Emotions in Conflict: Correlates of Fear and Hope in the Israeli-Jewish Society

Eran Halperin, Daniel Bar-Tal, Rafi Nets-Zehngut, and Erga Drori

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Eran Halperin, Daniel Bar-Tal, Rafi Nets-Zehngut and Erga Drori
Emotions in Conflict: Correlates of Fear and Hope in the Israeli-Jewish Society

Eran Halperin
School of Political Science, Haifa University, Israel

Daniel Bar-Tal
School of Education, Tel-Aviv University, Israel

Rafi Nets-Zehngut and Erga Drori
Departments of Political Science and Psychology, Tel-Aviv University, Israel

This study explores the relations between collective memory, delegitimization of the rival, and personal experiences, on the one hand, and personal and collective fear and hope, on the other hand, in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict. A questionnaire was administered to 217 Israeli-Jewish undergraduates from three academic institutions in Israel. The dependent variables were levels of fear and hope on a personal and collective level, whereas the independent variables were collective memory of the Jewish past, delegitimization of Arabs, and the personal experiences of contact with Arabs, military service in the occupied territories, close relationships to a terror victim, and family relationships with Holocaust survivors. Results show that (a) delegitimization of Arabs has the highest correlations with fear and hope, personally as well as collectively; and (b) the centrality of Jewish collective memory is directly related to levels of collective fear. In addition, we found a combined interaction effect of collective memory and personal contact with Arabs on fear, and of collective memory with political orientation and various elements of life experience on hope. It seems, hence, that the level of centrality of collective memory serves to moderate the influence of conflict-related life experiences on personal and collective fear and hope.

Correspondence should be addressed to Daniel Bar-Tal, School of Education, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv 69778, Israel. E-mail: daniel@post.tau.ac.il
Intractable conflicts are prevalent worldwide, and in all of them emotions play an important role (Bar-Tal, 2007b). Some of these emotions fuel the conflict and prevent its peaceful resolution, whereas others are necessary to embark on the road of peace. In the first category, fear is a central emotion, whereas in the other, hope best symbolizes the attempt to change and opt for peace. The study of these emotions, hence, is of major importance in the understanding of the psychological forces that energize conflict and motivate its resolution.

Whereas the major thrust of emotion research has been in the individual context (see Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 2004), this study attempts to elucidate some of the antecedents to fear and hope in the situation of conflict both on the individual and on the collective level. Specifically, in this study we explore the influence of a few main variables such as collective memory, delegitimization of the rival, and personal experiences on the evolution of collective and personal fear and hope in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

FEAR AND HOPE

Fear is usually defined as a discrete subjective aversive emotion that arises in situations of perceived threat or danger to a person or his or her society that enables the person to respond adaptively (Gray, 1987; Ohman, 1993). It is frequently accompanied by a perception of relative weakness and low coping potential with the threatening event (Roseman, 1984). Threats and dangers, present or anticipated, vary greatly; but in cases of conflict, they usually relate to personal and collective experiences determined by the nature of the conflict (e.g., war, terror attack, persecutions, economic depression, or imprisonment). Frequently, fear can be induced by information received about certain objects, events, peoples, or situations that are capable of threatening the person or his or her society (see Grings & Dawson, 1978; Rachman, 1978). Although reactions of fear may also be aroused through a conscious appraisal of a situation, often they are activated and processed automatically: Danger, in such cases, is dealt with in a routine way, without reflection or conscious reference to experience and stored memories (LeDoux, 1996).

Hope is an integrated reaction that consists of cognitive elements, including expecting and planning a positive occurrence with positive affect (Snyder, 1994, 2000; Staats & Stassen, 1985). As a complex syndrome, hope has not been associated with any specific physiological response leading to specific and concrete forms of behavior. Hope is based on higher cognitive processing and requires setting goals; planning how to achieve them; use of
imagery, creativity, cognitive flexibility, mental exploration of novel situations, and even risk taking (Breznitz, 1986; Clore, Schwartz, & Conway, 1994; Fromm, 1968; Isen, 1990; Lazarus, 1991; Snyder, 1994, 2000). Hope arises when a concrete positive goal is expected (Stotland, 1969), including yearning for relief from negative conditions (Lazarus, 1991), in our case, when signs of a possible ending of the conflict appear.

Emotions like fear and hope not only characterize individuals but collectives as well (de Rivera, 1992; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006). A collective emotional orientation occurs as a result of particular societal conditions, common experiences, shared norms, and socialization processes (Kitayama & Markus, 1994). Persons thus may experience emotions as a result of their membership in a certain group or society (Smith, 1993). Collective emotions have been defined, in a relatively general way, as emotions that are shared by large numbers of individuals in a certain society and are targeted at generalized out-groups or group-related events (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007).

