In Love With Hatred: Rethinking the Role Hatred Plays in Shaping Political Behavior

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This paper addresses the problem of isolating and measuring the influence of hatred on political behavior by analyzing a nationwide panel study conducted during the 2006 election campaign in Israel. We argue that collective hatred is composed of 2 distinct emotional aspects: chronic and immediate. The core of this paper is an analysis of the influence of these 2 types of group-based hatred on 3 aspects of political behavior: political learning, party identification stability, and partisan support. The results indicate that both aspects of collective hatred—chronic and immediate—are incongruously crucial for the understanding of political outcomes, particularly political learning. We discuss the broader implications of these findings in assessing the impact of group-based hatred on the political process.

The past few years have witnessed a growth in the comprehensive consideration of emotions as antecedents of political behavior. Emotions are fundamental to political dynamics. Emotions targeted at political leaders, issues, groups, parties, or symbols influence political attitudes and behaviors (Glaser & Salovey, 1998). American surveys have shown that in some cases, voters’ emotions directed at candidates are as effective as cognitive evaluations in predicting voting behavior (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982). However, scientific inquiry into the role played by emotions in politics is still in its preliminary stage.

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Developments in the study of emotions in politics have followed in the wake of rapid advances in the study of the psychology of emotions. Social psychology has shifted its focus in the last two decades from pure cognitive research to a more integrative perspective, which combines aspects of cognition and emotions (Zajonc, 1980). While a few scholars have studied specific emotions targeted at groups (see Halperin & Gross, 2011; Halperin, Russell, Dweck, & Gross, 2011; Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007; Isbell, Ottai, & Burns, 2006), the vast majority of research in the field has focused on the study of the impact of clusters of emotions (e.g., positive vs. negative, anxiety vs. enthusiasm) aimed at political leaders or political issues on political judgments, voting tendencies, and behavior of citizens.

Research has shown that discrete emotions, rather than their mere valences (i.e., negative vs. positive), have an effect on the formation of attitudes and behavior (e.g., Halperin, 2008, 2011; Lewis & Haviland-Jones, 2000; Maoz & McCauley, 2005, 2008). Whereas much of the literature on emotions and politics lacks references to hatred (e.g., MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman, Keele, & Wolak, 2001; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000), we focus on the role of hatred in political behavior.

The Psychology of Group-Based Hatred

In a comprehensive review of classic as well as more contemporary conceptualizations of hatred, Royzman and colleagues (Royzman, McCauley, & Rozin, 2005) defined hatred as the most destructive affective phenomenon in the history of human nature. It is particularly destructive in the violent effect it exerts on intergroup relations. Recent studies have shown that in the context of long-term intergroup conflict (e.g., the Israeli–Palestinian conflict), hatred reduces people’s support for making compromises in order to resolve the conflict (e.g., Halperin, 2011; Halperin et al., 2011; Maoz & McCauley, 2005) and induces their support for initiating aggressive actions targeted at the out-group (Maoz & McCauley, 2008). Furthermore, hatred also has the potential to impel people to engage in massacres and wars (Staub, 2005).

Such extreme, violent expressions of hatred are only the tip of the iceberg. Hatred toward other groups is a widespread human phenomenon that is rooted in everyday intergroup and political relations. Yet, there are few contemporary definitions of hatred (Bartlett, 2005; Gaylin, 2003; Royzman et al., 2005; Sternberg, 2005; Yanay, 2002). We define hatred toward out-groups as a secondary, extreme, and continuous emotion that is directed at a particular group and that fundamentally and all-inclusively denounces it (also see Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoeferl, 2009; Manstead, Frijda, & Fischer, 2004; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Sternberg, 2005).
Hatred toward out-groups includes a wide cognitive spectrum that produces a clear distinction between out-group members and in-group members, and consequently rejects the hated out-group (Bartlett, 2005). The affective aspect of collective hatred is secondary and thus involves unpleasant physical symptoms, as well as anger, fear, and powerful negative feelings toward out-group members (Sternberg, 2003, 2005). Behaviorally, hatred may lead to the desire to eradicate the hated out-group (White, 1996). Extensive research has demonstrated that in some situations, there is a connection between hate and its various active manifestations; that is, out-group exclusion (Leader & Mullen, 2009), terrorism (Sternberg, 2003), motivation to fight and kill in battle (Ballard & McDowell, 1991), and hate crimes (Berkowitz, 2005).

