Supplementary Appendix to "Human Rights Treaties and Mobilized Dissent Against the State"

1 Theoretical Implications

The theory of this paper builds on a formal model presented in full in Anonymized.

1.1 Model Specification

We model an interaction between a Leader (L) and a Group (G). At the outset, the Leader decides whether to commit the state to a human rights treaty, with the expectation that doing so will amplify (ϵ) the extant probability he will experience costly litigation (ϕ) for a given level of repression. After committing to the treaty or not, the Group decides how much to dissent (d) around a demand, and the Leader simultaneously chooses how much to repress (r), though both of these decisions entail resource costs ($-d$ and $-r$) that make the actors want to minimize their expenditures. Finally, their decisions condition the probability (θ) that the Leader remains in power at the end of the game. Equations (1) and (2) present the players' expected utility functions, and we discuss the notation below. The Leader's payoffs are:

$$U_L = \begin{cases} -r * \phi + \left(1 - \frac{d}{d+r}\right) * \theta + \left(\frac{d}{d+r}\right) * \frac{\theta}{\kappa} & \text{uncommitted to IHRT} \\ -r * (\phi + \epsilon) + \left(1 - \frac{d}{d+r}\right) * \theta + \left(\frac{d}{d+r}\right) * \frac{\theta}{\kappa} + \mu & \text{committed to IHRT} \end{cases} \tag{1}$$

and the Group's payoffs are:

$$U_G = -d + \left(1 - \frac{d}{d+r}\right) * (1-\theta) + \left(\frac{d}{d+r}\right) * \left(1 - \frac{\theta}{\kappa}\right) \tag{2}$$

We make the following assumptions:

- Repression ($r \geq 0$) requires resources, represented by $-r$ in both utilities in Equation (1). The more the state represses (or the more severe its action), the more resources it expends.
- Dissent ($d \geq 0$) requires resources, represented by $-d$ in Equation (2). The more the Group dissents (or the more severe its action), the more resources it expends.
- The chosen levels of repression and dissent affect the probability the Group receives its demanded policy or good allocation $\left(\frac{d}{d+r}\right)$. Using this relational specification, we capture the idea that the Group is more likely to receive its demands as dissent increases and less likely as repression increases.
- If the Group does not receive its demand, the Leader remains in power (with benefits equalling 1) with probability $0 \leq \theta \leq 1$, which represents his baseline or *a priori* job security. If, instead, the Group receives its demands, the Leader remains in power with a lower probability: $\frac{\theta}{\kappa}$, such that $\kappa > 1$. κ can represent the scope of the accommodation; the more the Leader gives in—costing him resources or legitimacy—the more he risks his position of power. He is κ more vulnerable to turnover if he loses the conflict (which he does with probability $\frac{d}{d+r}$), and if he loses office, L receives 0. Although the baseline probability of remaining in office is exogenous, both the Group's and the Leader's conflict decisions condition the *ex post* probability L will lose office.
- The Leader's costs for repression also include the probability ($0 \leq \phi \leq 1$) of incurring litigation-related costs (valued at 1).

- Committing to an HRT makes the Leader a small amount (ϵ, such that $0 < \epsilon < 1 - \phi$) more likely to incur litigation-related costs.
- The Leader receives a benefit—economic or political, domestic or international, physical or reputational—for committing to an IHRT, represented by the term $\mu > 0$.

1.2 Equilibrium

The model solution is a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, such that there is one optimal choice for any given combination of parameter values. Proposition 1 states the equilibrium solution; proofs can be found below.

Proposition 1. *The following strategies constitute the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: (1) when L does not commit to an HRT, G dissents at level d_U and S represses at level r_U, defined as*

$$d_U \equiv \frac{(\kappa-1)\theta\phi}{\kappa(1+\phi)^2} \quad \textit{and} \quad r_U \equiv \frac{(\kappa-1)\theta}{\kappa(1+\phi)^2};$$

(2) when L commits to an IHRT, G dissents at level d_C and S represses at level r_C, defined as

$$d_C \equiv -\frac{(\kappa-1)\theta(\epsilon+\phi)}{\kappa(1+\epsilon+\phi)^2} \quad \textit{and} \quad r_C \equiv \frac{(\kappa-1)\theta}{\kappa(1+\epsilon+\phi)^2};$$

and (3) L commits to a treaty when

$$\mu > \frac{\theta}{2\kappa}\left(-1 + \frac{2(\kappa-1)}{(1+\phi)^2} + \frac{2}{1+\phi} - \frac{2(\kappa-1)}{(1+\epsilon+\phi)^2}\right).$$

1.3 Proof of Equilibrium Behavior

In the final stage, L and G simultaneously choose levels of repression and dissent.

