterred from seeking nuclear weapons in one of two ways. First, most states are deterred by the fact that their acquisition of nuclear arms would lead to the breakdown of the nonproliferation regime, leading other states to seek weapons. For these states, the resultant widespread proliferation would be worse than abiding by the nonproliferation regime, even if it meant giving up the chance to be the first, and temporarily the only, state to acquire nuclear weapons.

However, other states—the spoilers—have the opposite preference. These states would actually prefer seeking nuclear weapons, even if all other states followed, to complying with the nonproliferation regime along with the other states. This preference is formalized in the condition defining $S^1$. The right side is the value of abiding by the regime, while the left side is the value of cheating on it: the spoiler enjoys sole possession of nuclear weapons temporarily, but eventually all other states get nuclear weapons as well.

Obviously, the spoilers cannot be deterred from seeking weapons by the threat of the regime’s subsequent breakdown, since they actually prefer this outcome. Instead they are deterred by the prospect that, if they seek nuclear weapons and are detected, the superpowers will collude to stop them, so that the resources invested in a nuclear program will be lost. In condition 1 above, the left side is the expected cost of pursuing nuclear weapons (sacrificing the investment $d$ if caught and stopped), while the right side is the expected benefit of going undetected and getting nuclear weapons, over and above the value received from abiding by
the regime. Thus, this condition specifies that, for any spoiler, the expected cost of cheating on the regime outweighs the expected benefit.

These spoilers are not just a theoretical possibility. India sought nuclear weapons despite surely knowing Pakistan would follow and preferring that it not; it is hard to believe that North Korea would have been deterred from pursuing nuclear weapons if it thought that South Korea, or any other countries, would get them in response. In a counterfactual world without superpower enforcement of nonproliferation, it is easy to imagine other spoilers. For instance, West Germany, which had to contend with the massive conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact and the uncertain reliability of its US security guarantee, might have resorted to nuclear arms, in spite of the likelihood that other European states would follow.

For their part, the superpowers enforce nonproliferation because the cost of doing so is outweighed by the losses they will suffer from widespread proliferation should they shirk. For each possible set of willing spoilers, and each superpower, condition 2 above requires that the superpower’s value of enforcing the regime at least equal its value of shirking, wherein the superpower allows the set of spoilers to get nuclear weapons, but soon faces proliferation by the other states.⁷

This result synthesizes the grand bargain and cartel views of the nonproliferation regime, and also exposes the flaws of each view when considered on its own. The grand bargain envisions a set of states that agree to eschew nuclear weapons so long as other states do so, too (whether now, or only eventually in the case of the acknowledged nuclear-weapon states). And indeed, this is an apt description of the way the equilibrium looks from the point of view of the non-spoiler states. These states prefer nonproliferation to widespread proliferation, are willing to give up weapons themselves to support the former, and will renege only if other states cheat on the bargain. These states abide by the regime voluntarily, rather than being

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⁷Note that this nonproliferation regime is the least demanding one possible for the superpowers, because they are only required to stop spoilers caught pursuing nuclear weapons. Requiring the superpowers to also stop non-spoilers that are detected pursuing nuclear weapons would make condition 2 more stringent.
coerced into compliance by the superpowers. However, this in itself is not enough to make the regime viable. In the absence of superpower enforcement, the spoiler states would seek nuclear weapons, and in response other states would pursue nuclear weapons, and yet more states would acquire weapons in response to these, so that proliferation would eventually be widespread. The grand bargain is thus not robust to spoilers.

To make the regime—and the underlying grand bargain among the non-spoilers—viable, the spoilers must be coerced into nonproliferation so that it is safe for the non-spoilers to abide by their bargain. From the spoilers’ point of view then, the nonproliferation equilibrium looks much more like the cartel: the superpowers collude to strong-arm these states into the regime. The flaw in the cartel view is that because this enforcement is expensive for the superpowers, it is only worth doing if, by coercing just a few states, the superpowers can make nonproliferation among a much wider set of states possible. Thus, the superpowers are willing to form a cartel only because many states needn’t be strong-armed into nonproliferation at all. In short, the cartel is needed to render the grand bargain robust to spoilers, and the grand bargain is needed to make the cartel affordable.

The Origins and Roles of the NPT

We first discuss the origins of the NPT in a shift in the superpowers’ perceptions of the effects of proliferation. We then explain how the NPT itself affects the underlying parameters that govern the viability of a nonproliferation regime. This in turn leads to the observable implications of our theory that are tested in the subsequent section. But first we need a result that makes explicit how the viability of the regime is affected by the various parameters of our model.

**Proposition 2.** The nonproliferation equilibrium only exists if $\alpha$, $\sigma$ are high enough and $c$ is low enough, and is more likely to exist if $\tau$ is higher and $|S^1|$ is lower.
Recall that $\alpha$ governs the importance of the intra-alliance effects (a superpower loses influence over a nuclear-armed client) relative to the inter-alliance effects (a superpower’s side gets stronger with nuclear-armed clients) of proliferation. In the limiting case where $\alpha = 0$, there are no intra-alliance effects, and proliferation simply increases one side’s power and decreases the other’s by the same amount, so that proliferation is zero-sum. Then for any set of states that get nuclear weapons, one superpower will be left at least equally well off by this proliferation. This superpower will be unwilling to pay the costs of enforcing nonproliferation against these states, and anticipating this, the other superpower will not try either, since enforcement would fail without the first superpower’s help. So, if proliferation is zero-sum, neither superpower will ever enforce nonproliferation in equilibrium.