Chronic Hatred and Immediate Hatred

Both classical (Arnold, 1960; Shand, 1896) and contemporary (Frijda, 1994) scholars of emotions point to a fundamental distinction between immediate emotion and an emotional attitude, sentiment, or chronic emotion (see Frijda, Mesquita, Sonnemans, & Van Goozen, 1991; Halperin & Gross, 2011). While immediate emotion is an acute reaction to stimuli or a changing environment, sentiment is a chronic emotional phenomenon that represents a highly emotional standing disposition toward a person, group, or symbol (Ekman, 1992). According to Ben-Zeev (1992), apart from the sensory component, the sentimental chronic emotion has the same structure as does the immediate one. Furthermore, Ben-Zeev claimed that certain emotions such as hatred or love, targeted at general objects, are more susceptible to transformation into sentiments.

Scholars of hatred have continually debated the question of whether hatred is an emotion or an emotional sentiment (Royzman et al., 2005). However, in the last two decades, scholars (e.g., Bartlett, 2005; Sternberg, 2003) have resolved the dispute by suggesting that hatred can occur in both configurations: immediate and chronic. Frijda et al. (1991) defined both configurations as emotional phenomena (for further elaboration, see Halperin, 2008).

Hence, we put forward the argument that there are two forms of hatred; related, yet distinct. The first form is a sentimental, stable, and familiar “hating” emotional sentiment (i.e., chronic/mild hatred), which involves extensive cognitions. The second form is an emotional, powerful, and “burning” hate (i.e., immediate/strong hatred), which occurs in response to significant events. The two forms of hatred can be targeted at individuals or groups, but we focus solely on group aspects. Both forms are similar in their
related cognitive appraisals and basic emotional goals, yet they differ in their duration, intensity, and immediate implications. As a result, while chronic/mild hatred may lead to disengagement from the out-group and preservation of the status quo, immediate/strong hatred can generate a desire for immediate action and a willingness to humiliate and destroy the out-group.

**Chronic/mild hatred** is an ongoing emotional attitude, which totally rejects all members of the out-group. It involves a restricted amount of negative feeling, as well as a stable cognitive perception that members of the hated group cause offense to the in-group and its members in a severe, recurrent, unjust, and intentional way. This results from the basic evil that is rooted in the character of hated group members. To prevent future painful offenses, haters desire an absolute separation from members of the other group.

**Immediate/strong hatred** is a severe negative feeling, extreme and short-range, aimed at the out-group and its members in response to a particular incident that is perceived as a severe and significant offense to the in-group or its members, and that brings about total rejection of the out-group. This severe feeling is often accompanied by unpleasant physical symptoms and a sense of helplessness. It provokes a strong desire for revenge, a wish to inflict suffering, and, at times, desired annihilation of the out-group.

The Political Effects of Hatred

Political learning, party identification, and level of partisan support, which are key to understanding individuals’ political tendencies, were developed in Campbell and colleagues’ book *The American Voter* (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960) and are often interrelated. For instance, a shift in party identification, although uncommon, may depend on existing levels of party support and the acquisition of new political knowledge. Political changes and new kinds of political persuasion often result from openness to new political knowledge. Although opinions vary on whether and how party identification moves (MacKuen, Erikson, & Stimson, 1989) or remains fixed (Green & Palmquist, 1994), it is largely understood as a durable and lasting disposition. Most studies have shown that voters usually rely on their partisan inclinations (Krosnick, 1991), rather than on new information. However, there are other patterns of information processing (Krosnick & Petty, 1995; Rudolph, Gangl, & Stevens 2000), including suggestions that information that people consider in the political decision-making process affects voting (Zaller & Feldman, 1992).

During election campaigns, group-based hatred may be highly influential. First, politics is primarily about groups (Hutchings, Valentino, Philpot, & White, 2006; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944), and hatred is doubtless
the most “group-based” emotion. Second, the simple and extreme nature of hatred increases its recurrence in the political realm (Leader & Mullen, 2009). The intensiveness, swiftness, and superficiality of current politics and communications tend to enforce simple messages, symbols, and sharp emotions (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Kinder & Sears, 1985), such as hatred. Third, there is meager legitimacy for hatred and an inherent gap between emotional goals and actual behavior (Fitness & Fletcher, 1993). It seems that political systems are optimal receptors of hatred that is not translated into extreme action. Hatred messages are often converted into politically correct political interests (e.g., Cowan & Mettrick, 2002). Destructive behavioral tendencies may become “acceptable” legislative demands.

We are interested in the question of whether and how this unique feature of hatred can account for variances in political behavior. More specifically, what makes one person a partisan citizen whose political behavior is based on standing loyalties or symbols, and another person a deliberative citizen who seriously considers political alternatives?

Framework and Hypotheses

Affective intelligence theory (Marcus, 2000; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993) assumes that emotions carry two distinct effects on politics. One is the dispositional system in which emotions serve to preserve fixed and stable political tendencies. The other is the surveillance system in which emotions bring about reassessment and a search for new political information. While the dispositional system is related to well-learned and predicted stimuli, the surveillance system will occur only when individuals feel that existing beliefs do not meet the needs of current events. Politically speaking, the dispositional system is associated with partisan citizenship, while the surveillance system is associated with deliberative citizenship (Marcus, 2000).

