Afghanistan is America’s longest war. Thousands of U.S. troops and those from nearly 50 other countries have fought in Afghanistan against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, but it was in nuclear-armed Pakistan where Osama bin Laden was killed, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (the mastermind of 9/11) was captured, and Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar as well as the heads of the virulent Haqqqani network reside. Pakistan’s duplicity is a fact, yet it is often excessively characterized as a function of the India–Pakistan rivalry. Pakistani generals do fear India, but they have also recognized the threat from domestic insurgents. The height of this concern was reached in 2009, when the Pakistani Taliban were 60 miles from the country’s capital and jeopardized U.S. as well as Pakistani goals in the region: interdicting al-Qaeda, protecting Pakistani nuclear weapons, and stabilizing (and in Pakistan’s case, an anti-India) Afghanistan. At that point, Pakistani troops, unlike past attempts, fought back and prevailed against the insurgents. It can be done.

Pakistan’s remarkable counterinsurgency turnaround since 2009 was one of few net gains for the United States. A mix of bullying and bribing since 2001 on the part of Washington has failed to change Islamabad’s double dealing, but the relative success of the Pakistani counterinsurgency since 2009—resulting in part from training and equipment provided by the United States—offers important opportunities for the U.S.–Pakistan partnership. First, it increases American leverage. Amid multiple insurgencies, Pakistan needs counterinsurgency support.
While Anti-Americanism in Pakistan is certainly high, many Pakistanis, with the support of a free media and Supreme Court, are demanding their military to act decisively or stop taking the lion’s share of the federal budget. That pressure is pushing Pakistan toward goals that the United States also shares. Second, there are signs that India–Pakistan relations are in a period of détente, and the amount of control Pakistan’s civilian government can exert over the military is increasing, albeit very slowly. Sooner rather than later, the Pakistani military will need a new enemy to justify its budget: insurgents who challenge the writ of the government are that enemy.

With the fallout from the May 2011 bin Laden raid, today is the lowest point in U.S.–Pakistan cooperation post-9/11, but it is also the ideal time for a reset. Certainly, any U.S. policy which ignores the India–Pakistan rivalry will have limited mileage, but a more selective and limited engagement with the Pakistani military on counterinsurgency could help narrow the gap between what is feasible and what is sought by the United States in its relationship with Pakistan. Now, unlike the first seven years after 9/11, the United States has partners within the Pakistani government with whom it can work.

**Pakistan’s counterinsurgency has turned around remarkably since 2009.**

**The Turning Point: 2008–2009**

In the spring of 2008, then-Major General Tariq Khan commanded 14th Infantry Division, 11th Corps in South Waziristan, witnessing firsthand the failure of Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations. Regular infantry soldiers used artillery to level entire villages with the support of F-16 fighter jets. The Frontier Corps played second fiddle with inferior equipment amid turf wars between the Directorate for Military Intelligence (MI) and the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). In theory, MI was in charge of providing battlefield intelligence, but in practice ISI dominated intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and negotiations with insurgents. Beyond the battlefield, Pakistani politicians, clerics, and journalists lambasted the troops as U.S. mercenaries, and U.S. diplomats complained about the Pakistani Army’s duplicity in going after some insurgents, but protecting others.¹

A year later, Khan again locked horns with the insurgents, mainly the Pakistani Taliban, but the results were remarkably different. In spring 2009, Pakistan launched operations Rah-e-Rast in the Swat Valley and Rah-e-Nijrat in South Waziristan. Amid close U.S.–Pakistan military and intelligence cooperation, Pakistani regular soldiers, paramilitary troops, and Special Forces—many trained...
and equipped by the Americans—cleared the Swat Valley and held territory. By winter 2009, South Waziristan was cleared and most of the populous areas had active troop patrols and revived intelligence networks, especially in Makin and Shakai, the insurgents’ base of operations. Besides the shift in public opinion against the insurgents, the partial success in Swat and South Waziristan was a product of reform envisioned by senior generals and demanded by junior officers.