As $\alpha$ rises from zero, proliferation has increasingly important intra-alliance effects. Because one superpower’s loss of influence over a nuclear-armed client is not fully recouped by the other, proliferation becomes increasingly negative-sum. Now, if nuclear weapons spread far enough, both superpowers could be left worse off because of their net loss of influence. Once $\alpha$ gets high enough, the anticipated joint loss of influence from proliferation will outweigh the costs of stopping it, and the superpowers will become willing to institute a non-proliferation regime. Essentially, $\alpha$ controls the size of the net benefits to the superpowers from nonproliferation.

The superpowers’ perceived value of $\alpha$ changed over the course of the early Cold War, explaining why the regime was not instantiated until the late 1960s. In principle, the superpowers could have pushed the NPT forward as early as the 1950s, once both had nuclear weapons and established alliances, and thus something potentially to lose from further proliferation. However, until well into the 1960s, each superpower instead saw substantial advantages to be gained from selective proliferation to certain of their clients. The US perceived nuclear cooperation and weapons-sharing with its European allies as a valuable counter to the USSR’s superior conventional forces, and these initiatives were prioritized over nonpro-
liferation (Brands, 2007). As late as the mid-1960s, the US interest in sharing weapons with West Germany in the form of the Multi-Lateral Force (MLF), adamantly opposed by the Soviets, was an important obstacle to creating the nonproliferation regime (Brands, 2007). High-level US officials also privately advocated the consideration of giving weapons to India and Japan, reasoning that this would help to balance the threat from nuclear-armed China (U.S. Department of State, 1964). For its part, the USSR greatly facilitated China’s development of the bomb in the 1950s, providing expertise, materials, and even building a model weapon intended for China to copy (Timerbaev, 1999). In short, both superpowers focused on the inter- as opposed to intra-alliance effects of proliferation, suggesting they perceived the importance of the latter (that is, $\alpha$) to be low.

The experience of dealing with newly nuclear—and newly obstreperous—allies led the superpowers to reassess the intra-alliance effects of proliferation, raising their perceived value of $\alpha$. The estrangement of China from the USSR allowed the US to play one against the other, while the ructions France generated in NATO were surely to the USSR’s liking. However, after ending its alliance with the USSR, China proselytized for a more radical version of communist ideology that neither superpower favored, while France sought to preserve control over its remaining colonies against both superpowers’ desires for colonial independence. In the US, elites increasingly recognized that nonproliferation was needed to limit the superpowers’ joint loss of influence. High-level deliberations after China’s nuclear test led to the US dropping its support for the MLF in favor of establishing a nonproliferation regime (Brands, 2007). A similar evolution of views took place in the Soviet Union (Potter, 1985). With both superpowers weighing the intra-alliance effects of proliferation more heavily, both became more willing to pay the costs of enforcement under a nonproliferation regime, and so the NPT was agreed. Thus, the increase in $\alpha$ explains the origins of the NPT.

The NPT contributes to the viability of the incipient nonproliferation regime by affecting several of the model’s parameters. First, the inspections which non-nuclear signatories are
required to accept increase the chance that a covert nuclear weapons program will be detected and subsequently stopped (raising $\sigma$). This decreases the willingness of spoilers to try to cheat under the regime, and thus also renders enforcement cheaper for the superpowers. Second, the same inspections also make it easier to catch a superpower surreptitiously helping a state with its program or simply allowing it to proceed (increasing $\tau$). This increases the willingness of each superpower to enforce nonproliferation, secure in the knowledge that the other superpower is doing its part and thus that their efforts will be effective, and decreases the temptation to enable favored states to get nuclear weapons. Third, the willingness of non-nuclear states to sign the NPT, and thus voluntarily subject themselves to better monitoring, reveals that most states are not spoilers. This lowers the superpowers’ perceived costs of enforcing the regime (by decreasing $|S^1|$), because it enables the superpowers to confirm that only a few holdouts will have to be strong-armed into nonproliferation. And finally, the NPT served as a device to coordinate all states on the nonproliferation equilibrium, rather than the widespread proliferation that might otherwise result. By leading non-spoilers to expect nonproliferation to be upheld, it rendered them more willing to contribute to the superpowers’ efforts to enforce the regime, lowering the costs of enforcement ($c$).

Our theory of the nonproliferation regime, and the origins and roles of the NPT within it, offers at least three observable implications. First, our model assumes that collusion between the superpowers is central to the regime’s establishment and enforcement, so the first implication is that this collusion should have taken place, during negotiations over the regime and in reactions to states’ noncompliance with the regime. Second, the theory implies that the superpowers have strong incentives to collude to pressure the other states into joining the NPT. If a state refused to join, it would increase the difficulty of catching it pursuing nuclear weapons covertly, undermine the willingness of other states to join and comply with the treaty, and thereby increase the superpowers’ costs of enforcing the regime. Third, and most obviously, the superpowers should collude to stop any signatory that is
revealed to be (potentially) pursuing nuclear weapons, as doing otherwise would lead to the breakdown of the regime. We test these implications against the historical record in the next section.