When the state is not committed to an HRT:

The first order conditions (FOC) of the players' respective utility functions are $\frac{\partial U_L(\neg C)}{\partial r} = \frac{d\theta(\kappa-1)}{\kappa(d+r)^2} - \phi = 0$, which ensures r_U will be a maximum because $\frac{\partial^2 U_L(\neg C)}{\partial r^2} = -\frac{d\theta(\kappa-1)}{\kappa(d+r)^3} < 0$ when $\kappa > 1$, which is true by assumption, and $\frac{\partial U_G(\neg C)}{\partial d} = -1 + \frac{r\theta(\kappa-1)}{\kappa(d+r)^2} = 0$, which ensures d_U will be a maximum because $\frac{\partial^2 U_G(\neg C)}{\partial d^2} = \frac{2r\theta(\kappa-1)}{\kappa(d+r)^3} < 0$, in both cases when $\kappa > 1$, or when L is more likely to lose office if he loses the conflict with G, which is true by assumption. Solving simultaneously for d and r yields G's and L's optimal choices to be

$$d_U = \frac{(\kappa-1)\theta\phi}{\kappa(1+\phi)^2} \quad \text{and} \quad r_U = \frac{(\kappa-1)\theta}{\kappa(1+\phi)^2}.$$

When the state is committed to an HRT:

The FOC of L's utility function is $\frac{\partial U_L(C)}{\partial r} = \frac{(\kappa-1)d\theta}{\kappa(d+r)^2} - \phi - \epsilon = 0$, which ensures r_C will be a maximum because $\frac{\partial^2 U_L(C)}{\partial r^2} = -\frac{2(\kappa-1)d\theta}{\kappa(d+r)^3} < 0$ when $\kappa > 1$, which is true by assumption. The FOC of G's utility function is

$\frac{\partial U_G(C)}{\partial d} = -1 + \frac{r\theta(\kappa-1)}{\kappa(d+r)^2} = 0$, which ensures d_C will be a maximum because $\frac{\partial^2 U_G(C)}{\partial d^2} = \frac{2(\kappa-1)r\theta}{\kappa(d+r)^3} < 0$ when $\kappa > 1$. Solving simultaneously for d and r yields G's and L's optimal choices to be

$$d_C = -\frac{\theta(\epsilon+\phi)(\kappa-1)}{\kappa(1+\epsilon+\varphi)^2} \quad \text{and} \quad r_C = \frac{(\kappa-1)\theta}{\kappa(1+\epsilon+\varphi)^2}.$$

The optimal d and r in both committed and uncommitted states are positive given the defined constraints of all parameters.

Commitment stage:

Finally, L commits to the HRT when $U_L(C) > U_L(\neg C)$. Substituting the optimal levels of repression and dissent into the original utility functions, L will commit to an IHRT when

$$\frac{\theta + \kappa\mu + \frac{(\kappa-1)\theta}{(1+\epsilon+\phi)^2}}{\kappa} > \frac{\theta(1+2\kappa+\phi(4+\phi))}{2\kappa(1+\phi)^2}$$

which holds true when

$$\mu > \frac{\theta\left(-1 + \frac{2(\kappa-1)}{(1+\phi)^2} + \frac{2}{1+\phi} - \frac{2(\kappa-1)}{(1+\epsilon+\phi)^2}\right)}{2\kappa}.$$

1.4 Comparative Statics

Comparative statics demonstrating the relationships stated in Hypotheses 1 and 2 are presented in Figure 1.4. Figure 1.4 plots the equilibrium level of dissent across the range of job security under two scenarios: (a) a low probability ($\phi = 0.2$) of incurring litigation costs for repression and (b) a high probability ($\phi = 0.8$) of incurring litigation costs. These figures further assume that commitment to a treaty increases the expectation of litigation by $\epsilon = 0.2$. The solid lines represent the level of dissent that maximizes the group's utility for a given level of job security when authorities are not bound to an HRT; dashed lines represent optimal challenges under HRT commitment. The *difference* between the solid and dashed lines represents the equilibrium effect of treaty obligation.



