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EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE – ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT

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Personal Information:

Date of birth: 13th December 1987
Citizenship: Spanish

Undergraduate Studies:

B.A., Economics and Politics, University of Exeter, 2009

Graduate Studies:

MSc, Economics and Finance, Universidad de Navarra, 2011
MRes, Economics, European University Institute, 2013

European University Institute, 2012 to present

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics

Thesis Title: "Essays in International Trade and Labour"

Expected Completion Date: June 2017

References:

Professor Ramon Marimon
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Professor Juan J. Dolado
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Assistant Professor Dominik Sachs
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Teaching and Research Fields:

Primary fields: International Trade, Macroeconomics

Secondary fields: Labour Economics, Computational Economics

Teaching Experience:

Spring 2015 International Trade, SAIS John Hopkins University (Bologna), Teaching Assistant for Professor Michael G. Plummer

Professional Activities:

Zurich Initiative on Computational Economics 2015, participant. COEURE Workshop on Labour Markets “EU Dual Labour Markets: Consequences and Potential Reforms” 2015, rapporteur. EABCN Training School: Micro-Structure of Trade – Theory and Evidence 2016, participant. Klaus Adam and Henning Weber “The Optimal Inflation Rate and Firm-Level Productivity Trends” at Workshop on Economics Policy Challenges Florence 2016, discussant. The Econometric Society 2016 European Winter Meeting in Edinburgh (upcoming), presenting. Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía 2016 in Bilbao (upcoming), presenting.

Research Papers:

“Competition, Tasks and Earnings Inequality” – **Job Marker Paper**

Abstract: Two major trends have characterized the changes in earnings distribution in developed countries since 1970. One, an increasing gap between top earners and the rest of workers. The second is the relative loss of purchasing power between the middle class and the rest. In this paper I propose a mechanism based on the special properties of cognitive tasks, by which a more globalized economy would see both trends in the earnings structure. In a more global world, workers performing cognitive tasks can capture a larger market share, giving rise to larger superstars, and increasing the inequality between top earners and the rest. At the same time, low skill cognitive workers, who made the middle class, have to perform less skilled jobs, creating a trickle down, and reducing the earnings of workers in the middle part of the earnings distribution.

“Optimal Haircuts” with Nicolas Aragon – Working Paper

Abstract: This paper develops a simple model of heterogeneous firms and households. Households finance firm's working capital, and firms are credit constrained and differ in their debt levels. When there is an aggregate shock, less productive firms go bankrupt. This directly decreases the demand for labor and the wage receipts for households and indirectly decreases income from the defaulted loans to firms. The main result of the paper is that there is an optimal haircut for deposits such that both firms and families are better off. Moreover, there is a tension between maximizing welfare and maximizing output. This provides a rationale for the Cyprus, Greek and Argentinean experience. We extend the model to an open economy and show an equivalence result. The model is also extended to infinite horizon to perform a quantitative exercise for the Argentinean devaluation episode of 2001.

“Seniority before homogeneity: A firm’s firing and hiring decision under firing costs with heterogeneous tenure” – Working Paper

Abstract: In most labour markets the cost of firing a worker increases with the years of seniority the worker has in the firm. But the heterogeneity of workers in this dimension is often ignored by the literature. But many labour markets, especially dual labour markets, seem to have large and discontinuous jumps in the firing costs with seniority. This can lead to changes in the hiring and firing behavior of firms as they fire workers before the large increase of firing costs, which then affects the seniority structure of the labour market. This paper studies the effects of non-continuous changes in firing costs with respect to seniority and its effects on the labour market. For this I create a partial equilibrium dynamic problem for a firm who can fire its current workers or hire new ones with seniority zero. Each period staying workers increase their seniority by one. I show that small non-continuous changes for firing costs in the seniority dimension can have large effects on the probabilities of being fired before the increase. This creates a labour market similar to labour markets. But the overall effects on employment can also be positive for the labour market.

“Behavioural Cycles” with Nicolas Aragon – Work in Progress

Abstract: We include behavioral biases in an open economy real business cycle model. Agents learn about different mental models regarding the processes generating disposable income. We combine Barberis et al (1998) and Mullainathan (2002) in order to create waves of optimism, pessimism, over reaction and under reaction. The model can explain three stylized facts found in developing economies that the standard model cannot capture: i) high consumption to output volatility ii) countercyclical trade balance and iii) sudden stops.