**Empirical Tests**

In this section we test three observable implications of our theory. Looking at archival and secondary sources, we evaluate the history of nonproliferation-related interactions between the superpowers, of superpower responses to those states that hesitated to join the NPT, and finally of superpower responses to suspicions of nuclear weapons programs in various states. We also demonstrate that neither the grand bargain nor the cartel theory can account for the evidence on its own. Extensive documentation of our sources, the set of cases we employ, and our coding of data is available in the online appendix.

**Evidence of Collusion in Superpower Interactions**

Our theory holds that once the superpowers have come to realize the full consequences of proliferation, they will begin colluding to establish and maintain the nonproliferation regime. While we do not expect this collusion to be explicit in all cases, a total absence of observable collusion would call our theory into question. We examined declassified documentation of private meetings between the superpowers during episodes particularly relevant to nonproliferation: the NPT negotiations, and later instances when certain states came under suspicion of pursuing nuclear weapons. As we will describe, we found ample evidence that when the superpowers discussed proliferation issues, they did so in collusive terms.

*Collusion in NPT Negotiations*

The US and the Soviet Union had numerous disputes in negotiating the NPT, and the
process was at times seriously stalled due to their disagreements (Brands, 2007). However, when it came to dealing with other states, their discussions became remarkably cooperative.

First, the superpowers sought to coordinate their mutual efforts to corral states into the treaty. In a November 1967 meeting between ACDA Director William C. Foster and Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, each side calls for flexibility on specific treaty language, but then expresses ongoing mutual concern over whether key states would sign, as well as measures the superpowers were undertaking to promote their signature (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1967). In a later meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasili Kuznetsov “urged that the US do everything it could to bring the Latin Americans into line... The Secretary said that we would do everything that we could on an urgent basis” (U.S. Department of State, 1968a). Throughout this meeting, the US and Soviet representatives essentially report on their assessment of the prospects for signature among their respective allies: Japan and Latin American countries in the case of the US; Romania and some African countries in the case of the Soviet Union (U.S. Department of State, 1968a). In October 1968, after the NPT was opened for signature, senior US and Soviet officials exchanged explicit assessments of whether Japan, Brazil, Argentina and India would sign, and expressed hopes that the other superpower would use its leverage to cajole the holdouts (U.S. Department of State, 1968b).

Next, the US and USSR worked together to control the process of the treaty negotiations. Drafts of the Treaty were prepared privately by the superpowers before being presented to other states (Swango, 2014). Upon nearing the final stages of the negotiations, US and Soviet representatives privately agreed on ways to deal with attempts by other states to change the draft. These representatives jointly determined that only changes which could “get significantly wider adherence to the Treaty” and “not affect basic substance” would be seriously considered from that point on (U.S. Department of State, 1968a).

Finally, the superpowers often presented a united front to the rest of the international
community, and this evidence of their collusion did not go unnoticed by other states. For example, Soviet and US delegations regularly compared and coordinated their strategies on nonproliferation discussions at the UN General Assembly (Quester, 1981, 228). While the superpowers attempted to keep their cooperation private, it was often noted and criticized by other states. Numerous states, including US and Soviet allies, decried the treaty’s discriminatory nature, referring not to the official discrimination between nuclear haves and have-nots, but to the US-Soviet hegemony they saw the regime as entrenching. The now-declassified evidence shows that these critiques were well warranted.8

Collusion in Response to Suspected Nuclear Weapons Programs

We also found instances of explicit US-Soviet collusion in responding to suspicious nuclear activity by another state. In surveying cases where a state was suspected of pursuing a nuclear weapons program (see Table 2), we find that such states were most often pressured by their patron superpower, without comment or interference by the other superpower. In this respect, collusion is implicit in the other superpower’s acquiescence to the patron’s pressure. However, there are at least two cases—North Korea and South Africa—where we can observe collusion in a more explicit form, through documented requests from one superpower to the other to police the state in question.9

North Korea became interested in a nuclear program in the early 1960s, but due to financial and technical limitations, its progress was slow. While it had long possessed a small Soviet research reactor, US satellites detected the construction of a second, larger reactor at Yongbyon in the mid-1980s. US officials approached the Soviet Union, highlighting its obligations under the NPT and calling into question its provision of nuclear technology

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8The online appendix contains examples of commentary by other states on their observations of superpower collusion.

9It is possible that similar requests or cooperative communications occurred in other cases as well, but have not yet been documented or declassified.
assistance to North Korea. The USSR responded positively, and during the next visit to
Moscow of North Korean KWP Secretary Kang Song San, the USSR pushed for North Korea
to sign the NPT, offering to provide new nuclear energy reactors if it did (Mazarr, 1995, 40-
41). This episode shows the US pressing the Soviet Union to act on the obligation implicit
in the superpowers’ collusion. It also demonstrates that the Soviet Union was willing to
comply and even offer incentives to make the deal work, suggesting that the issue was not
one of opposition between the two superpowers, but rather cooperation.

