

## Ideas for Action Competition

Proposal Title: Decreasing poverty in the mining communities of the world through the empowerment of communities in the control of mining royalties: an application to the Peruvian case.

Team name: *OUTCOME (Oportunidades de Desarrollo a través del Canon Minero* or Development opportunities supported by mining royalties)

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### **Abstract.**

Although mining gives governments in many countries access to a significant amount of resources through taxes paid for the mining of minerals by mining companies, governments often fail to invest funds in projects directed at the human development of their populations. Our proposal grounds itself in the case of Peru, in pursuit of a strategy that increases the effectiveness of how mining royalties are spent in satisfying the unmet needs of mining populations. First, we propose the use of qualitative indicators to prioritize projects objectively. Subsequently, we focus on the involvement of an external agent of information and monitoring given the task of informing the population of how local government actors are spending mining royalties. We then put forward the idea of a project incubator, which would serve, to finance, implement, and monitor initiatives involving investments in infrastructure and capacity building. Lastly, should irregularities in the use of mining royalties be found, we propose a mechanism by which civil society may raise its complaint to the level of the National Comptroller (*Controlaría de la Nación*) so that they may carry out an investigation into the validity of such claims. This would be possible through a link between the National Comptroller and oversight committees.

## **I. Explanation of problem and context.**

Since the mid-1990s, large-scale mining has resulted in a substantial windfall for the Peruvian government via taxes paid by private sector entities for the mining of minerals. However, the government has had difficulty managing and spending tax revenues effectively, and, consequently, during 2013, regional governments spent just 57% of the funds previously budgeted for investment projects.<sup>1</sup> This has translated into the implementation of few public investment projects aimed at the human development of populations living in areas affected by mining. An investigation carried out by development bank CAF found that, between 2003 and 2007, municipalities receiving larger mining windfalls did not experience significant improvements in performance indicators such as the number of municipal or public health establishments and the number of beneficiaries of social organizations vis-à-vis municipalities that did not benefit from the rise of this source of income.<sup>2</sup>

According to author Jaime de Arellano, PhD in Development Studies from the University of Sussex, even if the mining sector has been responsible for the exceptional economic growth Peru has experienced, it has also been the main contributor to social conflicts threatening the political stability of the country. Tension between the central government's efforts to attract private investment and the will of communities to reject mining projects has led to conflicts that have discredited the central government in areas outside of the capital. Consistent with the "natural resource curse," the Peruvian government has had limited success in converting its mineral wealth into policies contributing to a reduction in poverty, while, avoiding social conflict.

An interesting case is the mining project *Tintaya* located in the province of Espinar in the department of Cusco. The project has been operating for approximately 29 years, but, only recently, between 2007 and 2012, has it led to a substantial increase in mining royalties. Notwithstanding, Espinar's most important projects to date have not been undertaken with funds derived from mining royalties and, neither has there been a significant improvement in the quality of life of the residents of Espinar. Indeed, the areas furthest from the provincial capital continue to experience the same levels of poverty as before and find themselves, still, living in a subsistence economy.<sup>3</sup> For example, in 2009, 64.4% of those living in Espinar were below the poverty line, with 33.3% living in extreme poverty compared to 51.1% and 20.7% living in poverty and extreme poverty, respectively in the department of Cusco.<sup>4</sup>

We believe that the problem, as described above, results from a combination of factors, including, but not limited to: corruption of a portion of municipal authorities, a lack of adequate oversight of municipal authorities, the prioritization of physical infrastructure projects with little or no relevance to real needs of the population, the lack of expertise in the development and implementation of projects, and the lack of a coordinated work plan that links national goals with local ones.

With that being said, and given our experience working on development projects in both Peru and Bolivia, we believe in the importance of building the capacities of public administrators as well as community leaders to guarantee that mining royalties are spent on public investment projects that contribute to the human development of mining communities.

## **II. Explanation of solution.**

### *A. Why is it relevant?*

We are aware of initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which proposes a global standard of transparency in which, governments, as well as mining companies, report to civil society on how mining royalties are spent. This creates a forum for debate and, at the same time attempts to develop a relationship of trust with the population.<sup>5</sup> Many countries have implemented strategies and mechanisms to increase transparency, or have joined initiatives such as the EITI. In spite of their efforts, populations receiving the greatest amount of mining royalties in the world are ironically some of the same populations those facing high levels of poverty.<sup>6</sup>

In the case of Peru, granted the adoption of EITI principles has been an important achievement, it is likely that mining populations continue to have problems accessing information related to how royalties are spent, voicing opinions as to how they should be spent, and registering complaints for irresponsible spending behavior on the part of municipalities. At the same time, there should be a mechanism to verify whether royalties are being spent efficiently and effectively. As such, we come to the conclusion that the problem likely goes beyond transparency. We must ask whether royalties are actually being invested in projects that address mining communities' priority needs.