These successes were the result of a deliberate effort on Pakistan’s part to combat the domestic insurgency which Pakistani military officials finally recognized as a threat to the country. In early 2008, Pakistan’s newly-appointed Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, had created a special inquiry commission at General Headquarters (GHQ) to examine the reasons for the military’s failure in counterinsurgency and to recommend remedies. While the GHQ Commission’s exact composition is not public, it is known to have included senior leaders from the directorates of Military Operations, Military Training, Doctrinal Development, MI, ISI, and the Frontier Corps.2 (The Commission lasted until December of 2008.)

The Commission’s findings are not public either, but interviews with many of the key players have made it clear that, in line with other counterinsurgency doctrines (such as the U.S. military’s) which emphasize population security, Pakistan’s findings indicated a need for its military to prioritize population security. However, in sharp contrast to U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine based on fighting foreign insurgents in foreign lands, Pakistanis have the added burden of fighting their people on their own land. Consequently, the need to win hearts and minds is second only to maintaining troop morale.

Absent public support and a smarter way to clear and hold territory, the Commission feared the very unity of the army was at stake. Pakistani soldiers were fighting fellow Muslims and needed a clear, believable, and worthy mission to justify doing so. According to interviews, the Commission therefore recommended a series of reforms centered on building public support, troop morale, better training and materiel, robust information operations, synchronization among military organizations, and significant intelligence reforms.3 These reforms were to help sell the war to the soldiers, a task made easier by the insurgents’ brutal suicide campaign—by 2009, 35,000 Pakistani bystanders and 3,500 soldiers were killed by terrorist attacks and counterinsurgency operations.

Many of these reforms were to center on training and “lessons-learned” processes in the army, Frontier Corps, and the ISI. Training in counterinsurgency
had not been well resourced or prioritized previously, and most company, battalion, brigade, and division commanders generally had to figure it out on the job. The U.S. military had begun a “train the trainer” program in 2007, but it was limited in scope—even by 2009, critical military institutions still lacked the infrastructure investments and concepts needed to change military culture, doctrine, and practice. The reforms recommended by the commission in 2008 significantly changed that.

**Counterinsurgency’s “Old School”**

To understand the complete impact of the counterinsurgency reforms advocated in the 2008 GHQ Commission report, one should understand the typical training cycle of a Pakistani soldier preparing for counterinsurgency operations. Prospective Pakistani officers apply to the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul, near Abbottabad in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province (formerly known as the North West Frontier Province, or NWFP). They then choose one of several arms or warfare schools. Many pick the School of Infantry and Tactics, the flagship institution responsible for producing junior commanding officers critical to counterinsurgency operations.

Before the Commission paid notice in 2008, the students, faculty, and alumni of the School of Infantry and Tactics’ United Nation’s Complex (about 30 percent of the School) viewed themselves, and may very well have been, the most capable and least consulted officers of counterinsurgency in Pakistan. For nearly 50 years, the Pakistani army has provided large numbers of troops to UN peace missions in places such as Bosnia, Cambodia, Congo, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia. Many of their crucial insights guided early experiments in 2009 with provincial and district reconstruction teams in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and KPK.

Besides the UN-focused complex, the School of Infantry and Tactics built a Counterterrorism Training Center in 2009. Here, the enemy was not India but Taliban role-players challenging students amid hills, tunnels, huts, and apartment buildings. The school also publishes the *Infantry Ripples* magazine where veterans are invited to contribute their experiences with asymmetric warfare and its complexities. Case studies highlight lessons learned, such as anti-ambush tactics, the importance of combined operations (helicopters and infantry), and the perils of excessive use of artillery.