2 Operationalization

2.1 Judicial Effectiveness

Courts are effective when they are free from manipulation (e.g., Cross 1999), and when domestic actors are willing and able to punish noncompliance (e.g., Vanberg 2005). A measure of Judicial Effectiveness must account for two concepts. First, it should indicate whether judges are free to rule as they see fit and whether their rulings are translated into political outcomes. Second, the measure should reflect the extent to which the population believes the court to be effective in its ability to rule against the state; this captures the idea that individuals are more likely to bring litigation to an effective court. To measure judicial effectiveness, we use a new indicator from Linzer and Staton (2011). Recognizing that extant measures are indicators of an underlying concept, Linzer and Staton (2011) use a heteroskedastic graded response item response theory model to combine information from eight existing measures to create a latent measure of Judicial Effectiveness. The final continuous measure included in our models ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values on the scale indicate higher levels of effectiveness. LJI draws on data from Cingranelli and Filippov (2010), Clague et al. (1999), Feld and Voigt (2003), Howard and Carey (2004), Marshall and Jaggers (2009), Tate and Keith (2007), among others.

2.2 Executive Job Security

To represent the executive's probability of political survival, we follow Cheibub (1998), who uses parametric survival models to create empirical measures of job insecurity based on the leader's time in office, previous trends in leadership change, and annual economic growth. Our main measure of job insecurity is an estimated function of time-to-date in office, previous trends in leadership change, and economic growth. The resultant measure of job insecurity ranges from 0 (lowest probability of leadership turnover) to 1 (highest probability of leadership turnover). We reverse the scale to create the measure of Job Security used in our empirical models. Because, on average, state leaders face a low probability of losing office in any given year, the data are highly right-skewed. Two additional measures of job insecurity. Because leadership change in democracies is arguably different than leadership change in autocracies, our first alternative measure of job insecurity accounts for previous trends in irregular leader change, the age of the leader, and the level of democracy of the state. Our second alternative measure of job insecurity accounts for the Cheibub (1998) covariates, as well as previous trends in irregular leader change, the age of the leader, and the level of democracy of the state.

2.3 Measuring Repression and Dissent

Although there are several cross-national measures of Dissent available at the country-year unit of observation, these measures are inappropriate for our dependent variable for two reasons. First, these indicators often include information on state repression in addition to providing information about opposition mobilization. Second, most commonly used data on mobilized challenges is only available at the country-year unit of observation. Given that mobilized challenges and state repression can vary so much within a year, and that temporal aggregation of events data can bias parameter estimates (Shellman 2004), we prefer to use a less aggregated measure of popular dissent as our dependent variable.

This section describes the data created for empirical analysis of the theoretical implications in more detail; the data was originally coded for use in ANONYMIZED. More detail on the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) dataset can be found in King and Lowe (2003).

We use data from the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) Project (Bond et al. 2003, King and Lowe 2003), which codes events from daily reports of the Reuters Global News Service from 1990 to 2004 and aggregate the data to the state-month level of analysis. The IDEA data includes over 10 million

events, from conflict to sporting events to elections to natural disasters. From the raw IDEA data, I extracted all conflictual events, using the Taylor et al. (1999) Conflict-Cooperation Scale for Inter- and Intrastate Interactions as my guide. To develop this scale, Taylor et al. asked scholars of intrastate conflict to rank the IDEA event categories on scales of contention–accommodation, coercion–altruism, and physical violence and collapsed these scales into a single index of conflict and cooperation. From these rankings, Taylor et al. (1999) developed a scale that ranges from -11.033 (most conflictual) to 5.813 (most cooperative). I weighted each conflictual event[1] according to its Taylor et al. index coding. I then coded all conflict events with a government source and civilian target as repression and all conflict events with a civilian source and government target as dissent, limiting the sample to events that occur between sources and targets within the same state.