Our proposal seeks to create a global strategy that, first of all, channels the investment of mining royalties into projects addressing priority needs of populations. Secondly, we seek to ensure that civil society is both informed and participates actively in the control of public spending by way of an external agent of information and monitoring as a mediator between the local government and communities. The function of said agent would be to strengthen the relationship between local governments, civil society, and mining companies. Thirdly, we propose a project incubator that would give form to initiatives from mining communities through the planning, financing, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of initiatives in the form of projects. Lastly, we propose a system to enforce sanctions against authorities that have violated regulations or misappropriated funds designated for development projects in mining communities.

### *B. What is new about it?*

To date, we are unaware of a system or strategy that combines the previously-mentioned elements, given that initiatives have generally paid more attention to issues such as transparency in public expenditures and/or participation of the population in the drawing up of budgets. Nevertheless, it appears that there is still a need to strengthen the formulation, implementation, and monitoring of development projects financed by royalties, and, especially, an effective control of the utilization of royalties.

*C. By who, what, how and when would it be implemented?*

Our strategy calls for the involvement of five key actors: (1) the central government, (2) local governments, (3) companies extracting non-renewable resources, (4) national or international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multilateral institutions with knowledge of monitoring and transparency, as well as (5) civil society.

Our proposal consists of four stages:

i. ***Stage #1: The classification of mining communities on the basis of qualitative indicators of socioeconomic needs and potential opportunities.***

This stage borrows from the System for Economic Decision Information of the Administration (*el Sistema de Información Decisional Económico de la Administración* or *SIDEA*), developed by the Public Spending Observatory (*el Observatorio del Gasto Público*) in Spain<sup>7</sup>, which proposes the use of qualitative indicators to judge the performance of municipalities whose populations share similar socioeconomic profiles.

In order to arrive at a set of indicators for the sake of comparison, it is necessary to understand that each mining population has different potential opportunities and economic needs. At the same time, in spite of the diversity of contexts, we can group populations sharing similar characteristics together, yielding a baseline of what should be considered “normal” and “ideal”. From there, we can select indicators that will allow us to measure the degree of deviation of a given standard relative to a baseline. Use of such indicators serves as an indicator of the effectiveness of a municipality’s projects in addressing priority needs and assists in setting priorities to be addressed by future development projects.

In order to identify communities’ strengths and needs, we suggest a revision of the Municipal Development Plan (*Plan de Desarrollo Municipal*), which presents an integral diagnostic of municipalities.<sup>8</sup> As a complement, in the case of Peru, we suggest the use of the United Nations’ State Density Index (*Índice de Densidad del Estado* or *IDE*), consisting of a basket of basic public services needed to achieve a satisfactory level human development.<sup>9</sup> Combined, both

sources provide us with a panorama of the measurements of socioeconomic development we are looking for in prioritizing development projects. It is important to consider both sources, given that data present in one source may be absent from the other, and vice versa.

The indicators chosen become qualitative upon taking into consideration a variety of information that may not necessarily be numerical. The information must be systematized to determine whether use of indicators from the Municipal Development Plan and the United Nations' State Index is enough, or whether it is necessary to develop new ones.


In particular, we propose the use of indicators to measure the quantity and quality of education, health, sanitation, and electrification in mining communities. For example, according to the Pan American Health Organization-World Health Organization standard, there should be 10 physicians per 10,000 inhabitants.<sup>10</sup> In the case that a community is below this threshold, perhaps, it should think about prioritizing a project that would address this deficiency. On the other hand, it is also important to invest in education so that local people may have the opportunity to access mining positions that require technical knowledge. At a certain point, mining will no longer be the driver of economic growth. Consequently, we would suggest using an indicator such as secondary school attendance for teenagers between 12 and 16 years old. The same rationale would apply to indicators for access to drinking water, drainage systems, and electrification. These indicators should be used to measure the degree to which a given municipality is "developed" with respect to other mining communities. Notwithstanding, we suggest the use of indicators that do not require a significant incremental investment of time and money, but, rather ones that can be adapted from information and data that already exists, or require limited further data collection efforts. In the case of countries that do not have national indices comparable to the State Density Index, it may be possible to use like-minded indices and indicators such as the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index, the Human Development Index, or data on Unsatisfied Basic Needs from the national census.