We observe a similar incident in the case of South Africa, but with the roles reversed.
In the summer of 1977, South Africa finished the construction of two nuclear devices, which
were not yet armed with highly enriched uranium, and also a testing site. At the time,
South Africa was a pariah state, but with its greater economic ties and sanctions, the US had
greater leverage over the state than the USSR. In July 1977, a Soviet reconnaissance satellite
detected the test site. The USSR passed the information to the US, with a personal request
from Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter for assistance in stopping the test (Richelson,
2007, 278). Several days later Carter replied to Brezhnev that the US assessment was in
agreement regarding suspicions of a South African nuclear test. It is clear from this exchange
that collusion to stop a state from moving ahead with a weapons program was carried out
at a very high level by both superpowers.

Collusion in pressuring South Africa continued during the following months, and declass-
sified memos refer to ongoing “quiet cooperation” on the South Africa issue (Gelb, 1977).
The collusion was kept private however, particularly on the Soviet side. Publicly, Soviet
newspapers alleged that the US was the culprit by helping South Africa with a nuclear pro-
gram. However, declassified documents reveal a recognition on the US side that the USSR
was likely using the South Africa issue to divert attention from international criticism of the
superpowers failing to curb the growth of their own arsenals (United States Embassy, Soviet
Union, Thomas J. Watson, 1980). This connection between private and public approaches
suggests that the superpowers had a considerable understanding of each others’ real interests in preventing proliferation.

Our findings reinforce the conclusions of the most recent historiography of the NPT. This work has documented the superpowers’ collusion: in discussions of their mutual interests in maintaining dominant positions within their alliances; in their support for the NPT over allied opposition; and in their attempts to control the drafting of the treaty itself (Gavin, 2010; Hunt, 2012; Popp, 2014; Swango, 2014). Our documentation of the superpowers’ coordination of their efforts to get other states to sign the treaty, and of their cooperation in dealing with suspected nuclear weapons programs in South Africa and North Korea, contributes important new examples to the increasingly strong evidence of collusion between the superpowers over nonproliferation.

**Superpower Pressure to Join the NPT**

Having investigated the interaction between the superpowers, we turn to two hypotheses which focus on their interactions with other states. First, under our theory, the superpowers have a clear interest in other states joining the NPT, as this signals states’ commitment to eschew nuclear weapons and eases the monitoring of that commitment. However, in pressuring states to join, the superpowers are unlikely to treat all states equally: a superpower will have the most leverage over its own clients, so that we expect that each superpower will focus on policing the states in its orbit, rather than those aligned with the other superpower. Moreover, given that these efforts are costly, the superpowers should only apply them where they are likely to be needed and effective. We also expect that neither superpower will undermine the other’s efforts to pressure a client state into joining the treaty. Our theory also implies that the number of states which the superpowers needed to pressure to join should be relatively small: most states should join the treaty voluntarily, so that enforcing the regime is perceived by the superpowers to be affordable.
**Hypothesis 1:** Each superpower will seek to convince (though incentives or coercion) other states, especially its own clients, to join the NPT, focusing its efforts on cases where pressures are likely to be both necessary and effective. Neither superpower will undermine the other’s efforts.

To evaluate this hypothesis, we assess how the superpowers acted toward those states they judged as technologically capable of, and potentially interested in, seeking nuclear weapons. Such states would pose the greatest threats to the nonproliferation regime, since states that lacked either capability or interest would be unlikely to acquire nuclear weapons even if they stayed out of the treaty. Because our theory posits that the superpowers are the main enforcers of nonproliferation, our selection of cases relies on the superpowers’ own contemporary assessments of which states had a worrisome combination of nuclear interest and capability. We intentionally do not use present-day assessments of states’ historical nuclear interest and capability. Such assessments would pose an unfair test for the theory, because the superpowers were, at the time, simply unaware of what would later be revealed about certain states’ nuclear programs, and thus would not be predicted to do anything about these programs.

We use a series of US intelligence estimates from 1957 to 1974 that assess states’ technological capability for, and, after 1960, interest in, developing nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the analogous documents are not available from the Soviet side. The documents we do have indicate that the US saw the Eastern bloc states as under the tight control of the USSR, which would not allow them to develop nuclear weapons. From the Soviet side,

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10See the online appendix for the details and citations of these estimates.

certain Eastern European states were likely considered nuclear-capable,\textsuperscript{12} and the USSR would probably have added North Korea to the list, as the state had received Soviet nuclear assistance in the 1950s and 1960s (Szalontai and Radchenko, 2006).

We also use other declassified documents, containing superpower assessments of states’ positions on the NPT, to assess whether the superpowers were uncertain or suspicious of a given state’s intent toward nuclear weapons. As long as some doubt remains, we expect the superpowers to explicitly pressure the state to join the treaty. However, if a state expresses a resolute position against the treaty, and it becomes apparent to the superpower that no feasible measures would be effective at altering its position, then it would be reasonable for the superpower to reassess whether any available pressure is worth exerting. Additionally, if a state delays joining the NPT, but the superpowers are confident that this is driven by something other than an interest in nuclear weapons, then we do not expect the superpowers to apply pressure.