The Taylor et al. scale places conflictual events on an ordinal scale with a linear-like relationship, which may not be an appropriate approximation of the actual relationship between these behaviors. While the scale was developed to assign each event a weight rather than a ranking,[2] the weights are still based on the (informed) opinions of scholars. Weights suggest a sense of equality among events that could be seen as very qualitatively different. How many instances of torture is the equivalent of one extrajudicial killing? Is a state-wide curfew the equivalent of isolated beatings? These events are difficult to compare. The scale seems increasingly ambiguous in the small differences, as it is difficult to assess qualitatively whether a beating (weighted -8.689) is more or less severe than an abduction (weighted -8.532), though this index suggests they are quantitatively different. While using such a scale ranks among the most reliable and valid ways to quantify such a concept as the severity of conflict, basing the scale on scholarly opinions introduces ambiguity to any weighting system.

In an attempt to use the most valid and representative possible, I selected three dissent event forms and three repression event forms to represent the range of severity of each of these behaviors.Table 1 lists the selected event forms and their respective severity weights. They serve to represent a varied range of violence, coercion, and disruption. When comparing them qualitatively, one event type is clearly more severe than another.

IDEA identifies targets and sources of violent and non-violent behavior, allowing us to create a measure of the number of times in which a member of a domestic non-state group took a mobilized conflictual action against the government in a given month. Our theory posits the relationship between structural variables and the likelihood of mobilized dissent, so the variable we include in our estimates is a dichotomous indicator of Dissent coded 1 in a given country-month if a domestic non-state actor engages in any of these actions, targeted at a state actor. This operationalization allows us to estimate the continuous, latent likelihood of observing an act of Dissent against the state in a given country-month.

[1] That is, each event that is relevant to intrastate conflict short of civil war. I dropped any event that did not have a Taylor et al. coding, such as sporting events, health articles, natural disasters, etc.

[2] The Shellman (2004) piece criticizes ordinal rankings as being unrepresentative of the actual relationship between behaviors and develops a weighting system in the same style of Taylor et al. (1999).

Table 1: Event Forms Chosen for Analysis

Repression			Dissent		
Event Form	Weight	Freq	Event Form	Weight	Freq
Armed Hostilities[a]	-10.399	2542	Armed Hostilities[d]	-10.399	2024
Non-armed Physical Force against Human Targets[b]	-8.514	3210	Non-armed Physical Force against Human Targets[e]	-8.514	2497
Declare Martial Law or Curfew[c]	-5.813	2413	Non-armed Protests[f]	-5.042	2268

[a] IDEA event form armed hostilities <RAID>.
[b] IDEA event forms physical assault <PASS>, corporal punishment <CORP>, and beating <BEAT>.
[c] IDEA event form declare martial law or curfew & the imposition of similar rules <BANA>.
[d] IDEA event form armed hostilities <RAID>.
[e] IDEA event forms physical assault <PASS>, corporal punishment <CORP>, and beating <BEAT>.
[f] IDEA event forms non-military protests & sit-ins <POBS>, protest processions <PMAR>, and protests that place participants at risk <PALT>.

3 Descriptive Data

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of each of the measures used in our analysis. The reported estimates include 24,883 observations.

[Table 2 about here.]

Figure 1 is a histogram showing the right skew of our monthly data on executive job security.



Figure 1: Histogram of Executive Job Security

Figure 2 is a histogram showing the left skew of our monthly data on the number of reported dissent events.



Figure 2: Histogram of Dissent Count

Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of our country-month data across IHRT commitment status, executive job security, and domestic judicial effectiveness, as well as a correlation matrix of our key independent and dependent variables.

[Tables 3 and 4 about here.]

4 Model Specification, Substantive Effects, & Robustness Checks

Table 5 shows the results reported in our manuscript.

[Table 5 about here.]

Figure 3 shows our substantive results based on the Average Treatment Effect for the Controls (ATC), as reported in the manuscript.