We propose that while chronic hatred strengthens the partisan citizen, short-term bursts of immediate hatred call into question previous partisan connections and lead citizens to inquire further into their political environment, looking for more extreme political solutions. We suggest that long-term, moderate feelings of hatred toward a selected out-group represent the opposite form of an in-group’s party identification, hence leading individuals to support the preservation of the political status quo. On the other hand, extreme actions or statements of the out-group that elicit immediate and strong hatred reactions might lead individuals to believe that the status quo is intolerable and that an urgent change is needed. Hence, such an intense hatred reaction might “shake” current partisan identifications and enhance the motivation to act and to seek new information.
When hatred is a standing emotional attitude toward an out-group, in terms of the affective intelligence theory, we assume that it functions as a dispositional emotion. This latter assumption also relies on the classic notion of in-group love/out-group hate (Brewer, 1999; Turner, 1975) and on the hostility hypothesis (Maggiotto & Piereson 1977), suggesting that a standing emotional sentiment of hatred serves as the basis for unifying the in-group and offers a shared belief for overcoming conflicting views. With this rationale, intergroup hatred is part of the ongoing learned repertoire of individuals. It facilitates automatic information processing and loyal party identification.

Contrary to the homeostasis just described, it is assumed that when dramatic intergroup events occur, the surveillance system comes into play, the subjective barometer of hatred overflows, and people seek to reevaluate the political status quo. These extreme emotional situations, which we define as immediate hatred reactions, lead to a feeling of urgency and to an explosive motivation to act in order to cope with the new dramatic situation. It is suggested that this feeling of urgency moves citizens from a state of apathy to a seeking behavior that subsequently may lead to the acquisition of new information and even to the destabilization of partisan loyalties.

We suggest that the two forms of hatred will have opposite effects on political learning and partisan support. Thus, we propose the following:

**Hypothesis 1.** Chronic hatred will decrease motivation to acquire new political knowledge, increase party identification stability, and increase levels of party support.

**Hypothesis 2.** Immediate/strong hatred will increase motivation to acquire new political knowledge, decrease party identification stability, and decrease levels of favorite party support.

The 2006 Election Campaign in Israel

Contemporary political science literature implies that most election campaigns are characterized by an extensive emotional aspect (e.g., Brader, 2005). Recently, this has been found to hold true for the Israeli political system (Marmur & Weimann, 2001). Like the United States, Israel has multiple social and political schisms and, like several European countries, a multiparty system (Horowitz & Lissak, 1990). In such political systems, extreme emotions—whether positive or negative—are usually aimed at political parties associated with social groups that are based on ideology, religion, or social status.
There are two major events that took place prior to the 2006 elections. The first was the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and north Samaria; namely, removal and relocation of two dozen settlements and 10,000 residents. The second was the sudden hospitalization of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. A leading Israeli columnist portrayed the elections as “the elections [in] which we didn’t feel” (Lapid, 2006). Not surprisingly, emotions were at their peak at the beginning of the campaign, rather than in its final stages.

**Method**

**Sample**

To test the role of the two forms of hatred targeted at each individual’s most hated group on their political behavior during the 2006 election campaign in Israel, we advanced a nationwide, random, large-scale, two-wave panel study during the 2006 Parliamentary election campaign in Israel. Participants were interviewed on two occasions, 3 months apart, upon the launch of the campaign and days prior to the elections. This design enabled a proper examination of the long-term and short-term effects of hatred on political outcomes. Interviews, which were completed in 20 min, were conducted in Hebrew and Russian by experienced interviewers.

The dropout rate (Time 1, \( N = 847 \); Time 2, \( N = 457 \)) between the two interviews resembles that of other “emotional” panel studies (e.g., Conover & Feldman 1986), which require enhanced mental effort by respondents. A binary logistic regression model in which odds for dropout at Time 2 were utilized as a dependent variable (Little & Rubin, 2002) resulted in insignificant results. Excluding date of birth, sociodemographic indicators did not predict the odds for dropout at Time 2. The older one is, the higher the probability for dropping out during the second survey is, multiplied by 1.023.