In the 2009 edition of *Infantry Ripples*, for example, Major Muhammad Suleman Tayyar highlighted weaknesses of past operations and argued for robust training reform as recommended by the GHQ report. Tayyar argued that “units failed to draw maximum benefits from availability of force-multipliers like Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and combat aviation, primarily due to less expertise.”
Lack of improvisation was less of a problem at the time, Tayyar stated, but language barriers were still alarming: “Units with no Pashto speaking individuals felt extremely handicapped in communicating with local populace, especially in Waziristan area, where masses are comparatively more illiterate... even checking of vehicles at check points became a problem.” Successful integration of largely the Pashtun Frontier Corps with local militia and police forces was placating the language barrier, however. He concluded by recommending additional war games as well as language and cultural training.8

The infantry school shared a selection of lessons learned, like Tayyar’s, with the Command and Staff College, National Defense University, the 11th Corps, and Frontier Corps to improve company, battalion, brigade, and division effectiveness as well as coordination.9 The broad recommendations were implemented by military educational institutes like the National Defense University, with eager support from disgruntled junior officers. These recommendations have helped improve Pakistani counterinsurgency in at least five areas: training and education; population relocation; materiel; intelligence; and information operations.

Training and Education

At the direction of the Military High Command and the recommendations of the 2008 GHQ Commission, the School of Infantry and Tactics initiated an internal inquiry to highlight weaknesses in training and explore remedies. The result was an introspective report in the spring of 2009, Back to Basics: A Guideline for Commanding Officers, which emphasized the need for training and educational reforms as well as the importance of capturing, examining, and disseminating lessons learned.10 The report and several interviews with the school’s chief instructor and commandant highlighted four major challenges: too many group thinkers, too few innovators willing to write honest accounts of battles and respect the enlisted troops, a general rejection of objective military history, and a general lack of inter-service cooperation. Several remedies were proposed, such as changing the syllabus and encouraging junior officers to debate and dissent. They were not implemented wholesale, but significant changes were made leading to a turnaround on the battlefield. In 2009, the Command and Staff College introduced a training and educational cluster called Low Intensity Conflict-Plus (LIC-plus) in response to the findings of the GHQ Commission.11 Besides curriculum reform, there was a concerted effort to recruit army veterans from FATA and Swat operations for faculty positions.

The Frontier Corps and the 11th Corps also examined post-conflict stabilization efforts. The “social action plan” was critical, which incorporated Pakistani versions of provincial and district reconstruction teams, also called collaborative teams in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. (The Frontier Corps supervises
agency reconstruction teams, which were expected to come online by August 2010 but delayed due to the catastrophic floods. Some came online in northern FATA and South Waziristan by early 2011.) For example, during the Swat Valley operations, the army worked closely with civilian commissioners and developed interagency task forces with the army’s Engineer Corps to provide services such as electricity, water, and sanitation soon after military operations ended.\footnote{12}

In 2009 and beyond, Khan, who was the Frontier Corps’ commander from September 2008—October 2010, instituted critical financial reforms in dispersing funds from both the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Pakistani government. Today, through pilot Agency Reconstruction Teams—and smaller tehsil (sub-district) coordination teams—a donor representative works with a local team. This model is more effective and breeds less corruption than previous experiments with post-conflict development projects in FATA, where due to a lack of troop presence, most of the money dispersed was unaccounted for and often wasted. (As of late 2010, company commanders and political agents supported this model and agreed with the military.) The reconstruction team model also promoted better civil–military cooperation at the local and provincial level up until the 2010 floods, when 60,000 troops left FATA for relief operations.\footnote{13}

**Population Resettlement**

Absent civilian physical and property security, however, a well-trained and liked fighting force can only go so far. Consequently, the 2008 GHQ Commission decided to experiment with population resettlement in early 2009. Population resettlement is very difficult, but the idea is simple: separate insurgents from the people by moving the people to protected areas. With mixed results, the United States had tried resettlement in Vietnam by creating hamlets, as did the British in the Malayan insurgency. After examining historical case studies, Pakistani authorities were determined to avoid three major pitfalls: using foreign troops, enacting forceful and permanent transfers, and managing poorly.