(a) Ineffective Judiciary

(b) Effective Judiciary

Figure 3: Average Treatment Effect (ATC) of ICCPR Commitment on the Pr(Mobilized Dissent) as Job Security Increases in States with (a) Ineffective Courts and (b) Effective Courts for the Control Cases

Figure 4 shows our substantive results based on the Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATT). According to our theory, we would expect that if a state that is committed to a treaty were to be made to revoke that commitment, mobilization would decrease in states with ineffective judiciaries and sufficiently secure leaders. These figures support this prediction.



(a) Ineffective Judiciary

(b) Effective Judiciary

Figure 4: Average Treatment Effect (ATT) of ICCPR Commitment on the Pr(Mobilized Dissent) as Job Security Increases in States with (a) Ineffective Courts and (b) Effective Courts for the Treated Cases

Figure 5 shows the substantive interpretation of the estimated results reversing the interacting effect between Job Security and Judicial Effectiveness. This figures plot the ATC marginal effect of commitment to the respective treaties on the probability of mobilized dissent across the range of Judicial Effectiveness for both (a) insecure and (b) secure leaders. These figures further support our predictions. Groups are no more or less likely to engage in mobilized dissent for any level of judicial effectiveness when leaders are vulnerable to turnover and will thus act without institutional constraints. When leaders are comparatively secure in office, commitment to an HRT makes a group more likely to engage in dissent when the judiciary is ineffective, and less so as judicial effectiveness increases.



(a) Insecure Leader

(b) Secure Leader

Figure 5: Average Treatment Effect (ATC) of ICCPR Commitment on the Pr(Mobilized Dissent) as Judicial Effectiveness Increases in States with (a) Insecure Leaders and (b) Secure Leaders for the Control Cases

Figure 6 shows the the average treatment effect (ATC) of ICCPR commitment on the probability of mobilized dissent at different percentiles of judicial effectiveness.



(a) Judicial Effectiveness (Minimum) (b) Judicial Effectiveness (10th) (c) Judicial Effectiveness (20th)

(d) Judicial Effectiveness (30th) (e) Judicial Effectiveness (40th) (f) Judicial Effectiveness (50th)

(g) Judicial Effectiveness (60th) (h) Judicial Effectiveness (70th) (i) Judicial Effectiveness (80th)

(j) Judicial Effectiveness (90th) (k) Judicial Effectiveness (Maximum)

Figure 6: Average Treatment Effect (ATC) of ICCPR Commitment on the Pr(Mobilized Dissent) as Executive Job Security Increases at Different Levels of Judicial Effectiveness

Table 6 shows the robustness of our reported results to the inclusion of a measure of democracy in the selection/outcome equations.

[Table 6 about here.]

Table 7 shows the robustness of our reported results to the inclusion of a dichotomized measure of human rights organization activity from Bhasin and Murdie (2011).

[Table 7 about here.]

Although selection models are notoriously sensitive to model specification (e.g., Sartori 2003), our results are highly robust to a myriad of model specifications as shown below. Tables 8 and 9 show the robustness of our reported results to alternative measures of job security, repression, and dissent as noted in the manuscript.

[Tables 8 and 9 about here.]

Table 10 shows the robustness of our reported results to dropping Eastern European country-months from the analysis.

[Table 10 about here.]

Table 11 shows the robustness of our reported results for the ICCPR to models in which the unit of observation is the country-year rather than the country-month.

[Table 11 about here.]

Table 12 shows the robustness of our reported results to the inclusion of polynomial time counters to account for temporal dependence.

[Table 12 about here.]

Table 13 shows the robustness of our reported results to the inclusion of cubic splines to account for temporal dependence.

[Table 13 about here.]

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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Frequency
Dissent (*IDEA*)	0	1	–	10,904
ICCPR Commitment	0	1	–	21,730
Judicial Effectiveness (*Linzer & Staton*)	0.016	0.989	0.516	–
Executive Job Security	0.903	0.995	0.982	–
Repression (*IDEA*)	0	1	–	10,980
IO Membership	0	10	3.788	–

NOTES: Frequency reports the number of 1s for binary variables. The reported estimates include 24,883 observations.