The sample represents the distribution of the Israeli–Jewish population with regard to sex, age, place of residence, and political tendencies (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005). The mean age of the respondents in the first wave of interviews (Time 1) was 46.0 years (\( SD = 16.1 \)). Of the sample, 54% \( (n = 385) \) were men, and 20.8% were immigrants from the former Soviet Union. In terms of education, 4.5% did not complete high school, 27.1% possessed a high school education, 22.1% had some post-high school education, 2.7% were college students, and 43% had a university or college degree. Finally, one third of the sample (32.9%) defined themselves as rightist, 45.8% as centrist, and 21.4% as leftist.
Measures

Construction of hatred scale. While relying on our conceptual definitions, we followed DeVellis’ (1991) method of scale development. We conducted face-to-face interviews with 100 college students (59 women, 41 men). The sample consisted of 75% secular and 25% religious; and 32.2% rightist, 27.3% leftist, and 40.5% centrist. With regard to income, 55.1% reported an income higher than the average in the Israeli society, while 44.9% reported an income lower than the average. Analysis of the sample shows that this distribution had no apparent effect on the results. No significant differences in the mean item scores or in the factor structures of the different subgroups were noticed.

We compiled 25 statements that tap chronic/mild hatred and 30 statements that tap immediate/strong hatred toward a selected out-group. Each group of statements was aimed at capturing the essence of the conceptual definition that we gave for each form of hatred. The statements were reviewed by three independent expert referees, who rated the level of correspondence between each item and its relevant conceptual definition. Following this procedure, the pool of statements was reduced by half, and 5 items were rephrased.

Next, factor analysis (principal components analysis with varimax rotation) revealed two factors (after deleted items that neither loaded significantly on any factor nor loaded exclusively on one factor): chronic hatred (7 items), and immediate hatred (6 items). Internal reliability was excellent for immediate hatred (Time 1, $\alpha = .81$; Time 2, $\alpha = .83$) and adequate for chronic hatred (Time 1, $\alpha = .71$; Time 2, $\alpha = .67$; see Table 1).

Selection of “hated” political party. We used a method that is often employed in studies on political tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982). Respondents were presented with a number of political groups and were asked to select their least liked one. Following this selection, all items measuring emotional phenomena in both waves were adjusted to the chosen “hated” group of each participant. A list of a dozen potential hated out-groups was based on Israeli studies on political tolerance (e.g., Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006). For clarity considerations, we combined the groups into the following five clusters: Arabs (Islamic Movement, Hadash Party), leftists (Peace Now), seculars (Shinui Party), ultra-orthodox (Shas Party, Yahadut-Hatora Party), and extreme rightists (Ha-ihud Haleumi, Hamafdal, Yesha Council, Israel Beitenu, Kach). The distribution of the selection of out-groups was compatible with those found in previous studies (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, & Roberts, 1985). Of the sample, 37.4% chose Arab groups as their most distant out-group, 26.2%
Table 1

*Exploratory Factor Analysis*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immediate hatred</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unpleasant physical feelings (e.g., increased blood flow or pulse rate, sweating, muscle tension, chest pains)</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme feelings toward members of the Islamic Movement</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoughts of a desire to get rid of or destroy members of the Islamic Movement in any kind of manner</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To feel a desire to take action in order to take revenge on members of the Islamic Movement and its leaders</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To imagine a violent action against members of the Islamic Movement</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To feel negative and hard feelings toward members of the Islamic Movement</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronic hatred</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what degree do you feel that the actions of the Islamic Movement have offended you and/or members of your group over a long period of time?</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what degree do you estimate that some of the actions of members of the Islamic Movement and its leaders are a result of a “bad” internal character?</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what degree do you estimate that some of the actions of the members of the Islamic Movement and its leaders are a result of an intentional desire to harm you and members of your group?</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what degree does the thought of the Islamic Movement give rise to negative feelings in you?</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what degree do you estimate that the actions of the members and leaders of the Islamic Movement are just and legitimate?*</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what degree would you be glad to develop social relations with members of the Islamic Movement?*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what degree would you be glad to know members of the Islamic Movement more closely?*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>Explained variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Entries in boldface represent the loadings of the items on two types of hatred.
chose extreme-right groups, 14.3% chose secular groups, 13.0% chose ultra-orthodox ones, and 9.1% chose extreme-left groups.

Selection of political party/group to which one feels closest. Heeding the procedure of Barnes, Jennings, Inglehart, and Farah (1988), participants were also asked to choose the political party they like the most or to which they feel closest. This political identification may be seen as a standing political decision stored in human minds, and may later affect aspects of political behavior (i.e., level of partisan support, performance/skills evaluation) relating to this most liked party.

Questionnaires contained items on political learning, stability of party identification, party identification, and emotional measures of hatred (i.e., chronic and immediate) targeted at the selected out-group. To control for the effects of alternative emotional explanations, we measured fear and anger targeted at the chosen out-group. Following Smith (1999), the participants were asked to indicate their feelings toward the out-group on items describing anger (i.e., angry, irritated, revolted; $\alpha = .92$) and fear (i.e., afraid, scared, worried; $\alpha = .86$). Computed scales were based on an average-extracting procedure.