We then assess superpower behavior towards each state. In some cases, the superpowers took no action towards a state; in others, their actions involved only informational meetings and diplomatic discussions with the state in question; and in still others, the superpowers resorted to stronger pressures, such as explicit threats or offers of benefits in exchange for joining the treaty. In the results presented in Table 1, a coding of “yes” indicates that the observed superpower behavior is consistent with our theory expectations. A coding of “partial” means that the limited historical record is supportive for the theory, but additional information would be needed for a more confident assessment. A coding of “mixed” implies that we found mixed support for the theory: the superpowers pursued the expected action, but either to a lesser extent or inconsistently. Finally, a “no” coding indicates evidence of superpower behavior opposed to our expectations, such as assisting a state in avoiding NPT signature, or failing to pay attention to a possible nuclear state’s rejection of

\textsuperscript{12}See the online appendix for Soviet information on the Yugoslavian and Romanian nuclear programs.
To summarize, we see that a number of states assessed to be nuclear-capable did not join the NPT completely voluntarily. Rather, when voluntary participation did not appear forthcoming, these states were pressured, largely as expected though not always successfully, by the superpowers. By contrast, but also as expected, the superpowers paid little attention to clear joiners. We also observe some interesting changes in the level of pressure applied in cases where doubts regarding signature are introduced or dispelled. South Korea, for example, was an early supporter of the NPT, and there is initially little action by the US to persuade it to sign the treaty. However, when South Korea was identified as having nuclear capabilities and delayed ratifying the treaty in the early 1970s, the US applied pressure to encourage speedier ratification. In the case of Israel, pressure and incentives were attempted until it became clear to key negotiators that Israel had already developed a nuclear device, so that no available means of pressure would be effective. In no case did we find any evidence of one superpower undermining the other’s efforts to pressure a state into joining.

Finally, we note that the evidence does not support either the grand bargain or the cartel theory alone. If the grand bargain were correct, then all states should be better off with the NPT, and all should join voluntarily given that they expect others to do so. We see this was clearly not the case, and for a number of states the superpowers had to go to considerable lengths to ensure their participation. Additionally, the fact that this pressure was at times ineffective suggests that some states had very strong incentives to stay out of the treaty, even as most others joined. If instead the cartel view is correct, then all states would have to be pressured to join the treaty, and all would do so with a desire to cheat. However, the evidence shows that numerous nuclear-capable states, even those that had previously considered nuclear weapons programs, joined the regime with little or no pressure from the superpowers.

13Documentation for our coding of each of the cases in Table 1 can be found in the online appendix.
Superpower Enforcement of Nonproliferation

In our theory, the superpowers should collude to stop other states from developing nuclear weapons, since if they do not, the nonproliferation equilibrium would break down. As in the previous hypothesis, if a client state is detected making a possible move towards nuclear weapons, its patron superpower ought to have the most leverage over it, and so we expect its patron to be the one to apply pressure. However, we also expect the other superpower to refrain from interfering with this pressure. With non-aligned states, we expect that either or both superpowers would apply pressure, and neither should assist the errant state. To test this hypothesis, we considered all cases where a state became suspected of pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and evaluated the superpowers’ response.

Hypothesis 2: Each superpower will apply pressure to prevent other states, especially its own clients, from moving toward acquiring nuclear weapons. Neither superpower will offer assistance to a state suspected to be pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

Our findings are presented in Table 2. In each case, we assess what the superpowers perceived about a state’s attempts to proliferation, and how they responded. A coding of “yes” indicates that the superpower acted as our theory predicts, taking steps to restrain a client’s progress towards nuclear weapons or its access to dual-use nuclear technology needed to make progress in the future. As before, a coding of “mixed” means that the superpowers sought to restrain the proliferating state, but either to a lesser extent or inconsistently. “Partial” implies that the limited historical record is supportive for the theory, but additional information would be needed to reach a confident assessment. Finally, a “no” coding indicates that the superpower did not behave as our theory predicts, instead aiding a client state with
a nuclear weapons program or turning a blind eye to apparent attempts to proliferate.¹⁴

We find general support for Hypothesis 2, with a few mixed cases. In the majority of cases, the superpower patron of each nuclear aspirant intervened with threats or incentives to prevent the nuclear program from progressing, so that the “policing” element of superpower relations with nuclear aspirants is clear. Examples of policing actions by the superpowers included direct instructions to stop the suspicious activity, threats to withdraw some military or economic support, restrictions on suppliers and access to technology, and high-level diplomatic pressure. By contrast, we find no cases where the opposing superpower provided assistance, reassurance, or any support for the fledgling nuclear state. To investigate this point, we surveyed a wide range of primary and secondary sources for evidence that such assistance occurred, and also looked for any accusations that might have been made by one superpower against the other for such a transgression. Although it is difficult to prove that neither superpower sought to lure away the opponent’s ally by offering nuclear support, we have not located any evidence of such behavior in all the cases surveyed.