A number of scholars have pointed to the important behavioral implications of collective or group-based emotions in situations of conflict between groups and societies (e.g., see Bar-Tal, 2001; Halperin, in press; Petersen, 2002; Volkan, 1997). We propose that in contrast to individual emotions, which are related to unique personal experiences, collective or group-based emotions are solely formed as a consequence of collective experiences in a particular societal context (Bar-Tal et al., 2007; Gordon, 1990; Kitayama & Markus, 1994). The societal context provides signals and cues that, when perceived and cognized by individuals and collectives, create the psychological conditions that become an inherent part of the societal environment (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, in press).

Human beings appraise a context as being threatening, harmonious, peaceful, and so forth; in turn, the appraisal triggers thoughts, attitudes, and emotions that then lead to various lines of behavior (see Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).

The social context can signal potential events related to personal or collective experiences. For example, in a threatening context, a person may be fearful that a terror attack will hurt him or her or that he or she may be fearful that a war will harm his or her society. Recent studies have pointed to the different impact of personal and collective threats in reactions to conflict events (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Jacobson & Bar-Tal, 1995). Those interesting findings call for intensive research that focuses on the distinct phenomena affecting the emergence of personal vis-à-vis collective fear and hope.

It is possible to point to at least three categories of variables that influence fear and hope in the context of conflict. The first category relates to the collective memory, generally defined as representations of the past that
are remembered by society members as the history of the group (Kansteiner, 2002). Collective memory is treated by society members as a truthful account of the past; and formal institutions, including state schools, impart it to society members. When the collective memory of a society focuses on past traumas and other negative experiences, it is possible to assume that when they relate present events to past experiences, society members are prone to experience fear (Volkan, 1997).

Second, fear and hope in conflict are determined also on the basis of society members’ perception of the rival. In line with the Integrated Threat Theory of Stephan and Stephan (2000), we may assume that in conflict situations the rival group poses considerable threat, leading to fear. There is ample evidence that in conflict the rival group is viewed extremely negatively, in delegitimizing terms, and as a threatening entity (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Kelman, 1987).

Third, fear and hope in a conflict context are directly related to society members’ specific personal experiences. For example, a person who either was hurt or has a relative who was hurt in the intergroup conflict is likely to experience more fear than someone who has been spared such personal experience (Bar-Tal, 1991).

THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT

This research was conducted with regard to the Jewish society in Israel in the context of the active Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which is part of a more general Israeli–Arab conflict. Going on for about 1 century, the latter developed about the territory that two national movements claimed as their homeland: Palestinian nationalism and Zionism clashed recurrently over the right for self-determination, statehood, and justice. Since 1948, the neighboring Arab countries also became implicated in the conflict, but at present it is mainly the Jewish Israelis and the Palestinians who, with the exception of a short engagement in a peace process in the 1990s, continue the violent confrontations. From the Jewish-Israeli perspective, the conflict continuously poses serious collective danger to the existence of the Jewish state, and on a personal level it threatens its population (Arian, 1995; Bar-Tal, 2007a). However, since Egyptian President Sadat visited Jerusalem in 1977, a gesture of good will that led to the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979, and since the peace process between the Israeli Jews and the Palestinian in the 1990s, hope also became a major force in the Jewish-Israeli emotional repertoire. In the 2000s, since the eruption of the second Palestinian uprising, the Al Aqsa Intifada, with the escalation of violence and the cessation of the peace process, a sense of
threat again became dominant in Israeli society (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2007). Research found that fear reduces Israelis’ willingness to compromise to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians and solve the conflict peacefully, whereas hope increases this readiness (Arian, 1999; Bar-Tal, 2007a; Gordon & Arian, 2001; Maoz & McCauley, 2005).

**THIS STUDY**

This study was designed to explore the relations between various factors and fear and hope among Israeli Jews. Each of these variables is briefly discussed in the following.

**COLLECTIVE MEMORY**

A central part of the analysis is devoted to collective memory, which seems of major importance in intractable conflicts. By and large, the Israeli collective memory is deeply marked by the hostile approach of the world toward the Jews. Jewish history shows that from the destruction of the Second Temple and the beginning of the forced exile in the Roman era, through the Middle Ages, the Reformation, and the Industrial Revolution, up to the present time, Jews, in almost every place they lived, have consistently and continuously been subject to what is now called anti-Semitism. Through this long history they experienced persecution, libel, social taxation, restriction, forced conversion, expulsion, and pogroms (e.g., Grosser & Halperin, 1979; Poliakov, 1974). As a result, as Liebman (1978) rightly pointed out, “Jewish tradition finds anti-Semitism to be the norm, the natural response of the non-Jew... The term ‘Esau hates Jacob’ symbolizes the world which Jews experience. It is deeply embedded in the Jewish folk tradition” (p. 45).

However, the climax of these experiences took place in the 20th century with the Nazis’ “final solution to the Jewish problem,” the systematic genocide that we now call the Holocaust (see Dawidowicz, 1975). The fact that six million Jews perished while “the world” remained indifferent (e.g., Morse, 1968) tragically and crucially confirmed the Jewish traumatic collective memory (Segev, 2000; Zafran & Bar-Tal, 2003).