Table 3: Frequency of Value Combinations for Country-Months Across ICCPR Commitment Status, Job Security, and Judicial Effectiveness (1990 - 2004)

				ICCPR Committed	**ICCPR Uncommitted**
Job Security	*Low*	**Judicial Effectiveness**	*Low*	3068	860
			High	4250	621
	High	**Judicial Effectiveness**	*Low*	8906	5454
			High	5506	5343

NOTES: Judicial Effectiveness and Job Security are dichotomized at their means. Frequency reports the number of 1s with positive values for the combination of variables in that cell.

Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Key Independent and Dependent Variables

	Dissent	Repression	Judicial Effectiveness	Job Security	IO Membership
Dissent	1.0000				
Repression	0.4569	1.0000			
Judicial Effectiveness	0.1486	0.0904	1.0000		
Job Security	-0.1917	-0.1526	-0.3436	1.0000	
IO Membership	0.1221	0.1023	0.2995	-0.1459	1.0000

Table 5: Effect of ICCPR Commitment on Dissent

Outcome DV: Dissent	Signatories	Non-Signatories
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-0.180	-9.902
	(4.668)	(10.461)
$Job\ Security_t$	-13.097*	-26.861*
	(3.533)	(7.627)
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	0.228	10.615
	(4.769)	(10.661)
$Repression_t$	1.062*	1.298*
	(0.032)	(0.049)
$Constant$	12.387*	25.523*
	(3.444)	(7.572)
Selection DV: ICCPR Commitment		
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-43.456*	
	(4.170)	
$Job\ Security_t$	-34.335*	
	(3.016)	
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	45.144*	
	(4.238)	
$Repression_t$	0.017	
	(0.019)	
$IO\ Membership_t$	0.103*	
	(0.005)	
$Constant$	33.585*	
	(2.971)	
ρ	-0.563*	0.274*
	(0.104)	(0.134)
$Log-pseudo\ likelihood$	-27001.530	-27001.530
N	24883	24883

NOTES: * Significant within 95% CI. Sample size: 147 countries from 1990 to 2004. ρ measures sample selection and ranges from -1 to 1.

Table 6: Effect of ICCPR Commitment on Dissent (Controlling for Democracy)

Outcome DV: Dissent	Signatories	Non-Signatories
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-13.557*	-0.619
	(4.571)	(10.023)
$Job\ Security_t$	-25.705*	-17.106*
	(3.423)	(7.235)
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	14.178	0.891
	(4.664)	(10.194)
$Repression_t$	1.081*	1.313*
	(0.031)	(0.045)
$Democracy_t$	-0.270*	0.259*
	(0.039)	(0.080)
$Constant$	24.723*	15.907*
	(3.356)	(7.144)
Selection DV: ICCPR Commitment		
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-17.935*	
	(4.248)	
$Job\ Security_t$	-7.973*	
	(3.145)	
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	18.411*	
	(4.324)	
$Repression_t$	0.041*	
	(0.019)	
$IO\ Membership_t$	0.109*	
	(0.005)	
$Democracy_t$	0.714*	
	(0.025)	
$Constant$	7.634*	
	(3.097)	
ρ	-0.486*	0.250
	(0.104)	(0.127)
$Log-pseudo\ likelihood$	-26582.738	-26582.738
N	24883	24883

NOTES: * Significant within 95% CI. Sample size: 147 countries from 1990 to 2004. ρ measures sample selection and ranges from -1 to 1.

Table 7: Effect of ICCPR Commitment on Dissent (Controlling for HRO Activity)

Outcome DV: Dissent	Signatories	Non-Signatories
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-1.231	-11.908
	(4.722)	(10.495)
$Job\ Security_t$	-13.699*	-27.458*
	(3.580)	(7.679)
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	1.309	12.602
	(4.825)	(10.695)
$Repression_t$	1.060*	1.289*
	(0.032)	(0.045)
$HRO\ Activity_t$	0.184*	0.145*
	(0.020)	(0.038)
$Constant$	12.850*	26.012*
	(3.487)	(7.623)
Selection DV: ICCPR Commitment		
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-43.030*	
	(4.179)	
$Job\ Security_t$	-34.214*	
	(3.020)	
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	44.725*	
	(4.248)	
$Repression_t$	0.029	
	(0.019)	
$IO\ Membership_t$	0.104*	
	(0.005)	
$HRO\ Activity_t$	-0.091*	
	(0.018)	
$Constant$	33.450*	
	(2.974)	
ρ	-0.514*	0.239
	(0.107)	(0.131)
$Log-pseudo\ likelihood$	-26943.121	-26943.121
N	24883	24883

NOTES: * Significant within 95% CI. Sample size: 147 countries from 1990 to 2004. ρ measures sample selection and ranges from -1 to 1.