In the first case, while the Pakistani army was not a foreign occupying force, many Pashtuns considered it to be, because of its predominantly Punjabi officer corps (most of whom can’t speak Pashto). Consequently, more Pashtun officers were put in charge of such operations.\footnote{14}

Second, successful resettlement must be reasonably voluntary and temporary—resettlement must not become depopulation. The Pakistani military encouraged interim population transfers,\footnote{15} and promised denizens of Swat and South Waziristan a better post-conflict life with minimum loss to life and treasure. In return, the military wanted intelligence against the insurgents;
in most cases, the promise was kept. Most people moved before the military went in, and they returned during the stabilization phase.\textsuperscript{16}

Third, resettlement must be sufficiently funded and effectively managed. As international support increased with the swelling number of refugees, an exceptional manager was picked to square the circle of isolating insurgents while rehabilitating civilians. Retired Lieutenant General Nadeem Ahmad, recognized for his 2005 Azad Jammu and Kashmir earthquake relief efforts, was selected to lead a special support group to move, feed, and shelter over two million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the summer of 2009. Management and delivery of services was inconsistent and slow, but in four months, 1.8 million IDPs returned, finding most of their houses and businesses intact.\textsuperscript{17}

Resettlement paid off on the battlefield. Only about 20 percent of the population remained in the conflict zone during combat operations, and most of those turned out to be hard-core Taliban supporters, giving the 30,000 Pakistani troops an artificial space-to-troop ratio advantage.\textsuperscript{18} Although some top Taliban leaders escaped, many others were killed or captured due to an increase in intelligence tips from the local population.

**Frontier Corps**

The Frontier Corps has grown significantly in quantity and quality, primarily due to U.S. financial, materiel, and training support.\textsuperscript{19} While this helped, increased salaries and benefits have boosted morale as well. Today, Frontier Corps soldiers have salaries 50 percent higher than in 2007, and their families receive tuition benefits as well as health and life insurance—about the same as regular army soldiers.\textsuperscript{20} For years, most Frontier Corps troops were stationed in makeshift camps, wearing flip-flops and carrying World War II-era small arms.

With advanced equipment and higher salaries, Frontier Corps troops today cover three-fourths of FATA and actively partner with the 11th Corps in conducting counterinsurgency operations. Moreover, the collection, examination, and distribution of lessons learned from the battlefield are now priorities. Many Frontier Corps officers are engaged in collecting data—such as IED attacks and insurgent reaction to state policy—and developing ways to manipulate enemy behavior.\textsuperscript{21} For example, Frontier Corps intelligence officers discovered that certain factions of the Pakistani Taliban in Bajaur agency in FATA would always return for their dead after a battle. So, the Frontier Corps came up with innovative ambushes designed to capitalize on that fact. They also discovered that a heavy presence of snipers and advanced IEDs usually meant the presence of “Al-Qaeda Special Forces,” i.e., Chechens, Uzbeks, and members of the Punjabi Taliban.\textsuperscript{22}
**Intelligence Reforms**

Intelligence agencies in the Pakistani military—specifically ISI and MI—have undergone some recent restructuring. ISI is still the most important player, dominating intelligence collection and dissemination as well as reconciliation with, and reintegration of, members of the Pakistani Taliban and the Haqqani network.²³

Under Lieutenant General Shuja Pasha, former director general of the ISI (2008–2012), the agency fired several sympathizers of the Pakistani Taliban. The agency has conversely hired employees with graduate degrees in defense studies, acquired U.S. tracing and communication gear, and increased sharing intelligence inside the military—with MI—and to a lesser degree outside, with the Federal Investigation Agency and the Intelligence Bureau.

ISI has worked to create and deploy more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to FATA in particular, and more recently in southern Punjabi towns such as Bahawalpur and Muridke to combat the growing threat of anti-Pakistan religious militancy. Although progress is being made, the processing, exploitation, and dissemination methods are wholly inadequate; they require large investments in technology and well-trained intelligence officers that are currently unavailable.