Political learning. Political learning was measured by three items that tapped general political knowledge regarding the 2006 elections (Zaller 1986):

1. Who is the leader advancing the “territorial exchange” plan between Israel and the Palestinians?
2. Which of the following parties leans toward a socialist–democratic approach?
3. Of the following parties, which is the most “rightist”?

The design enabled comparison between level of political knowledge pre- and post-election campaign. Following recomputation of learning indicators, to capture the extent of the learning process, we only analyzed the responses of the participants who did not provide correct answers to the questions in the first wave and, hence, were believed still to have learning potential.

Party identification stability. Party identification stability was measured using the advantages of this panel design (Brader, 2005). The scale expresses the political distance between the party that participants support at the dawn of the campaign and the party that they support at its dusk. Stability is coded from 1 to 3, where 1 means low stability (i.e., switch from one bloc—left or right—to the other block), 2 means moderate stability (i.e., switch within the original bloc), and 3 means high stability (i.e., no switch).

Partisan support. Partisan support was measured by two items that were previously validated in other studies (e.g., Weisberg, 1993): “On a scale of 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much), how would you describe your level of political identification with the party?” and “What is your current position about
voting for the party?” For the latter question, support was coded from 1 to 4, where 1 means the participant decided not to vote for the party; 2 means the participant has doubts about voting for the party; 3 means that the participant will probably vote for it; and 4 means that the participant undoubtedly will vote for the party. The scale yielded adequate reliability: Time 1, $\alpha = .67$; Time 2, $\alpha = .69$.

Results

The core analysis was conducted in two principal steps. First, to account for the characteristics of the primary variables—chronic hatred and immediate hatred—we advanced a series of variance analyses for each type of hatred, testing the differences between the two waves among groups of haters. Second, to pinpoint the influence of hatred on political behavior, guided by both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, we conducted a series of mean-based comparisons followed by a series of multiple linear regressions.

As seen in Table 2, within-subjects ANOVA raises some insights regarding hatred targeted at out-groups. Respondents scored higher on chronic hatred, as compared to immediate hatred, across different waves and hated groups. In addition, in response to the emotional events that occurred in Israel at the start of the campaign, levels of both types of hatred were higher in the first wave. These results hold true after controlling for those who participated in the first wave sample but not in the second. This decline in hatred levels also indicates the dynamic character of hatred within the Israeli political system.

Table 2 shows that the highest levels of both types of hatred were expressed by those who chose Arabs as their most disliked group. Those who chose leftists as their most hated group scored the second highest level of hatred on three out of four parameters (two types of hatred in two waves). Furthermore, while the lowest level of chronic hatred was expressed by the group of people who chose leftists as their most hated group, the lowest level of immediate hatred was displayed by haters of ultra-orthodox in the first wave and by secular haters in the second wave. Further scrutiny shows that for both chronic hatred and immediate hatred, the time interval and events that occurred during the campaign were probably most effective in reducing the hatred of secular haters.

Correlations between immediate and chronic hatred were positive and significant ($p < .05$), but not too high in both waves (Time 1, $r = .32$; Time 2, $r = .41$). Chronic hatred was significantly ($p < .05$) correlated with political orientation ($r = -.17$) and religiosity ($r = .17$) in the first wave, and with political orientation ($r = -.15$) in the second wave: the more chronic the
Table 2

*Within-Subjects ANOVA: Hatred Across Time by Hated Groups*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample/subsample</th>
<th>Chronic hatred</th>
<th></th>
<th>Immediate hatred</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>T2</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General sample</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Arab” haters (N = 313)</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Leftist” haters (N = 76)</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Secular” haters (N = 120)</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Ultra-orthodox” haters (N = 109)</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Extreme rightist” haters (N = 219)</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
hatred, the more the right orientation and religiosity. Immediate hatred, however, was negatively and significantly ($p < .05$) correlated with income level (Time 1, $r = -.09$; Time 2, $r = -.11$), level of education (Time 1, $r = -.16$; Time 2, $r = -.15$), and political orientation (Time 1, $r = -.17$; Time 2, $r = -.11$) in both waves: the more immediate the hatred, the lower the income level, the lower the level of education, and the more rightist the political orientation.

Correlations among political variables were significant at the .05 level. The correlation between identification stability and level of partisan identification was rather strong (Time 1, $r = .34$; Time 2, $r = .62$). Another important significant correlation, although low, was that of political learning with partisan identification (Time 2, $r = -.10$), and with identification stability (Time 2, $r = -.13$). These correlations may imply that the acquisition of new political knowledge may weaken identification with the in-group party, which, in turn, may lead to changes in support and voting patterns.