At the same time, it is important to take into account community members' own perspectives with regard to the projects that are most needed to improve quality of life. As a result, in the process of defining priority areas, we propose the use of a questionnaire, focus groups, and personal interviews to supplement the use of qualitative indicators. Frequently, information about mining communities is scarce. This process of rectifying qualitative indicators with what was learned from engaging personally with the population will serve to formulate a plan for the use of mining royalties that gives the community projects that what it truly wants.

All of the above, including the collection, validation, and systematization of information, as well as the selection and development of indicators, should be completed by an NGO knowledgeable in the areas of measurement and public administration (see Stage #2 for a detailed description of this agent). We adopt the recommendation of the non-profit organization, *Ciudadanos al Día*, to

require that a municipality prepare and deliver a baseline, an investment plan, and a strategic plan to access the portion of mining royalties due to them.<sup>11</sup>

Once the baseline for a variety of human development indicators has been established, it will be easier to analyze the degree to which potential opportunities and needs have been addressed in a given mining community, as well as the effectiveness with which mining royalties have been spent. The following is an illustration of how this would work.



In this example, water and sanitation is the need in question, whose indicators have been designated as: the percentage of households with (1) a latrine, (2) access to drinkable water, as well as (3) an irrigation system. The red line serves as an indicator of the baseline. As evident in the figure above, each population varies with respect to water and sanitation priorities. This exercise is consequently of use as each community begins to consider how to spend mining royalties and whether spending should go towards water and sanitation needs.

ii. **Stage #2: External agent of information and monitoring.**

The second stage relates to the participation of an external agent of information and monitoring that works full time in collaboration with local government authorities. This agent would work in representation of a specified institution or NGO, and would have access to all information related to local government expenditures and investment. An entity such as *Ciudadanos al Día* (CAD) in the case of Peru, a non-profit organization that contributes “tools for the improvement of administration in the public sector” and acts as “a source of reliable information on topics of national interest.” CAD “provides credible information to opinion makers and facilitates access to relevant information for public sector decision making.”<sup>12</sup> In the case that an organization of this type does not exist, a multilateral organization like the World Bank or the United Nations

could help create such an organization, with the intention of giving it full autonomy following an agreed-upon period of time.

The selection of the NGO given the task of training the external agent charged with forming a bridge between the communities and local authorities would be based on the following process. First, the terms of reference would be drafted, describing the profile of the institution sought. Afterwards, the process of selection would begin after which bids would be accepted from qualified institutions. The profile and experience of each institution would be evaluated, after which the institution that best meets the requirements and suggests ways of improving on the initial terms of reference would be selected.

The work of the external agent includes informing the population of how mining royalties are being spent, during all stages, in an easy-to-understand way, and in the native language, ensuring that authorities and community members understand clearly the projects that are to be developed. The agent will be trained in strategies to communicate with the population, as well as how to gain its trust. Said information will be reinforced through its diffusion in the media (i.e. radio, television, the newspaper), ensuring that it is accessible and easy to understand.

In the spirit of active participation on the part of the population, the external agent will involve community leaders and neighborhood groups so that they may participate in the diffusion of information on development projects. In its evaluation of community-driven development projects, the World Bank mentions that, empirically, facilitators play an important role in the mobilization of communities and marginalized groups, as well as in increasing the level of awareness and participation of communities in the development process.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, the idea is that, after a certain amount of time has passed, when the communities have internalized the activities promoted by the external agent in the development, promotion, and supervision of projects, the external agent can gradually devolve his or her responsibilities to the community. As such, we hope to empower leaders and the population as a whole.

The external agent will not respond to any interest, either of the central government, or of the mining companies. At the same time, with the backing and support of a team with expertise in technical aspects of project formulation and implementation, in the case that he or she identifies weaknesses in local government institutions in issues relating to management, monitoring, transparency, etc., the agent may provide technical training to municipal authorities.