The situation is much worse in MI.²⁴ While General Kayani has increased MI’s budget every year since 2009, after the director general of military operations made a strong case for raising the budget, MI still lacks the personnel, equipment, and infrastructure to collect and disseminate intelligence key to military operations in FATA. For example, Pakistan’s nascent surveillance drone program needs archival data capabilities and a core intelligence interagency team that can synchronize multiple ground and air assets.²⁵ Moreover, full-time civilian and military intelligence officers are generally not respected by infantry, artillery, and armor officers. Unlike U.S. combat officers, who can spend as much as 90 percent of their working time with military intelligence officers, Pakistani combat officers mostly neglect their MI counterparts, and consider its work less significant.²⁶ Instead, army officers rely on the overstretched and multipurpose ISI for “military intelligence” on the battlefield.

**The Battle for Pakistani Perceptions**

The GHQ Commission viewed reviving public support as a prerequisite for all other military reforms. The Pakistani Army had to increase its approval rating and debunk insurgent propaganda. In early 2008, the 11th Corps and Frontier Corps, working closely with USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, initiated a counter-narrative radio campaign that by 2009 was going full steam. In the past, the Pakistani Taliban, through its affiliates such as
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TSNM), dominated the airwaves in the Swat Valley. They used radio to announce public executions and moral codes for women, and occasionally had open phone lines for people to identify government spies and sympathizers.

The Pakistani military needed a strategic communications campaign to convince people that security, jobs, and quick justice could be delivered by the government, and not the insurgents. The military started small. In 2008, with general support from the GHQ Commission, it opened radio channels, with significant support from USAID, for internal refugees from military operations in FATA and Swat to stay in touch with their families and stay alert about curfews, electricity shortages, and impending military operations. Taking advantage of the changing tide of public opinion in 2009 against the Pakistani Taliban (as well as additional U.S. economic aid), the Frontier Corps and 11th Corps communication officers partnered with media specialists in the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR—the Pakistani military’s public relations bureau) to plan and execute a comprehensive radio campaign in the Swat Valley and its environs.

Setting up attractive content on the radio was essential for a successful information campaign. Here, Major General Athar Abbas, Director of ISPR, appointed retired Colonel Aqeel Malik to lead the information operations task force. Colonel Aqeel, a trained anthropologist, assessed the “perceptions landscape” and drafted innovative ways to discredit insurgent information operations. He set up various FM radio channels and hired moderate mullahs (clerics) from Lahore and Karachi to participate in live broadcasts and debate Taliban members and supporters on Islam and violence.

There was a simultaneous strategic communications campaign aimed at NCOs and officers of the military. The army, Frontier Corps, and intelligence agencies encouraged debate within their ranks on whether the Pakistani Taliban were justified in their war against Pakistan. In addition to culprits targeted by internal intelligence, many found sympathizing with the Pakistani Taliban were forced out.

The external and internal strategic communications programs were successful in fighting the Pakistani Taliban on the ideological terrain. Through cricket broadcasts, people in South Waziristan heard the message that Pakistan, no matter how imperfect, belonged to all Pakistanis, including those living in FATA; the Pakistani Taliban wanted to destroy it and replace it with something much worse. Amid frequent beheadings of tribal leaders and local journalists, the pro-Pakistan message began to resonate. According to Charney Research’s 2010 FATA survey, the approval rating of the Frontier Corps increased from 33 percent in 2009 to 60 percent in 2010. Also, the radio audience share of insurgent leaders such as Mangal Bagh dropped drastically.
Political Challenges Ahead

Although U.S. support for counterinsurgency is important, it has been limited to equipment and training (and since 2011, U.S. trainers have not been involved). So the real support for counterinsurgency must come from Pakistan’s elected civilian leaders. Pakistan historically suffers from weak civilian governance. For more than four years, the current civilian government has managed to avoid a military coup and hold its own against an increasingly activist judiciary. In part, it has survived by using demagoguery and inciting ethnic polarization, but in most cases Pakistani politicians have resolved their differences inside the parliament without rushing to the military or the Supreme Court for extra-constitutional solutions, as often was the case in the 1990s.