Table 8: Effect of ICCPR Commitment on Dissent (Alternative Job Security)

Outcome DV: Dissent	Signatories	Non-Signatories
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	11.767*	-14.015
	(4.413)	(10.848)
$Full\ Job\ Security_t$	-3.830	-31.206*
	(3.410)	(8.130)
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	-11.997*	14.600
	(4.503)	(11.022)
$Repression_t$	1.059*	1.287*
	(0.031)	(0.048)
$Constant$	3.304	29.875*
	(3.331)	(8.076)
Selection DV: ICCPR Commitment		
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-46.724*	
	(4.155)	
$Full\ Job\ Security_t$	-41.624*	
	(3.044)	
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	48.295*	
	(4.218)	
$Repression_t$	0.004	
	(0.019)	
$IO\ Membership_t$	0.106*	
	(0.005)	
$Constant$	40.840*	
	(3.001)	
ρ	-0.584*	0.256
	(0.100)	(0.130)
$Log-pseudo\ likelihood$	-26962.573	-26962.573
N	24883	24883

NOTES: * Significant within 95% CI. Sample size: 147 countries from 1990 to 2004. ρ measures sample selection and ranges from -1 to 1.

Table 9: Effect of ICCPR Commitment on Dissent (Alternative Repression)

Outcome DV: Dissent	Signatories	Non-Signatories
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	3.068	0.938
	(4.366)	(10.501)
$Job\ Security_t$	-12.798*	27.199*
	(3.326)	(7.700)
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	-3.174	-0.515
	(4.458)	(10.706)
$Repression_t$	1.044*	1.094*
	(0.034)	(0.059)
$Constant$	12.497*	26.135*
	(3.251)	(7.649)
Selection DV: ICCPR Commitment		
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-46.088*	
	(4.148)	
$Job\ Security_t$	-37.180*	
	(3.029)	
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	47.798*	
	(4.216)	
$Repression_t$	-0.127*	
	(0.026)	
$IO\ Membership_t$	0.102*	
	(0.005)	
$Constant$	36.418*	
	(2.984)	
ρ	-0.697*	0.183
	(0.104)	(0.135)
$Log-pseudo\ likelihood$	-28306.360	-28306.360
N	24883	24883

NOTES: * Significant within 95% CI. Sample size: 147 countries from 1990 to 2004. ρ measures sample selection and ranges from -1 to 1.

Table 10: Effect of ICCPR Commitment on Dissent (Dropping Eastern Europe)

Outcome DV: Dissent	Signatories	Non-Signatories
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-5.797	-15.136
	(4.832)	(10.904)
$Job\ Security_t$	-17.697*	-28.238*
	(3.594)	(7.914)
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	6.072	16.063
	(4.943)	(11.130)
$Repression_t$	1.130*	1.331*
	(0.030)	(0.043)
$Constant$	16.749*	26.677*
	(3.501)	(7.858)
Selection DV: ICCPR Commitment		
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-46.239*	
	(4.180)	
$Job\ Security_t$	-31.933*	
	(3.010)	
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	48.184*	
	(4.250)	
$Repression_t$	0.010	
	(0.019)	
$IO\ Membership_t$	0.104*	
	(0.005)	
$Constant$	31.165*	
	(2.964)	
ρ	-0.407*	-0.153
	(0.108)	(0.146)
$Log-pseudo\ likelihood$	-25010.461	-25010.461
N	23241	23241

NOTES: * Significant within 95% CI. ρ measures sample selection and ranges from -1 to 1.