Israeli society can, therefore, be characterized by its siege mentality, which is based on a prevailing belief that Jewish society is alone in a hostile world (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992). This perception constitutes a significant part of the Israeli ethos (see Arian, 1995; Gertz, 1995; Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983), and as such it obviously affects the perception of the Israeli-Arab conflict and its resolution. For example, studies show that Jews
in Israel who hold this type of memory tend to reject peaceful resolution of
do the conflict via the creation of two nations (Arian, 1995):

H1: The more central the collective memory among individuals, (a) the
stronger the fear related to personal and collective events will be and
(b) the weaker the hope related to personal and collective events.

Delegitimization

Delegitimization is defined as extremely negative social categorization of a
group (or groups) to the extent of excluding it from humanity as such,
and from the limits of acceptable norms or values. The delegitimized group
is viewed as violating basic human norms or values (Bar-Tal, 1990). It is a
kind of a moral exclusion, and those who are excluded are perceived as non-
entities, expendable, or undeserving; consequently, harming them appears
acceptable (Opotow, 1990). Intractable conflicts lead to mutual delegitimi-
zation (Bar-Tal, 2007b), and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is no exception
(Bar-Tal, 1988; Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007). Focusing on Jewish-Israeli society’s
deleogitimization of Arabs, Bar-Tal and Teichman’s (2005) extensive analysis
showed that as the conflict evolved and escalated, Arabs were perceived
more negatively as killers, blood-thirsty mobs, rioters, treacherous, untrust-
worthy, cowardly, cruel, and wicked. This view became normative in Israeli
society, mainly until 1993 when the Oslo agreements were signed, but it con-
tinues today (Bar-On, 2000; Kelman, 1999; Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007). Recently
Halperin (2007) found that delegitimization of Arabs among Israeli Jews
was positively correlated with emotions of fear, hatred, and anger:

H2: The stronger the Israeli delegitimization of Arabs will be, the stronger
will be the Israelis’ fear related to personal and collective events and
the weaker the hope related to personal and collective events.

Personal Experiences

The research regarding personal experiences suggests that life events,
whether they are political (e.g., in the course of a conflict) or personal
(e.g., an illness), have a psychological impact on people’s emotions and
behavior (Kaplan & Damphousse, 1997; Slone & Hallas, 1999). In this
study, we refer to four types of personal experiences related to the Israel–
Arab conflict.

Holocaust. The first type of personal experience is related to indirectly
experienced traumatic events. In this study, we investigated the experience
of living with Holocaust survivors. Many of the survivors suffer chronic anxiety, depressive reactions, insomnia, nightmares, somatization, anger, and guilt (Erlich, 2002; Niederland, 1968). As a result, studies have shown that the descendants of survivors suffer significantly due to their parents’ or grandparents’ horrible experiences in the Holocaust. They tend to display mistrust, isolation, alienation and suspicion, feelings of helplessness, a fear of abandonment or of catastrophes, depression, and anxiety (Davidson, 1980; Erlich, 2002):

H3: Close family relationships with a Holocaust survivor will be positively related to fear and negatively to hope.

Terror attack. The second personal event is injury either of oneself or the injury and death of a close relation in a terror attack conducted by Arabs. This type of event should also be seen as a traumatic experience, leading to psychological distress (Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, & Johnson, 2006). Deadly terror attacks have been a constant part of life in Israel. Accompanying these experiences are often feelings of helplessness, pessimism, insecurity, hate, depression, shame, and anxiety (Bleich, Gelkopf, & Salomon, 2003; Derman & Cohen, 1990):

H4: Being injured oneself, or experiencing injury or death of a family member in a terror attack, will increase fear on both the personal and the collective levels and weaken hope related to both personal and collective events.

Army service. The third type of personal experience we consider in this article is service in the Israeli army, in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Soldiers who served in these areas, mainly since the eruption of the first Intifada in 1987, are, on the one hand, exposed to constant threat and danger from attacks by the Palestinians; and, on the other hand, they may participate in or witness immoral Israeli conduct and view Palestinian suffering (Gazit, 1999). Studies conducted in Israel found that such service often leads to anti-Palestinian emotions, mistrust, fear, hate, disgust, dehumanization, and prejudice (Dar, Kimhi, Stadler, & Epstein, 2000; Gazit, 1999):

H5: Serving in the Israeli army in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will increase both personal and collective fear and weaken hope.

Encounters with Arabs. The fourth type of personal experience is contact with the rival (i.e., Arabs) through participation in organized
meetings aimed to enhance understanding and reconciliation between Israeli Jews and Arabs (e.g., Maoz, 2004). Such meetings became common, mostly after the Oslo accords, and were based on the contact hypothesis, which claims that encounters between members of rival groups, when conducted under certain conditions, ameliorate mutually held negative stereotypes, attitudes, and emotions (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969). Studies that specifically examined the impact of such meetings in the Israeli–Arab context generally confirmed this assumption, with some limitations (e.g., the positive impact wears off over time if additional supportive efforts are not made; Hertz-Lazarowitz, 1989):

H6: Participation in organized encounters between Israeli Jews and Arabs will be negatively related to personal and collective fear and positively related to both types of hope.