**Collective Hatred and Political Learning**

To examine the relationship between group-based hatred and political learning, we divided the Wave 2 sample twice into three groups according to levels of each type of hatred. For each type, we created three rather equal groups: *low haters* (chronic, $N = 158$; immediate, $N = 144$), *moderate haters* (chronic, $N = 147$; immediate, $N = 162$), and *high haters* (chronic, $N = 133$; immediate, $N = 124$). As predicted in Hypothesis 2, on a scale of 0 (*no learning*) to 1 (*full learning*), *high immediate haters* ($N = 102$) proved to be the highest learners ($M = 0.38$, $SD = 0.41$), while *moderate immediate haters* ($N = 123$) ($M = 0.29$, $SD = 0.40$) and *low immediate haters* ($N = 107$; $M = 0.25$, $SD = 0.37$) acquired a smaller amount of information throughout the campaign (see Figure 1). The only apparent significant difference was between moderate and high immediate haters ($p < .01$). While these findings lend support to Hypothesis 2, contrary to the predictions of Hypothesis 1, chronic hatred had no impact on political learning.

We then tested for the effects of hatred on political learning while controlling for all relevant variables. First, we tested a full model, controlling for all emotional variables. The results suggest that fear and anger did not have a significant impact on political learning. Next, we tested a trimmed model (Table 3), which emphasized the differences in the effects of hatred in each of the waves on political learning. Of all the predictors in both waves, immediate hatred proved most meaningful. With elections approaching, immediate haters were on the lookout for political knowledge.

We decided to take the analysis one step further. Brader (2005) suggested that the amount of time people spend watching or reading political content
reflects their willingness to acquire new political knowledge. Based on that assumption, we asked Wave 2 participants, “On a scale of 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much), to what extent do you follow the political campaigns in the newspapers or on TV?” The results indicate that, in general, the Israeli public exhibits moderate levels of interest in the campaigns ($M = 3.38, SD = 1.73$). More interesting, however, is the finding presented in the right column of Table 3: While immediate hatred increased political interest, chronic hatred decreased it. These results further strengthen findings on the relationship between immediate hatred and political learning, and create fertile ground for future investigation.

### Hatred and Party Identification Stability

A glance at Israeli partisanship reveals low levels of party identification stability. One third of the respondents changed their party identification toward the end of the campaign. While only 22% crossed the line to support a party from the other bloc, 78% shifted their identification within the same bloc. What may be the role played by hatred toward out-groups in explaining...
such trends? To explore further, we divided the sample into three groups by levels of chronic and immediate hatred, as presented in the previous section. Figure 2 presents the percentage of participants who changed their support during the campaign in each one of the groups. Generally speaking, the effect of immediate hatred on stability of support is a “mirror image” of the effect of chronic hatred on this important political variable. There are significant differences between low immediate haters and the other two categories, as well as between high chronic haters and the other two categories (all ps < .01).

In concurrence with Hypotheses 1 and 2, while chronic hatred enhanced stability of attitudes, immediate hatred was conducive to political changes. In line with our expectations, immediate haters do not openly consider their voting, but tend to move toward supporting more extreme parties. Further analysis shows that 56.3% of the high immediate haters shifted their support to a party more extreme than their party of identification at the outset of the campaign, and only 6.3% moved toward a more moderate party. In the same group, 35.7% switched identification within the same bloc or level of extremism. It can be argued that immediate haters do not thoroughly consider all potential alternatives, but mainly more extreme ones.

### Table 3

*Effects of Hatred on Political Learning and Political Interest*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political learning</th>
<th>Political interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income in comparison to average</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills evaluation</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance evaluation</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic hatred</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate hatred</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Beta = standardized regression coefficient. Political learning is computed based on the delta between the interviews; it was regressed on the predictors measured in T1 and in T2. Political interest was regressed on the independent variables measured in T2.

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.*
As seen in Table 4, while controlling for relevant variables, the results reinforce those presented in Figure 2. While the effect of hatred seems modest, it is second only to that of the candidate’s skills evaluation. The results of a regression equation that controlled for anger and fear were largely unchanged, yet coefficients were slightly lower.

Collective Hatred and Partisan Support

Although levels of support for the in-group political party were relatively high in both waves, the findings show a moderate decrease in these levels throughout the campaign. Irrespective of the favorite parties chosen, the mean level of support was 4.08 ($SD = 0.90$) at Time 1 and 3.81 ($SD = 1.07$) at Time 2, $t = 5.88$, $p < .01$. Nonetheless, given this significant decline, it was interesting to find that the impact of hatred on party identification was more salient in the second wave than in the first one.