President Asif Ali Zardari, for all his faults, remains president of the country and head of his unruly Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Very few opposition leaders, for example, would have imagined that Zardari would have lasted long enough to give a fourth annual speech to the parliament. Adept at political maneuvering, he continues to mold and break coalitions in Punjab and Sindh to sideline his opponents, while keeping the media, army, and Supreme Court off his back. Pakistan as a whole, however, remains a fragile state with weak security, governance, and economic indicators.

So far, Zardari has staved off threats to his government from the military, judiciary, and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League (N). He has conceded to demands that have reduced his power but increased his tenure. A new political force in the form of former cricket star-turned-politician Imran Khan is emerging, but his impact on the next elections, expected this fall, is unclear. Some analysts argue that Khan’s rise is in the long tradition of ISI-supported political figures to circumvent traditional parties like the PPP to retain the military’s dominance, but Khan vehemently denies it. More troublesome for Pakistani counterinsurgency is Khan’s controversial stand on negotiating with the Pakistani Taliban and other insurgent groups in the region without preconditions, and his support for a near complete withdrawal of troops from Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Zardari’s political maneuvering is one thing, but reviving the economy amid rising global oil and food prices and declining tax revenues is another. Pakistan has been in a recession for nearly four years. Multiple insurgencies, systemic problems with over-borrowing (deficit financing), a growing trade deficit, declining revenue and more spending (fiscal deficit), along with energy and

Pakistan remains a fragile state with weak security, governance, and economic indicators.
food shortages remain the greatest threats to Pakistan’s stability, with significant political and security spillover. From a high of 7.7 percent growth in 2005, the economy grew by less than 2.8 percent in 2011. As the population increases, Pakistan will face even more energy, food, and water shortages.

Moreover, the recently released income and asset figures for Pakistani government officials and parliamentarians are unusually low with serious discrepancies. On their tax returns and election commission forms, several parliamentarians, including former Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, stated that they do not own personal vehicles and have nearly empty checking and savings accounts. Senior military officers residing in mansions on prime real estate don’t even have to declare their economic assets.

Meanwhile, despite increasing food and water insecurity as well as these economic woes, Pakistan’s military budget and nuclear arsenal have grown. Pakistan is fast expanding its nuclear arsenal, production plants, and mining facilities. The focus is on making faster, lighter, and more lethal plutonium-based cruise and ballistic missiles. In 2011, Pakistan spent $2.5 billion on its nuclear weapons, or about 12 percent of the total defense budget (estimated at $21 billion, which includes the $5.2 billion official number, and other direct and indirect costs such as pensions, healthcare, procurement, etc). Overall, in 2011, that official $5.2 billion defense budget alone was 20 percent of all government expenditure.

To mediate some of these economic and development challenges, U.S. development aid has increased four times since 2005. The 2009 Kerry–Lugar–Berman Bill offered conditions-based, result-oriented, non-military support of $1.5 billion per year for five years, focusing on high-impact infrastructural projects such as roads and electricity grids and social projects like girls’ schools and scholarships. Today, however, the fate of U.S. development and military aid remains unclear, despite Pakistan’s recent decision to open NATO’s ground supply lines, after a seven month blockade.

**Policy Recommendations**

Where do we go from here? Pakistan and the United States must continue supporting what works and stop supporting what doesn’t. It is unrealistic for Pakistanis to expect the United States to pressure India, and equally unrealistic for the United States to expect Pakistanis to sever all ties with their proxies in Afghanistan such as the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqanis. Resetting

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**Resetting U.S.–Pakistani relations must focus on a limited, yet public, engagement.**
U.S.-Pakistani relations must focus on a limited, yet public, engagement—unreasonable secrecy about the U.S.–Pakistan partnership within Pakistan and the Pakistani Army hurts U.S. interests. The international community, especially the United States, should develop a roadmap to making the U.S.–Pakistan partnership transparent and accountable. Pakistani generals must be persuaded to share agreements made between American and Pakistani generals with regular troops. Without a balance between local political dynamics and marketing American goodwill, Pakistani society, and by extension the Pakistani army, will not be able to sustain operations against insurgents.