Sociopolitical Characteristics

Three sociopolitical variables functioned as control variables in this research: political orientation, religiosity, and education. These variables are considered important in the general theoretical literature, as well as being central in the specific context of the Israeli–Arab conflict.

Political Orientation

Israel’s political continuum stretches from a dovish pole characterized by more trust in Arabs–Palestinians and readiness for concessions in exchange for peace, to a hawkish pole characterized by deep mistrust of the world at large and Arabs–Palestinians, more specifically, with no or minimal readiness for concessions (Neuberger & Koffman, 1998).

Level of Religiosity

Jewish-Israel’s religious continuum has, on one hand, a secular pole and, on the other, an ultra-orthodox one. Studies conducted in Israel found a close correlation between political orientation and religiosity, indicating that religious Jews tend to be much more hawkish and secular Jews more dovish (Deshen, 1995; Peres, 1995). In addition, in comparison to secular Jews, religious Jews hold more negative stereotypes of Israeli Arabs (Griffel, Eisikovits, Fishman, & Grinstein-Weiss, 1997), are less willing to conduct social relationships with Israeli Arabs, and are less willing to make territorial concessions in exchange for peace.
Education

The final variable pertains to the level of formal education of the respondents. There are some indications that level of education is positively related with the readiness to compromise and resolve the conflict peacefully (Arian, 1995).

METHOD

Participants and Procedures

In June 2000, a questionnaire was administered to 217 Israeli-Jewish undergraduates from three academic institutions: (a) Tel-Aviv University ($N = 65$), (b) Judea and Samaria Academic College ($N = 88$), and (c) Or-Yehuda College ($N = 64$). The choice of these institutions was guided by the fact that each of them has a concentration of students with different political orientations. Participation in the survey was voluntary, but because respondents were approached during class, the response rates in all three institutions were relatively high (around 85%). Before filling out the questionnaires, the respondents were informed that they would be taking part in an academic study that deals with perceptions and feelings about certain events in Israeli society.

In general, the sample represented the distribution of the Israeli-Jewish population with regard to gender, place of residence, immigration status, political stand, and religiosity (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2000). The mean age of the respondents was 23.9 years ($SD = 3.47$). The proportion of men was 50.2% ($N = 109$), and 15.2% ($N = 32$) were immigrants—mostly from the former Soviet Union. In reference to their political stand, 45.4% ($N = 98$) defined themselves as “rightist,” 25.5% ($N = 55$) as “centrist,” and 29.2% ($N = 63$) as “leftist.” When participants were asked to describe their level of religiosity, 49.5% ($N = 106$) defined themselves as secular, 23% ($N = 50$) as traditional, and 26.7% ($N = 57$) as religious or very religious.

Instruments

Respondents were asked to answer a structured questionnaire that assessed emotional measures of personal and collective fear and hope, centrality of

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1Tel Aviv University is mostly identified with the dovish political spectrum (“left”). Judea and Samaria Academic College, which is located within the occupied territories (the city of Ariel), is well known for its hawkish orientation (right). Most of the students in Or-Yehuda College are of middle to low socioeconomic status and are religious.
Jewish collective memory, delegitimization of Arabs, family history (Holocaust survivors), life experiences (terror victim, meeting with Arabs, and army service in the occupied territories), and sociopolitical information. To control for order bias, one half of the questionnaires started with hope scales and the other half with fear scales.

Dependent Variables

1. Personal and collective fear: Fear scales consisted of eight items: three for personal fear and five for collective fear. All these questions began with the following formulation: “On a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much), to what extent are you afraid of . . .?” The items reflected common Israeli fears with regard to personal threats (e.g., “terror attack on a bus, terror attack in a crowded place”) and to collective threats (e.g. “military actions against Israel, widespread anti-Semitism, large-scale terror attacks against Israel”). The scales were constructed and validated in a large-scale study reported in Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal (2006). The distinctiveness of each of the subscales was confirmed by principal component analysis that yielded two independent scales (collective vs. personal fear) and, hence, lends construct validity to the measures used. Both subscales yielded a satisfactory reliability: $\alpha = .79$ for personal fear and $\alpha = .78$ for collective fear (Cronbach’s alpha).

2. Personal and collective hope: Hope scales were based on the conception developed by Snyder (2000) and also consisted of eight items: three for personal hope and five for collective hope. All hope questions started with these initial words: “On a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much), to what extent do you hope that . . .?” The items reflected the common hopes of the Israeli public regarding a personal issue (e.g., “visiting Damascus as a tourist”) and a more collective one (e.g., “comprehensive peace, cooperation with Arab countries, solution of the Jerusalem problem”). The scales were constructed and validated in a large-scale study also reported in Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal (2006). The distinctiveness of each of the subscales was again confirmed by principal component analysis that yielded two independent scales (collective vs. personal hope). Both subscales yielded a satisfactory reliability: $\alpha = .81$ for personal hope and $\alpha = .82$ for collective hope (Cronbach’s alpha).