Based on the research done in preparation for the thesis written by one of the members of our team, we know that, in Peru, the relationship between civil society with the mayor is frequently distant, and, consequently, monitoring of municipalities' work is often infrequent. The relationship between community authorities and the mayor is one of subordination and a great deal of distance divides the mayor from his constituents. Unsurprisingly, the scope of power that

community authorities wield is reduced in comparison to that of the mayor. Consequently, informal monitoring is uncommon, and, the idea of registering a complaint is frequently perceived as demonstrating a lack of respect for authority. In this sense, collaboration between the mayor and his or her constituency is rare; this frequently leads the population to attribute all responsibilities to mining companies, rather than considering the role that the mayor plays in how mining royalties are spent on development projects. It is this type of case in which the idea of an external agent becomes a strategic solution, being that he or she will serve as a bridge between the community and local authorities.

iii. **Stage #3: Project incubator.**

We believe that the main problem in the case of Peru is the inability to manage and monitor how mining royalties are spent at the local level. Municipalities exist in which proposals are scarce and the population is not proactive. Consequently, funds are frequently wasted on projects not relevant to populations' needs. Furthermore, the drafting of project proposals is frequently outsourced, delaying project implementation and misusing valuable economic resources without ensuring that the unique needs of mining communities are taken into consideration.

Consequently, we propose that resources that currently go towards the management of projects and that are derived from mining royalties be redirected to the implementation of a project incubator. This will consist of the external agent, representatives from the community, and the official responsible for economic development at the municipality. The incubator will benefit from the advice of a group of advisors with expertise in the management of projects chosen with the support of the NGO selected during the second stage.

The project incubator aims to shape the ideas for projects determined during the second stage to be planned in detail, financed, implemented, monitored during implementation, and evaluated ex post.

The incubator contemplates three principal activities.

1. *Support in the formulation, monitoring, and tracking of projects.* The external agent, together with the official responsible for economic development in the municipality and advisors, will support community leaders in the development of project proposals based on community initiatives. In this way, both the feasibility and the administrative capacity of the proposal will be addressed directly with the municipality.
2. *Training in formulation and administration of projects for public administrators.* Experts in the formulation of projects, with the help of the NGO will develop training workshops addressing the drafting and administration of projects for municipal authorities. In this way,

we seek to strengthen the technical abilities, as well as the social commitment of administrators with their work on behalf of the community.

3. *Continuing education for social leaders.* At the same time, we seek to empower and develop the ability of community leaders to act as agents of change within the community by way of continuing education workshops. This task will be charged to the external agent with the assistance of the NGO.

These activities will result in a repository or bank of project profiles in which all municipalities, regardless of whether they are mining communities, can access projects that have been both planned and implemented. In this way, we hope to avoid the duplication of efforts, leveraging the experiences of municipalities with similar conditions and socioeconomic characteristics. We also hope that incubator activities will contribute to the formation of community leaders and committed and well-trained public administrators.

Currently, according to Peruvian law, resources derived from mining royalties can be utilized in the financing of investments oriented towards the provision of public services of universal access (i.e. irrigation, sanitation, electrification). We propose that municipalities be allowed to spend mining royalties not only on physical infrastructure projects, but also in the development of skills necessary for taking full advantage of physical infrastructure built using royalties. For example, as part of its intervention strategy, the sub sectorial irrigation program in Peru conducted interventions with the participation of the committee of users and beneficiary farmers.

iv. ***Stage #4: Control and accountability.***

This last stage is applicable in the case that civil society finds irregularities, acts of corruption or misappropriation of funds, by the local government, as well as by mining companies. In these cases, community oversight committees outside the realm of local government, whose members are the authorities of different communities, will take action. Both the external agent and the oversight committee will meet continuously throughout the year to examine information collected, in detail. In the case that an irregularity is found, the oversight committee will have the power to raise its complaint to the Comptroller's Office concerned with transparency, so that the Comptroller may conduct an investigation into the civil or criminal liability of the offenders.

In the diagnostic of the problem, we realized that corruption from within local government could potentially be rooted in the lack of an incentive for having spent mining royalties on projects benefiting the community. Bearing this in mind, we propose something similar to the Performance Stimulus Fund (*Fondo de Estimulo al Desempeño* or *FED*) of the Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion (*Ministerio de Desarrollo e Inclusión Social*) in Peru. Resources received by way of the FED may be used in the purchase of goods, services, and capital goods for programs related to Early Childhood Development based on the level of

compliance with previously agreed to commitments.<sup>14</sup> We propose to reward municipalities with an increase in its portion of royalties to be applied to projects in the community in the event that there is no incidence of corruption or waste on projects that do not contribute to local development. At the same time, in the case of corruption or waste, the municipality will no longer be able to access funds from mining royalties until the situation is remedied. One way of achieving this is by way of sequential disbursements from the mining royalty fund conditional on good behavior.<sup>15</sup>

Another important issue related to corruption and accountability has to do with the prevention of fund misappropriation. For this, we recommend that the Comptroller General initiate an annual cycle of training of oversight committees in this topic, in such a way that committees have the knowledge necessary to identify and prevent suspected act of corruption with anticipation.