Regression of partisan support on the independent variables while controlling for anger, fear, and other control variables shows (see Table 5) that while at the outset of the campaign chronic hatred was the only emotional variable that affected (positively) the level of partisan identification, regression analysis of the second wave emphasizes the role of both kinds of hatred
Table 4

Effects of Hatred on Party Identification Stability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors measured in T1</th>
<th>Predictors measured in T2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income in comparison to average</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills evaluation</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance evaluation</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic hatred</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate hatred</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Beta = standardized regression coefficient. Party identification is computed based on the delta between the interviews. It was regressed on predictors measured in T1 and T2.

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

in shaping partisan support. As expected (in Hypotheses 1 and 2), both configurations of hatred yielded opposing effects on party support. While chronic hatred strengthened partisan support, immediate hatred weakened it. Importantly, in both waves, no significant relation was found between partisan support and fear or anger.

To recap, the analysis provided support for our hypotheses. Irrespective of other controlled predictors, chronic hatred tends to make people maintain party identification and hold on to their preferences; they do not necessarily attempt to learn new political information. Immediate hatred, however, tends to cause people to be less stable in their political preferences, as well as in their level of party support, but more inclined to continuously seek new political information.

Discussion

Unlike past studies, we isolated and measured the influence of two separate types of hatred on political behavior using a large-scale representative
sample of Jewish citizens in Israel. This paper presents an original conceptualization and operationalization of two related, though distinct types of hatred. Our core findings suggest that hatred is central to politics, but also that different types of hatred differently affect political behavior and attitudes. Despite the influx of studies using affect—alongside cognition—to understand politics, anxiety (or fear), anger, and enthusiasm are almost the only emotions used as exogenous predictors of political behavior. Hatred has trailed behind. This study supports the contention that hatred is a dynamic and powerful agent in the realm of politics above and beyond other common exogenous predictors of political behavior. In line with the results of other recent studies (e.g., Halperin et al., 2009) we found that hatred is a more powerful predictor of political attitudes than are other psychological phenomena (e.g., fear, anger) and is particularly useful in promoting or demoting political learning.

The dual dimensionality of hatred toward out-groups—chronic hatred versus immediate hatred—enables the feasibility of different political consequences. Generally speaking, while immediate hatred is a springboard for political change, revision, and reappraisal, chronic hatred is actually a political rethinking buffer.

Table 5

Effects of Hatred on Partisan Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>T1</th>
<th>T2</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-2.19</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income in comparison to average</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills evaluation</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>9.41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance evaluation</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic hatred</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate hatred</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.13*</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-2.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
The results support the generally acknowledged notion that emotional experiences are expressed in both a chronic and an immediate manner (Frijda et al., 1991). Early theorists in the psychological study of emotions (Arnold, 1960; Shand, 1922), as well as more recent ones (Frijda, 1994; Lazarus, 1994) have referred to the concept of chronic emotion or similar concepts, such as emotional sentiment or emotional attitude. Among scholars of hatred, only Sternberg (2003, 2005) indirectly referred to the different configurations of hatred by proposing a seven-category typology of hatred types: cool hate, immediate hate, chronic hate, boiling hate, simmering hate, seething hate, and burning hate.

We build on but depart from the assumptions of affective intelligence theory (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993) to specify the role of hatred in political behavior. We extend this important theory by examining the role of intergroup emotions on political behavior, as well as by differentiating between the role of two emotional phenomena—emotional sentiments and emotions—in determining such behavior. We suggest that hatred should be viewed beyond the dispositional (aversive) system (MacKuen et al., 2001). According to our theory and findings, immediate hatred may be viewed as part of the surveillance system.

Hatred can easily lead individuals to change their initial political positions and partisan support. Campaign ads, canvassing, and slogans based on collective hatred are not uncommon. Hatred has been employed in a number of local and national political campaigns by far-right political parties and candidates in Israel, Europe (Mudde, 2005), and the United States (Kaplan & Weinberg, 1998). In Israel, Kach in 1984, Shas in 1999, Shinui in 2003, and Yisrael Beiteien in 2006 have been successful in mobilizing voters while using negative campaigning, heavily relying on hatred of different social groups. Several governments in Western Europe include radical right parties (e.g., the Austrian Freedom Party in Austria, the Northern League in Italy) that gained popular support almost exclusively because they made use of hatred-based campaigns toward minorities.

George Corley Wallace, best known for his pro-segregation campaign (Hill, 2002), ran as the American Independent Party candidate for the Presidency in 1968. David Duke, a former leader of the Ku Klux Klan, has made a number of unsuccessful bids for higher office. In his 1991 run for governor of Louisiana, Duke won more than 50% of the White vote, but lost because of Black voters (Kuzenski, Bullock, & Gaddie, 1995). Recent hatred-based campaigns in the United States include anti-homosexual voter mobilization in 2004, and anti-immigrant rhetoric in the 2006 midterm elections.