Independent Variables

1. Jewish collective memory: To examine the centrality of Jewish collective memory, it was essential to accurately define the components of that
memory. Hence, in a preliminary study we systematically analyzed relevant passages in some of the pivotal history textbooks used in Israeli schools. In addition, five in-depth interviews with Jewish-Israeli students (aged 24–30) were conducted, asking them to provide a detailed description of the way they perceive the main components of the “Jewish-Israeli collective memory.” Data from both procedures (i.e., history textbooks and interviews) were the basis for a scale consisting of nine items. All questions began with the following wording: “On a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much), to what extent do you find yourself thinking about issues related to the following statements?” (e.g., “Throughout history, Jews continuously suffered from anti-Semitism”; “The existence of the Jewish people has been under immediate danger throughout history”; “The Jewish Holocaust is the most important event in human history”). The scale yielded a satisfactory reliability of $\alpha = .94$ (Cronbach’s alpha).

2. **Delegitimization of Arabs**: The scale was aimed at measuring participants’ perception of Arabs in delegitimizing terms (see Bar-Tal, 1989)—for example, as aggressive, inhuman, or as war mongers. It consisted of five items. All items began with the following words: “On a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much), to what extent do you agree with the following statements?” Each statement concentrated on a different aspect of Arabs’ character (“Arabs tend to be violent”; “Arabs do not care for human life”; “Arabs are not to be trusted”) or Arabs’ actions (“Most Arabs support terror”; “Arabs consistently initiate violence against Israel”). The scale yielded a satisfactory reliability of $\alpha = .84$ (Cronbach’s alpha).

3. **Life experiences**: One dichotomous item examined participants’ personal contact with Arab people: “Have you ever participated in an organized meeting with Arabs?” ($1 = no, 2 = yes$). A second dichotomous item tapped participants’ army service: “Did you serve as a soldier in the Occupied Territories?” ($1 = no, 2 = yes$). A third dichotomous item examined participants’ relation to the Holocaust: “Are you second or third generation to Holocaust survivors?” ($1 = no, 2 = yes$). The fourth dichotomous item examined the participants’ personal exposure to terror attacks: “Were you or any other member of your family ever hurt by a terror attack?” ($1 = no, 2 = yes$).

4. **Sociopolitical variables**: Sociopolitical variables included participants’ self-defined political stand ($1 = extreme left to 7 = extreme right$), self-definition regarding religiosity ($1 = secular, 2 = traditional, 3 = religious, to 4 = ultra-orthodox$), and level of education completed ($1 = elementary 2 = high-school, 3 = post-high school, 4 = student, to 5 = academic education$).
RESULTS

Before presenting the advanced analysis, we display descriptive statistics for the four main dependent variables and two of the independent ones (Table 1). By and large, levels of collective fear ($M = 3.77$, $SD = 0.74$), as well as the levels of collective hope ($M = 4.22$, $SD = 0.88$), are quite high. Indeed, they are much higher than their personal equivalents (personal fear: $M = 2.86$, $SD = 1.01$, $t = 12.85$, $p < .001$; personal hope: $M = 3.31$, $SD = 1.19$, $t = 11.58$, $p < .001$). Moreover, the standard deviations of all four variables reveal that, although the participants’ responses with regard to the collective emotions are relatively homogeneous, their responses regarding personal emotions are much more diverse. Finally, the high levels of both centrality of Jewish collective memory ($M = 3.34$, $SD = 1.03$) and the delegitimization of Arabs ($M = 3.47$, $SD = .96$) further emphasizes the important role of those phenomena in Israeli society.

A correlation matrix of the research variables is presented in Table 2. Results show that each of the personal emotions is positively and significantly correlated with its collective equivalent. Nevertheless, in concurrence with the factor analysis we already described (see the Method section), those correlations are not too high (less than 0.7); and hence, although it appears that the personal and the collective aspects of the same emotion (fear or hope) are related, they are distinct phenomena.

With regard to the relations between independent and dependent variables, results show that collective memory is positively correlated with personal ($r = .18$) and collective ($r = .47$) fear but not with hope. Delegitimization is positively correlated with both personal and collective