Ten years after 9/11 marks America’s second 10 year attempt at molding Pakistan to do its bidding. In the 1980s, the U.S.–Pakistan marriage of convenience came to a sudden halt, leaving thousands of unemployed religious soldiers in the hands of Al Qaeda. By 2014, a similarly abrupt uncoupling may occur. There was never a concerted effort to explain the American war against Al Qaeda to Pakistanis, or to explain Pakistan’s help and sacrifices in support of the war to Americans. Instead of tying Pakistani counterinsurgency with U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, Islamabad should focus on owning the war and connecting it to multiple insurgencies inside Pakistan; in addition to the Pashtun north, Pakistan’s Balochistan and Sindh provinces are home to expanding rural and urban insurgencies.

As Pakistan delivers U.S. materiel support—unmanned aerial vehicles, protected mobility vehicles, fire-support helicopters, and anti-IED technology—training must continue and expand. Lessons learned on both sides of the Afghanistan–Pakistan partnership must be shared and applied. In addition to increasing intelligence sharing, augmenting training programs, and expanding weapons sales, Washington must help in creating a central hub to discuss and debate future regional threats that can connect COIN operators with analysts. This could come in the shape of a Pakistani-managed (and U.S.-funded) COIN institute that brings together military, intelligence, police, and post-conflict administrators to train, debate, and issue threat reports and recommend policy. Such an institute could then be linked to development and security agencies in Washington and Kabul.

Finally, U.S.–Pakistan intelligence cooperation must reflect converging security goals. Since that won’t happen anytime soon, the best alternative for the United States is to work closely with ISI, but equip and train MI officials as strong counterinsurgency partners. A better—and more independent of ISI—military intelligence corps would help NATO operations in eastern
Afghanistan, as well as U.S.–Pakistan joint efforts (such as surveillance operations) in the tribal areas. Pakistani military intelligence officials, forced to play second fiddle to ISI, have expressed a desire to regain a monopoly of battlefield intelligence.41

Absent a push to normalize relations, creating a baseline for cooperation, Pakistan’s counterinsurgency gains from 2009 will continue to reverse. Adding Pakistan to the list of rogue states like Iran and North Korea, after spending billions to shore up its military, must remain as the last resort for the United States. The only way to recalibrate is to reengage with realistic expectations and mutual need.

Notes

1. Author interview with then-Major General Tariq Khan, June 2010.
2. The existence and objectives of this commission were verbally shared with the author by senior officials at the 11th Corps in June 2010.
6. Author interview with Commandant, School of Infantry and Tactics, June 2010.
9. Briefings given to author at Infantry and Tactics School, June and August 2010.
10. Report was shared with author in Quetta, Baluchistan in June 2010.
11. Author interview with Commandant Command and Staff College and former Division Commander in South Waziristan, 11th Corps, June 2010.
14. Author interview with Major General Athar Abbas, Director General Inter Services Public Relations, GHQ, Rawalpindi, September 2010.

15. Author interview with National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) officials, September 2010.


18. Author interviews with Major General Athar Abbas (retired), June 1, 2010; retired Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani, May 2010; and Ashraf Ali, President, FATA Research Center, May 2010.

19. Author interview with Frontier Corps of officials, June 2010.

20. Interview with then Major General Tariq Khan, Commander Frontier Corps Northern Command, June 2010.

21. Author interview with Commander Frontier Corps (North), June 2010.

22. Author interview with a junior Frontier Corps (North) officer, June 2010.


24. Author interviews with senior ISI official, June 2010; and Military Intelligence officials, June 2010.

25. Author interviews with Pakistani military officials familiar with Pakistan surveillance drones, September 2010.


29. Author interview with Col (retired) Aqeel Malik, and other ISPR officials, June 2010.

30. Author interviews with senior military operational planners, June 2010.


41. Author interviews with Pakistani Military Intelligence officials, June 2010.