We believe that the well established role of hatred in intractable conflicts, mass murder, and genocide (Bar-Tal, 2007; Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003) is highly
related to the destructive impact of hatred on everyday politics. It is our
argument that the roots of some of the more destructive consequences of
hatred are embodied in routine, everyday politics. Hatred is an effective
political tool commonly used by politicians to attain in-group solidarity and
political benefits. In its extreme form, hatred can turn into a destructive,
uncontrollable force.

Notwithstanding the context of moral values, our study indicates that
hatred may be problematic from a purely functionalist, political perspective.
It is a significant political force, and different configurations or levels may
result in conflicting consequences. From a leadership perspective, caution is
called for; fine tuning of the exact configurations of hatred is almost impos-
sible. On the one hand, the use of hate rhetoric to attract traditional voters
may, indeed, encourage voters to reconsider their habitual support as they
search for more extreme political representation. On the other hand, the use
of hatred to mobilize new voters may enhance their support for their own
traditional parties.

Arguments frequently made by political scientists that Israel is unique
and, hence, incomparable are flawed (Pettigrew, 2003). Our findings are
applicable and are probably replicable beyond the Israeli political context,
particularly—yet not exclusively—to multiparty systems. For example, in
reviewing this finding through an American prism, shifts between the two
blocs may be compared to shifts between Democrats and Republicans in the
United States. Although it is not extremely common to switch party identi-
fication, we all know the term Reagan Democrats: working-class Whites who
defected from their traditional party to support Republican President

With the rise of terrorism and political violence worldwide, there is
increased interest in terrorism’s psychopolitical impact (e.g., Canetti, Halperin,
Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009). Questions of intergroup relations in the
wake of terrorism—particularly the role played by group-based hatred in
politics—are increasingly relevant for the rest of the world. With an influx
of immigration changing the face of Europe and the United States, many of
Israel’s social and political characteristics and schisms are no longer
unusual. In the United States, as we alluded to earlier, hatred has reared
its ugly head in numerous political campaigns. European countries (e.g.,
France, Germany) as well as the United States are ideal incubators for
immediate hatred (religious- and security-based), and thus relevant contexts
for further comparative studies. A case in point is the Danish cartoon affair
in 2005, considering the strong hate-based immigration platform in Danish
politics.

In many ways, the limitations of the present study arise naturally from the
correlational design used to test the research hypotheses. For example, we are
totally aware of the fact that even a two-wave panel design, as we used in the current investigation, can only imply toward causal effects and that these effects should be further examined in future experimental research design. Furthermore, assessments conducted in the setting of real-world events—especially during such an emotionally charged campaign—inherently include error variance that is minimized in a laboratory setting. On the other hand, no laboratory setting can recreate emotionally charged situations like election campaigns. Therefore, acknowledging the value of both approaches (i.e., lab experiments and real-world field assessments), we believe that our theoretical framework of hatred should be tested in the future under more controlled lab conditions. In addition, the generalizability of our findings to other contexts and cultures is limited; hence, it might be useful to test it among populations from different cultures, and particularly among citizens of countries with different election systems and regime types. Congruent findings from these different settings would provide important support to our proposed theoretical framework.

This study covers much new ground by empirically unraveling the political consequences of group-based hatred. It suggests that different types of hatred produce distinct—at times contradictory—political outcomes. Of no less importance, it is exemplary as a study of emotions that uses constructed scales to measure hatred and its political outcomes. On moral and practical grounds, hatred is a challenging emotion. This study reaffirms the notion that hatred is prevalent in politics simply because it is an effective, yet worrying political tool.

Alas, it works! Hatred is used and abused by politicians for their own advantage or for the detriment of others. As Ekman (2003) stated, “Emotions determine the quality of our lives. . . . They can save our lives, but they can cause real damage” (p. xii). It is our hope that the present study can spur scholars to empirically study the complex role that distinct, extreme, negative emotions play in politics.

It would be interesting for follow-up studies to readdress questions of why people switch from chronic to immediate hatred. Does it stem from an element of surprise at the action of the out-group? Is it the intensity of the action? Or perhaps new, extreme political ideas regarding the appropriate way to deal with the out-group are a contributing factor? Although we know that immediate hatred may lead to political learning, we are not sure about what type of knowledge is sought by “immediate haters.” Is it any knowledge or mostly selective, extreme knowledge? One can think of immediate haters as voters who have temporarily withdrawn their support for a certain party, and are looking for new answers to the situation from other sources on the political spectrum. It is reasonable to assume that these answers may be no less extreme than hatred itself.
References