#### *D. What is the expected impact?*

Overall objective: Help improve the quality of life of individuals living in rural mining communities, channeling investment of mining royalties into projects that are sustainable and respond to the most urgent needs of mining populations.

Specific objectives.

1. Promote transparency in mining royalty expenditures, involving the mining population in the management of its resources by way of a new system of transparent management leveraging the participation and knowledge of all actors.
2. Diagnose the needs of mining towns on the basis of qualitative indicators that take into consideration unique socioeconomic conditions, needs, as well as potential opportunities, attending with the most urgency the most vulnerable populations within communities.
3. Facilitate access by mining populations to relevant information for decision making as well as their active participation to promote project initiatives by way of an external agent.
4. Ensure the viability of, planning, implementation, and monitoring development projects, providing capacity building services to social leaders and public administrators.

#### **VI. Similar examples.**

The first stage leverages the experience in System of Economic Decision Information of the Administration of Spain that has its foundation in the idea that expenditures should be efficient, objective, prioritized, transparent, sustainable, and socially admissible. Based on a comparative analysis of government entities that have homogenous characteristics, the Spanish system establishes baselines for the indicators of its entities. A deviation of one indicator with respect to “normal” behavior equates to efficient or inefficient management depending on the direction of

the deviation. The key advantage of this system is its ability to contribute to objective decision-making.<sup>16</sup> In the case of Peru, we have decided to apply this concept to a set of social qualitative indicators to identify areas in which a given municipality is underperforming.

The second stage parts from what has been learned from the 1994 Law of Popular Participation (*Ley de Participación Popular*) of Bolivia that established Territorial Grassroots Organizations (*Organizaciones Territoriales de Base* or OTBs) and Oversight Committees (*Comités de Vigilancia*) to channel the participation of the community in the formulation of the Annual Operating Plan (*Plan Operacional Anual* or POA) as well as the Municipal Development Plan (*Plan de Desarrollo Municipal* or PDM). In the case of the municipality of Vallegrande, an NGO succeeded in mobilizing 23 local organizations in the implementation of the POA and PDM drafting processes in 2003/04. Said NGO took responsibility for collecting information on community needs, as well as on the projects the community wanted through participatory workshops and an institutional fair. They used brief and easy-to-understand documents with the public and local government officials made themselves available to answer questions from the public.

In Vallegrande, the trend in poverty reduction since 1994 appears to be correlated with higher rates of community involvement. Nevertheless, following the participative process for 2003/04, elites were able to manipulate the budget for their own benefit; the oversight committees overreached and alienated some municipal officials. Granted it is difficult to prevent situations like this, we believe that Stage #4 equips the population with a mechanism by which it can prevent the municipality from implementing projects that do not contribute to an improvement in quality of life in the community.

## **VII. Challenges potentially encountered.**

1. *The external agent as a threat to local government and mining companies.*

Approach: Clarify the presence of the external agent not just as an informant. Highlight his or her role of providing continuous support to the municipality via technical training for local government authorities in areas having to do with projects utilizing mining royalties (i.e. elaboration and development of project profiles). At the same time, make it clear that his or her presence is beneficial for mining companies given that the agent is there to relieve much of the burden that frequently falls on the private sector, avoiding the unrest that can lead to social conflict.

2. *Lack of trust in the external agent on the part of the population, leading to low participation in informational meetings.*

Approach: Present the agent in all communities, explaining its functions and the benefits of its presence. The agent should be present in assemblies and meetings with local

authorities before starting to assume functions officially. If possible, the external agent should come from the community itself or, at least, have some sort of connection to it. At the same time, the external agent is not to be imposed on the community from the outside; his or her role is to collaborate with the community so that it may play a larger role in the management of the economic resources derived from mining royalties.

3. *Difficulty in creating profiles of projects for the incubator.*

Approach: The creation of a committee of experts that carries out periodic and continuing training sessions to designated mining populations. Similarly, we propose the establishment of a repository for project profiles that all municipalities may access, regardless of whether they are mining communities.

4. *Community justice in the case of irregularities, corruption and/or misappropriation of the budget.*

Approach: Oversight committees as a mediator. Highlight the importance of proceeding with evidence and, with the help of the external agent, make the violation public, through the media. Go to the Comptroller's office to enforce the penalty.