Neither the grand bargain nor the cartel theory fit this evidence. The nuclear weapons states were widely perceived as reneging on their end of the grand bargain. No significant disarmament on the part of any of the nuclear-weapons states occurred until the very end of the Cold War (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2002). Moreover, there is no evidence that NPT membership increased a state’s chance of receiving nuclear energy assistance (Fuhrmann, 2009). Despite this: hardly any of the non-nuclear weapons states cheated on the regime; those few that did were not motivated by the need to punish the nuclear-weapons states for not disarming; and these were stopped from getting nuclear weapons not by the prospect that others would follow but by the intervention of the superpowers. None of these three facts is consistent with the grand bargain theory. While the superpowers’ enforcement of nonproliferation is consistent with the cartel view, the small number of cases

¹⁴Documentation of our set of cases and coding of each can be found in the online appendix.
in which such enforcement was needed is not. Most states showed no interest in bucking the nonproliferation regime and abided by it voluntarily, without pressure from the superpowers.

[Table 2 about here.]

**Implications**

Hymans (2010) argues that the fundamental question for students of proliferation is why so few of the nuclear-capable states ended up acquiring nuclear weapons: some six nuclear-weapons states out of more than 40 estimated to be nuclear-capable by 1970. Our answer is that once the superpowers realized nonproliferation was necessary to preserve their influence and set about colluding to enforce it, many states chose not to realize their latent nuclear capacity. A few of these states refrained because they were deterred by the punishment the superpowers would impose if they were caught seeking nuclear weapons. But most did so because they preferred nonproliferation to widespread proliferation, and were confident enough that the superpowers would be able to curtail proliferation to voluntarily forego weapons for themselves. These latter states’ willing compliance with nonproliferation made the regime’s enforcement affordable for the superpowers. Moreover, we presented evidence, consistent with this answer, that the superpowers explicitly colluded to create the nonproliferation regime and to cajole the few worrisome states into joining and complying with it. We conclude by discussing three broad implications of our study.

First, our theory implies that the nonproliferation regime substantially reduced the incidence of proliferation, relative to the proliferation that would have occurred had the superpowers not colluded to stop it. The evidence we gathered cannot be used to demonstrate the truth of this theoretical assertion—that the superpowers did engage in collusive enforcement does not prove that these efforts were necessary to stop proliferation. However, it does
strongly suggest that the assertion is true. To conclude that the regime was ineffectual, one would have to argue that all of the following claims are true. First, that states that were interested in nuclear weapons during the Cold War, including West Germany, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan, Iraq, Iran and Libya, would not have acquired them, even if the superpowers hadn’t acted to stop or delay their programs. Second, that none of that group, nor Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, East Germany, and Japan would have acquired nuclear weapons in reaction to proliferation in the first group, even if the superpowers hadn’t pressured them into committing to nonproliferation. Third, that no other states would have acquired weapons in further reaction and as the market for nuclear technology rapidly expanded and the taboo against nuclear weapons dissolved (if indeed it ever formed), even without superpower support for nonproliferation. Given the historical record of these states’ nuclear decision-making, every one of these claims seems implausible, and thus it seems likely that the regime did in fact curtail proliferation.

Despite this, Sagan (2011) reports that recent studies of nuclear proliferation agree that “the NPT does not have significant effects on the likelihood of proliferation” (p. 236). For example, Jo and Gartzke (2007) employs two variables—whether a state is a member of the NPT, and the proportion of states that are NPT members in a given year—to measure the effect of the nonproliferation regime, and finds that its impact is “modest or marginal” (p. 185). Our theory implies that these measures may be misleading, because of the incentives states face once the nonproliferation regime has been established. The regime forces states to signal nuclear intent in one of two ways: either by refusing to join the NPT, or by joining but then getting caught cheating. Thus, a state that intended to develop weapons in secret would have to weigh the suspicion it would raise by abstaining from or exiting the NPT against the risk, if it is a signatory, that inspectors would detect its program. Aspirants perceived to lack the technological sophistication needed to develop nukes might find excuses to abstain from the NPT without raising the superpowers’ suspicions, and then carry out a covert
nuclear program. Other aspirants, thought to have the requisite technological capability, would set off alarms if they refused to join the NPT, leading the superpowers to apply pressure, and so might prefer to sign the treaty, hoping to delay ratification and the signing of a safeguards agreement and then to conceal their illicit activities from inspectors. North Korea, for instance, used the former strategy initially and then switched to the latter when the superpowers eventually grew worried about its nuclear potential (Mazarr, 1995). Thus, our theory offers no reason to suspect that NPT membership per se, or the proportion of states that are NPT members, will predict a state’s pursuit of nukes.

Instead, the regime’s effect comes from the expectation of collusive superpower intervention if a state either abstains or is caught cheating. This expectation arose with the establishment of the regime in the late 1960s, and has been roughly constant since. Thus, to determine the effect of the regime, the appropriate comparison is not between NPT members and non-members, but between proliferation before the NPT and after. For this comparison, we find the trends in the number of nuclear-capable states and the number of nuclear-armed states highly suggestive. These two numbers were closely matched until the late 1960s, when the number of nuclear-capable states rose rapidly to more than 40, while the number of nuclear-armed states rose only very slowly (Sagan, 2011, Fig. 3).