Table 11: Effect of ICCPR Commitment on Dissent (Country-Year)

Outcome DV: Dissent	Signatories	Non-Signatories
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	6.457*	2.393
	(2.219)	(5.779)
$Job\ Security_t$	2.238	-0.301
	(1.603)	(3.783)
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	-8.025*	-1.995
	(2.7001)	(6.831)
$Repression_t$	1.095*	1.426*
	(0.088)	(0.324)
$Constant$	-1.471	-0.822
	(1.325)	(3.278)
Selection DV: ICCPR Commitment		
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-1.037	
	(1.705)	
$Job\ Security_t$	-4.289*	
	(1.272)	
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	2.211	
	(2.079)	
$Repression_t$	0.337*	
	(0.077)	
$IO\ Membership_t$	0.077*	
	(0.017)	
$Constant$	3.255*	
	(1.057)	
ρ	-0.955	-0.345
	(1.136)	(0.489)
$Log-pseudo\ likelihood$	-1881.025	-1881.025
N	2104	2104

NOTES: * Significant within 95% CI. Sample size: 147 countries from 1990 to 2004. ρ measures sample selection and ranges from -1 to 1.

Table 12: Effect of ICCPR Commitment on Dissent (Accounting for Temporal Dependence)

Outcome DV: Dissent	Signatories	Non-Signatories
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-5.303	6.938
	(4.611)	(10.284)
$Job\ Security_t$	-15.437*	-10.751
	(3.386)	(7.334)
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	5.719	-6.770
	(4.693)	(10.451)
$Repression_t$	1.000*	1.105*
	(0.021)	(0.038)
t	-0.750*	-0.639*
	(0.040)	(0.054)
t^2	0.131*	0.091*
	(0.019)	(0.019)
t^3	-0.007*	-0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Selection DV: ICCPR Commitment		
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-73.038*	
	(7.253)	
$Job\ Security_t$	-55.796*	
	(5.661)	
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	74.759*	
	(7.368)	
$Repression_t$	-0.024	
	(0.036)	
$IO\ Membership_t$	0.118*	
	(0.010)	
t	-3.153*	
	(0.068)	
t^2	0.483*	
	(0.015)	
t^3	-0.021*	
	(0.001)	
ρ	-0.189*	0.062*
	(0.069)	(0.029)
$Log-pseudo\ likelihood$	-15862.169	-15862.169
N	24883	24883

NOTES: * Significant within 95% CI. Sample size: 147 countries from 1990 to 2004. Constants not reported. ρ measures sample selection and ranges from -1 to 1.

Table 13: Effect of ICCPR Commitment on Dissent (Accounting for Temporal Dependence)

Outcome DV: Dissent	Signatories	Non-Signatories
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-5.282	6.761
	(4.627)	(10.292)
$Job\ Security_t$	-15.426*	-10.804
	(3.400)	(7.343)
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	5.700	-6.591
	(4.711)	(10.459)
$Repression_t$	1.000*	1.100*
	(0.021)	(0.039)
$Spline\ 1$	-0.065*	-0.099*
	(0.018)	(0.024)
$Spline\ 2$	0.012	0.047*
	(0.015)	(0.018)
$Spline\ 3$	0.004	-0.018
	(0.010)	(0.011)
$Non\ Dissent\ Years$	-0.685*	-0.693*
	(0.036)	(0.059)
Selection DV: ICCPR Commitment		
$Judicial\ Effectiveness_t$	-79.054*	
	(7.473)	
$Job\ Security_t$	-60.581*	
	(5.909)	
$JE_t\ x\ JS_t$	80.868*	
	(7.590)	
$Repression_t$	-0.022	
	(0.037)	
$IO\ Membership_t$	0.121*	
	(0.010)	
$Spline\ 1$	-0.638*	
	(0.028)	
$Spline\ 2$	0.229*	
	(0.015)	
$Spline\ 3$	-0.046*	
	(0.006)	
$Non\ Ratification\ Years$	-3.970*	
	(0.106)	
ρ	-0.181	0.067*
	(0.079)	(0.029)
$Log-pseudo\ likelihood$	-15680.180	-15680.180
N	24883	24883

NOTES: * Significant within 95% CI. Sample size: 147 countries from 1990 to 2004. Constants not reported. ρ measures sample selection and ranges from -1 to 1.