5. *The elites of the local government itself appropriate control of the expenditure of mining royalties.*

Approach: The committee will have an equitable representation of community members so that no one group has the power to appropriate mining royalty funds. By way of the external agent, community participation will be encouraged in all processes related to the spending of mining royalties so that the budgeting process is truly transparent.

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<sup>1</sup> Hidalgo Suárez, Luis. "Regiones Con Más Canon Ejecutan Solo 57% De Presupuesto De Inversión." *Gestion*. N.p., 11 Nov. 2013. Web. 21 Mar. 2015. <<http://gestion.pe/economia/regiones-mas-canon-ejecutan-solo-57-presupuesto-inversion-2080711>>.

<sup>2</sup> Arreaza, A., & Reuter, A. (2012). Can a mining windfall improve welfare? Evidence from Peru with municipal level data.

<sup>3</sup> Hidalgo Suárez, Luis. "Regiones Con Más Canon Ejecutan Solo 57% De Presupuesto De Inversión." *Gestion*. N.p., 11 Nov. 2013. Web. 21 Mar. 2015. <<http://gestion.pe/economia/regiones-mas-canon-ejecutan-solo-57-presupuesto-inversion-2080711>>.

<sup>4</sup> Lima: Instituto Nacional De Estadística E Informática (Perú). Dirección Técnica De Demografía E Indicadores Sociales, 2010. Mapa De Pobreza Provincial Y Distrital 2009: El Enfoque De La Pobreza Monetaria. Dirección Técnica De Demografía E Indicadores Sociales, Oct. 2010. Web. 21 Mar. 2015. <<http://www.unfpa.org.pe/publicaciones/publicacionesperu/INEI-Mapa-Pobreza-2009.pdf>>.

<sup>5</sup> *The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative*. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Jan. 2015. <<https://eiti.org/>>.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Luque, Ignacio. "Hacia Un Nuevo Modelo De Gestión Para La Reducción Del Gasto Público." *El Confidencial*. N.p., 28 June 2013. Web. 30 Enero 2015. <<http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/espana/tribuna/2013/06/28/hacia-un-nuevo-modelo-de-gestion-para-la-reduccion-del-gasto-publico-11553>>.

<sup>8</sup> "PLAN DE DESARROLLO MUNICIPAL CONCERTADO." Municipio Al Día - Planificación. Instituto De Estudios Peruanos, n.d. Web. 21 Mar. 2015. <[http://www.municipioaldia.com/index.php?fp\\_cont=987#.VMu3hJ2G98N](http://www.municipioaldia.com/index.php?fp_cont=987#.VMu3hJ2G98N)>.

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<sup>9</sup> "Los Componentes De La Densidad Del Estado." (n.d.): n. pag. Informe Sobre Desarrollo Humano Perú 2009. UNDP, 03 Feb. 2009. Web. 21 Mar. 2015. <[http://www.undp.org/content/dam/peru/docs/Publicaciones%20pobreza/Desarrollo%20Humano%202009/Capitulo 3.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/peru/docs/Publicaciones%20pobreza/Desarrollo%20Humano%202009/Capitulo%203.pdf)>.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Boza, B. (2006). Canon minero: caja chica o planca para el desarrollo?. Ciudadanos al Día.

<sup>12</sup> Misión Y Visión | Ciudadanos Al Día." Ciudadanos Al Día, n.d. Web. 21 Mar. 2015.

<<http://www.ciudadanosaldia.org/sobre-cad/mision-y-vision.html>>.

<sup>13</sup> Wong, S. (2012). What have been the impacts of World Bank Community-Driven Development Programs? CDD impact evaluation review and operational and research implications. World Bank, Washington, DC.

<sup>14</sup> "Creación Del FED." Fondo De Estimulo Al Desempeño. Ministerio De Desarrollo E Inclusión Social, n.d. Web. 21 Mar. 2015. <<http://www.midis.gob.pe/index.php?fes%2Ffed-creacion>>.

<sup>15</sup> Boza, B. (2006). Canon minero: caja chica o planca para el desarrollo?. Ciudadanos al Día.

<sup>16</sup> Luque, Ignacio. "Hacia Un Nuevo Modelo De Gestión Para La Reducción Del Gasto Público." *El Confidencial*. N.p., 28 June 2013. Web. 30 Jan. 2015. <<http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/espana/tribuna/2013/06/28/hacia-un-nuevo-modelo-de-gestion-para-la-reduccion-del-gasto-publico-11553>>.