Finally, our theory helps to explain some of the setbacks to nonproliferation that followed the Cold War’s end. The theory predicts that the disappearance of one of the superpowers would yield three results. First, the absent superpower’s former clients would be left needing to find some way to replace the security it provided. Fortunately, many of the most nuclear-capable ex-Soviet clients chose to switch sides and receive protection from the United States. However, a few such clients had pre-existing conflicts with the US and its allies, and were placed in a tough position: they could not switch sides, and without Soviet protection, the US and its allies would be very dangerous enemies. These states (North Korea, Iran, Libya, Syria) thus had strong incentives to seek, or redouble their efforts to acquire, nuclear
weapons. Second, in attempting to head off proliferation to these states, the US would no longer be able to rely on the Soviet Union’s leverage over them. It has therefore had to resort to extremely costly measures—comprehensive sanctions, military containment, preventive war—to try to enforce nonproliferation. And third, even when Russia retained some leverage over a former client, it would be less willing to make costly use of that leverage in support of nonproliferation. Paying the costs of enforcing nonproliferation no longer makes sense, because Russia’s global influence is much less than that of the Soviet Union’s and thus it has much less to lose from proliferation. The former superpower’s reluctance to enforce nonproliferation is evident in the difficulties the US has faced in securing its cooperation with pressure on Libya, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

We close with an interesting analogous case, involving chemical rather than nuclear weapons, which illustrates these predictions: the 2013 crisis with Syria. Russia did not initially express interest in forcing Syria to abandon its chemical weapons—something the US has always desired and would have agreed to at any point. However, a credible US threat to strike the regime raised the risk that Assad would be overthrown and Russia would lose one of its most important remaining clients, and Russia became willing to collusively enforce (chemical) nonproliferation. The rapid acquiescence of Syria’s regime to chemical disarmament suggests that (former) superpower collusion can still be highly effective, at least when Russia retains enough leverage over the state in question. Whether through Russian cooperation with sanctions in response to Iran’s nuclear program, or China’s help with pressure on North Korea, the viability of the nonproliferation regime may still rely on collusion, but now between the US and the relevant regional power rather than an opposing superpower.
References