\begin{table}
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\textbf{Variable} & \textbf{Number of items} & \textbf{n} & \textbf{Range} & \textbf{Reliability} & \textbf{M} & \textbf{SD} \\
\hline
Personal fear & 3 & 215 & 4.0 & .79 & 2.86 & 1.01 \\
Collective fear & 5 & 216 & 3.4 & .78 & 3.77 & 0.74 \\
Personal hope & 3 & 212 & 4.0 & .81 & 3.31 & 1.19 \\
Collective hope & 5 & 214 & 4.0 & .82 & 4.10 & 0.88 \\
Collective memory & 9 & 204 & 4.0 & .94 & 3.34 & 1.03 \\
Delegitimization & 5 & 212 & 4.0 & .84 & 3.47 & 0.96 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Descriptive Characteristics—Main Research Variables}
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\footnote{2It should be noted that the significant differences between the collective and the individual aspects of each emotion could be a simple artifact of the specific items chosen. Yet, they might also represent a real, substantial difference.}
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<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Meeting with Arabs</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Service in the territories</td>
<td>-.29**</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Political orientation (+ right)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>-.38**</td>
<td>-.33**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Level of religiosity</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
<td>-.25**</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Education</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>-.34**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Significant correlations are marked in bold.
*p < .05, **p < .001.
fear \((r = .24 \text{ and } .52, \text{ respectively})\). It is negatively correlated with both personal and collective hope \((r = -.39 \text{ and } -.33, \text{ respectively})\). As for the relations between personal experiences and emotions, surprisingly, second- and third-generation post-Holocaust participants tend to display higher levels of collective hope \((r = .16)\) than people not related to Holocaust victims. As predicted, terror victims tend to present low levels of personal hope \((r = -.14)\). In addition, army service in the territories seems to be negatively related to the levels of personal fear \((r = -.29)\) and negatively related to the levels of both personal \((r = -.25)\) and collective hope \((r = -.16)\).

Some of the sociopolitical variables are significantly correlated with fear and hope. Hawkish political attitudes are positively related to collective fear \((r = .49)\) and negatively related to both collective \((r = -.33)\) and personal hope \((r = -.38)\). No significant correlation was found between political orientation and personal fear. Level of religiosity is positively related to personal fear \((r = .14)\) but negatively related to collective fear \((r = -.21)\). In addition, it is positively related to both personal \((r = .23)\) and collective hope \((r = .16)\). Finally, level of education is significantly (negatively) related only to the level of personal fear \((r = -.27)\).

In the next stage, two steps of multiple regression analysis were conducted to examine research hypotheses that refer to collective and personal fear. In the first step, to examine the relations between the independent variables and each of the two types of fear while controlling for the impact of other variables, collective and personal fear were regressed on all the independent variables.

Table 3 shows that above and beyond the distinct influence of each of the independent variables on each emotion, the explanatory capability of the independent variables is much higher in the case of collective fear than in the case of its personal counterpart. The first steps of the regression of personal and collective fear partially confirm Hypothesis 1: The stronger a person’s Jewish collective memory, the higher her or his feeling of collective but not personal fear; confirm Hypothesis 2: Delegitimization of Arabs is the most significant predictor of both types of fear; oppose Hypotheses 3 to 6: (a) Family experience of the Holocaust is negatively related to levels of collective fear, (b) “army service” in the territories lowers the levels of personal fear, and (c) life experiences like being a terror victim or meeting with Arabs has no significant direct relations with either type of fear. Finally, some sociopolitical variables influence levels of fear: (a) rightist political orientation is closely related to collective fear, and (b) low level of education is related to personal fear.

In the second step, to examine potential joint influences of collective memory and other independent variables on each of the emotions, all possible interaction effects between the two clusters of emotions were examined.
Only significant interaction effects were entered into the analysis. Although no interaction effect between collective memory and other independent variables was found to be significant in reference to personal fear, the interaction of collective memory with meeting Arabs is positive and significant with regard to collective fear.

To reveal the nature of the interaction effect, we plotted an interaction graph while controlling for other predictors that were entered into the regression equation. As seen in Figure 1, the direction of relations between meetings with Arabs and collective fear is totally different for individuals with high and low levels of Jewish collective memory. Whereas for the first group the encounters with Arabs are closely related to higher levels of collective fear, for the second group they are related to lower levels of collective fear. It seems, hence, that it is not the contact with Arabs as such that directly influences collective fear, but that it is moderated by the collective memory a person brings to the meeting.

Next, two steps of multiple regression analysis were conducted to predict personal and collective hope. In the first step (Table 4), the direct relations between the independent variables and personal and collective hope were examined. Contrary to the findings presented in Table 3, the first steps in Table 4 show that the explanatory power of the independent variables is

### Table 3
Two Steps of Hierarchical Linear Regressions with Interaction Predicting Personal and Collective Fear

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Collective fear Step 1</th>
<th>Collective fear Step 2</th>
<th>Personal fear Step 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective memory</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegitimization</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holocaust survivors</td>
<td>-.22*</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror victim</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting with Arabs</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.56**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service in territories</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation (+right)</td>
<td>.14***</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of religiosity</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13 Collective memory* meeting with Arabs</td>
<td></td>
<td>.43*</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Cells contain unstandardized parameter estimates.

$p < .10$. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$. 