Brands, Hal. 2007. “Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT.” Cold War History 7(3):389–423.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Perceived nuclear intentions</th>
<th>Theory Expectation</th>
<th>Observed behavior details (indicator of intentions, superpower response)</th>
<th>Supports theory?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessed as nuclear-capable (1957 - 1974 intelligence estimates)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>None or low. Superpowers expect state to join NPT, or state has low weapons interests or capabilities</td>
<td>Mild to no pressure by allied superpower</td>
<td>State supports NPT, ratification hesitation by some domestic political groups. Limited US attention (informational visits)</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Early support of NPT, no US pressure</td>
<td>Early support of NPT, no US pressure</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Early support of NPT, no US pressure</td>
<td>Early support of NPT, no US pressure</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Early support of NPT, no US pressure</td>
<td>Early support of NPT, no US pressure</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Early support of NPT, no US pressure</td>
<td>Early support of NPT, no US pressure</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Some hesitation on treaty, few weapons interests, no US pressure</td>
<td>早支持NPT, no pressure by USSR</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Opposes NPT, but low evidence of weapons intentions. US applies mild pressure for NPT, diplomatic attention by US and USSR, some incentives.</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Opposes NPT, but low evidence of weapons intentions; some pressure by the US on nuclear facilities</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Early support of NPT; no pressure by USSR</td>
<td>Early support of NPT; no pressure by USSR</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Early support of NPT; no pressure by USSR</td>
<td>Early support of NPT; no pressure by USSR</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Some limited opposition to NPT, but early signer; likely diplomatic attention by USSR</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Opposes NPT, some nuclear technology interests, but early signer; possible USSR influence</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>Uncertain. Superpowers have doubts about states intentions to join NPT.</td>
<td>Explicit pressure by allied superpower</td>
<td>High level concern by the US, repeated reassurances</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Explicit pressure by allied superpower</td>
<td>Explicit pressure by allied superpower</td>
<td>Some hesitation in signing NPT (seeks to preserve full fuel cycle capability), urging by the US to sign, concerns expressed by USSR</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Signed NPT early but did not ratify quickly, raising concerns. US applied pressure, threatened bilateral relations if treaty not ratified</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Signed NPT early but did not ratify quickly, raising concerns. US applied pressure, threatened bilateral relations if treaty not ratified</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Initial pressure by the US, attempts link weapons sales, presidential level entreaties. Pressures unsuccessful, Israel does not sign NPT, US stops pressuring.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Initial pressure by the US, attempts link weapons sales, presidential level entreaties. Pressures unsuccessful, Israel does not sign NPT, US stops pressuring.</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Does not sign NPT; general sanctions and isolation, some US pressure against nuclear program, denial of nuclear technology</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Does not sign NPT; general sanctions and isolation, some US pressure against nuclear program, denial of nuclear technology</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>India rejects treaty in 1968. Some US pressure, attempts at soliciting Soviet pressure, some Soviet pressure</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>India rejects treaty in 1968. Some US pressure, attempts at soliciting Soviet pressure, some Soviet pressure</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Rejects NPT. Few strong pressures by US to encourage NPT signature, but later pressure on nuclear program.</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Rejects NPT. Few strong pressures by US to encourage NPT signature, but later pressure on nuclear program.</td>
<td>mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessed as nuclear capable by USSR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Explicit pressure</td>
<td>Opposes NPT but also has low technological capabilities, low level but ongoing pressure by USSR, denial of nuclear technology</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and nuclear program</td>
<td>Empirical evidence on superpower response</td>
<td>Support for theory</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>United States client states</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Korea</strong> Early/mid 1970- nuclear program started, attempts to purchase plutonium reprocessing technology</td>
<td>US pressure to end program High level US threats to end security relationship &amp; remove troops, threats to stop financing for civilian program, pressure to cancel purchases of nuclear technology, continued US attention to status of nuclear research</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taiwan</strong> In 1970’s sought reprocessing plant for potential weapons related research</td>
<td>US pressure to end program Repeated US intervention to stop procurement of reprocessing facility, threatened continued US support of civilian nuclear program, threatened general relationship w/US</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong> Established program in 1970’s, sought to purchase reprocessing technology, acquisition of nuclear technologies from China and other states. Develops nuclear device capability 1988.</td>
<td>US pressure to end program In late 1970’s, US interference to stop reprocessing plant acquisition, economic sanctions to curb nuclear program. 1980’s-pressure decreases, sanctions waived. Reagan administration overlooks Pakistani nuclear developments in favor of military and econ cooperation. Congress remains concerned, passing further econ and mil sanctions legislation.</td>
<td>yes/ followed by mixed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Iraq</strong> Weapons program established late 1970s, after 1981 program continued w/ higher secrecy, under 3 years away from nuclear device in 1991</td>
<td>US intelligence attention focused on Iraq, but no observed pressure to stop program Iraqi interests in nuclear weapons perceived, but significant advances towards nuclear weapons not detected until after Gulf War.</td>
<td>program not detected</td>
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<td><strong>Iran</strong> Pursuit of nuclear program started in mid-1970’s and again after 1984, sought international assistance with reactor and other fuel cycle facilities</td>
<td>US pressure to restrict access to fuel cycle technology Prior to Iranian Revolution, US requested safeguards from third party suppliers to Iran. Post revolution US repeatedly pressured states (Germany, Spain, Argentina) to withdraw from contracts for finishing Bushehr reactor and from contract for fuel fabrication and heavy water production</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>State and nuclear program</td>
<td>Empirical evidence on superpower response</td>
<td>Support for theory</td>
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<td><strong>Non-aligned states</strong></td>
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<td><strong>South Africa</strong></td>
<td>Soviet coordination with US on pressure</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<td>Weapons program started in 1970’s, built weapons, prepared for possible test and then dismantled</td>
<td>USSR monitored weapons activities and called for US pressure, US response was present but intensity unclear. US pursued trade embargoes, demarches, attempts to stop possible nuclear test</td>
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<td><strong>Brazil</strong></td>
<td>US and Soviet pressure to restrain fuel cycle acquisition</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<td>1970’s-1980’s: pursued extensive nuclear energy capabilities, including full fuel cycle, outside safeguards regime. Military involvement in nuclear program but no political decision to pursue weapons.</td>
<td>High-level and persistent US pressure on both Brazil and Germany in opposition of large nuclear technology deal, particularly reprocessing and enrichment technology. In 1976, also additional pressure on Germany by USSR regarding deal with Brazil.</td>
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<td><strong>Argentina</strong></td>
<td>US intervention with suppliers of nuclear technology</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<td>1970’s -1980s: nuclear program including plutonium preprocessing and uranium enrichment</td>
<td>US pressure on nuclear fuel cycle suppliers to prevent sales of technology to Argentina, including heavy water facilities</td>
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<td><strong>India</strong></td>
<td>Limited leverage by superpower to apply pressure, some attempts to restrain program</td>
<td>mixed</td>
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<td>Early 1970′s: nuclear program established, “peaceful nuclear explosive” test conducted in 1974, sought additional imports (including heavy water)</td>
<td>India was closer aligned to USSR in early 70’s; mixed response by the US to nuclear tests; pressure by Soviet Union for safeguards on heavy water sales in response to US requests for such terms.</td>
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<td><strong>Soviet Union client states</strong></td>
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<td><strong>North Korea</strong></td>
<td>Low level efforts by USSR to restrain DPRK capabilities</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<td>Continuing attempts to procure reactors and other fuel cycle technology with intention of weapons development</td>
<td>USSR denial of technology access but few direct threats or incentives to DPRK, pressures by USSR for NPT signature in exchange for nuclear technology</td>
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<td><strong>Yugoslavia</strong></td>
<td>No evidence of interaction with USSR on nuclear program</td>
<td>no/partial</td>
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<td>Nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, experimental research only.</td>
<td>Program proceeds slowly mostly due to domestic constraints; no evidence of Soviet assistance or opposition to program, possible Soviet technology denial</td>
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<td><strong>Libya</strong></td>
<td>Pressure by USSR for safeguarded faculties, pressure by US to restrict nuclear sales</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<td>Interests in establishing a nuclear program throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, repeated attempts to acquire nuclear technology.</td>
<td>USSR provided reactor technology, but not until Libya agreed to NPT and safeguards. US pressured other counties (Belgium) to cancel nuclear technology contracts.</td>
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