EMOTIONS IN CONFLICT

Q14Q15
It is interesting to note that the results reveal many similarities between the predictors of personal and collective hope. In more detail, contrary to Hypothesis 1, no significant relations were found between collective memory and hope (personal or collective). On the other hand, as in the case of the fear predictors, delegitimization of Arabs was found to be the most influential predictor of both personal and collective hope (Hypothesis 2). Yet, this time the direction is opposite—the higher the levels of delegitimization, the lower the personal and collective hope. Surprisingly, and contrary to Hypothesis 3, no significant relations were found between the family experience of living with Holocaust survivors and levels of hope. In addition, although meeting with Arabs and family relationships with terror victims was found to be negatively related to the personal sense of hope, it has no relations at all to the collective level (partial confirmation of Hypotheses 4 and 6). On the other hand, in concurrence with Hypothesis 5, army service in the occupied territories is significantly related to lower levels of personal and collective hope. Finally, results show that rightist political views are related to low levels of both personal and collective hope.

One of our most basic hypotheses was that understanding personal and collective hope through the prism of life events and attitudes toward Arabs would work differently for individuals with different levels of centrality of collective memory. Hence, in the second step, we divided the entire sample into two groups—those with a high sense of collective memory versus those}

![FIGURE 1](image-url)  
**FIGURE 1** The effect of the interaction between collective memory and meeting with Arabs on collective fear (controlling for other independent variables).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Collective hope</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Personal hope</th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entire sample$^a$</td>
<td>Central collective memory$^b$</td>
<td>Not central collective memory$^c$</td>
<td>Entire sample$^a$</td>
<td>Central collective memory$^b$</td>
<td>Not central collective memory$^c$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective memory</td>
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<td>$.07$</td>
<td>$.13$</td>
<td>$.10$</td>
<td>$.13$</td>
<td>$.10$</td>
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<td>$.08$</td>
<td>$.13$</td>
<td>$.08$</td>
<td>$.13$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegitimization</td>
<td>$-25^{**}$</td>
<td>$.08$</td>
<td>$.37^{**}$</td>
<td>$.13$</td>
<td>$.14$</td>
<td>$.10$</td>
<td>$-.47^{***}$</td>
<td>$.10$</td>
<td>$.52^{**}$</td>
<td>$.15$</td>
<td>$.45^{***}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holocaust survivors</td>
<td>$.13$</td>
<td>$.13$</td>
<td>$.11$</td>
<td>$.22$</td>
<td>$.20$</td>
<td>$.16$</td>
<td>$.04$</td>
<td>$.16$</td>
<td>$.11$</td>
<td>$.27$</td>
<td>$.12$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror victim</td>
<td>$.26$</td>
<td>$.33$</td>
<td>$.56$</td>
<td>$.65$</td>
<td>$.10$</td>
<td>$.37$</td>
<td>$.92^{**}$</td>
<td>$.41$</td>
<td>$.30$</td>
<td>$.80$</td>
<td>$.45$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting with Arabs</td>
<td>$.17$</td>
<td>$.21$</td>
<td>$.09$</td>
<td>$.31$</td>
<td>$.07$</td>
<td>$.29$</td>
<td>$.52^{**}$</td>
<td>$.26$</td>
<td>$.32$</td>
<td>$.38$</td>
<td>$.35$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service in territories</td>
<td>$-.27^*$</td>
<td>$.13$</td>
<td>$.06$</td>
<td>$.22$</td>
<td>$.33^{*}$</td>
<td>$.16$</td>
<td>$.44^{**}$</td>
<td>$.16$</td>
<td>$.02$</td>
<td>$.26$</td>
<td>$.19$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political orientation (+ right)</td>
<td>$-.29^*$</td>
<td>$.14$</td>
<td>$.06$</td>
<td>$.22$</td>
<td>$.50^{**}$</td>
<td>$.17$</td>
<td>$.54^{**}$</td>
<td>$.17$</td>
<td>$.23$</td>
<td>$.27$</td>
<td>$.21$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>$-.05$</td>
<td>$.08$</td>
<td>$.04$</td>
<td>$.13$</td>
<td>$.09$</td>
<td>$.09$</td>
<td>$.08$</td>
<td>$.10$</td>
<td>$.20$</td>
<td>$.16$</td>
<td>$.04$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>$.01$</td>
<td>$.03$</td>
<td>$.04$</td>
<td>$.05$</td>
<td>$.11^{*}$</td>
<td>$.04$</td>
<td>$.00$</td>
<td>$.04$</td>
<td>$.03$</td>
<td>$.06$</td>
<td>$.01$</td>
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<td>$.31$</td>
<td>$.24$</td>
<td>$.35$</td>
<td>$.32$</td>
<td>$.25$</td>
<td>$.18$</td>
<td>$.53$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Cells contain unstandardized parameter estimates.

$^aN = 204, ^bN = 107, ^cN = 97.$

$^{*}p < .10. ^{**}p < .05. ^{***}p < .01.$

Q15Q14
with a low sense of collective memory.\(^3\) The division was made by the median score and produced two almost equally sized groups—high central-

ity \([N = 107]\) and low centrality \([N = 97]\). Next, separate multiple regression analyses were conducted for each group to predict personal and collective hope.

In general, the results of the second steps in Table 4 show that, despite the fact that collective memory has no direct relation with personal or collective hope, its indirect effect is broad. More specifically, the results show that for individuals who define the collective memory as central, only delegitimization of the rival is significantly (positively) related to the levels of personal and collective hope. On the other hand, in addition to the significant influence of delegitimization, for those for whom collective memory is low, levels of both types of hope are negatively related to hawkish political orientation and to army service in the territories. In addition, personal hope is exclusively and negatively related to contact with Arabs and to family relationships with a terror victim.

**DISCUSSION**

Many researchers of intractable conflict recognize and write about the role of emotions (e.g., Petersen, 2002; White, 1996), but the empirical work on its antecedents, functions, and consequences is in its initial stages. This research makes a modest\(^4\) contribution to the study of emotions in intractable conflict by elucidating some of the antecedents of two major emotions—fear and hope—in the context of the Israeli–Arab conflict. Specifically, it focused on the interrelations between fear and hope with three categories of variables: collective memory, delegitimization of the rival, and traumatic personal experience related to conflict.

First of all, the results show that individuals differentiate between emotions (fear and hope) that are related to personal experiences and emotions that are related to collective experiences. Moreover, different factors are

\(^3\)It should be stressed that the split into high and low collective memory is for illustrative purposes only. In practice, this procedure enabled a deeper look into the interaction effects of various independent variables and collective memory on both types of hope. Despite some advantages of other methods to present interaction effects, we found the one used here as the most parsimonious as well as the most suitable for the needs of these analyses.

\(^4\)We define the contribution of this work as “modest,” mainly due to the correlative nature of the study and its non-comparative or local nature. Yet, we believe that the preliminary findings of this work can create a fertile ground for an in-depth line of studies on similar or related issues that will overcome the aforementioned limitations.
differently related to each of them. This means that individuals assess experiences that elicit personal fear and hope unlike experiences that elicit collective fear and hope. Similar results with regard to personal and collective threat were found by Huddy et al. (2002). In addition, explanatory factors that are related to the conflict, like the ones tested in this work, were found to be more related to fear on the collective level and to hope on the personal one. Their relation with collective hope and personal fear is much more limited. Hence, it can be argued that the psychological context of the conflict, as expressed through our independent variables, is more closely related to personal and not collective experience of hope and to collective and not personal experience of fear.

Second, the results indicate that the level of collective fear and hope is higher than the level of personal fear and hope. This means that the participants in the study were more affected emotionally by possible collective experiences than by personal experiences. Those results correspond with previous publications that stressed the intensity of the collective emotional experiences of members of societies that are involved in intractable conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2007; Volkan, 1997).

With regard to analyses of the determinants, not surprisingly, delegitimization was found to be closely related to both fear and hope. The more delegitimized the rival, the greater the personal and collective fear and the less the personal and collective hope. Delegitimization includes not only negative stereotyping but denied humanity (Bar-Tal, 1990). In our case, Arabs have been stereotyped with the most negative, threatening labels, which not surprisingly lead to fear on personal and collective levels and decreased hope for peace on both levels as well.

Collective memory was found to be another important correlate of fear, but it had direct relations only with fear related to collective experiences. Individuals who tend to remember the very negative experiences of the Jewish people tend also to experience fear about the future of the Jewish collective. This finding is of special importance because it shows that remembering traumatic Jewish experiences that took place in the distant past affects collective fear related to the Israeli-Arab conflict. It confirms longstanding observations by a number of social scientists and historians who suggest that remembrance of the distant Jewish past, and especially the Holocaust experience as actively propagated and fostered in Israel, feeds into Israeli citizens’ fear of Arabs (Bar-Tal, 2007a; Segev, 2000; Zertal, 2005).

Moreover, in addition to the direct relation of collective memory to collective fear, it was found to have a combined (interaction) effect on fear with personal contact with Arabs. The results indicate that collective memory highly influences the results of interethnic meetings. For those who have
high levels of collective memory, the meetings triggered feelings of collective fear. This suggests that for them an Arab serves as a generalized negative stimulus who elicits memories of past persecution. On the other hand, it appears that for people who are less flooded by traumatic national memories, interaction with Arabs has actually managed to reduce perception of collective threat and feelings of fear.

Rather surprisingly, we did not find any direct associations between the centrality of collective memory and both types of hope. Yet, the results point to a very unique role played by collective memory in the development of hope. It seems that levels of collective and personal hope are affected by life experiences and political orientation only among individuals for whom the collective memory is not a pivotal part of their life. On the other hand, individuals who are dominated by a central sense of collective memory are more resistant to changes in levels of hope, and this in turn is affected only by the perceptions of the rival (delegitimization). Hence, high levels of collective memory serve as barriers that blur any potential effect of important life experiences on emotions that are related to the conflict.

As for direct effect of life events, meetings with Arabs affected neither fear nor hope on the collective level. It seems that individuals who live with a long-term conflict tend to differentiate between sporadic positive interactions with individuals from the out-group and their deep-rooted collective feelings related to the longstanding rival out-group as a whole (Halperin, 2007). On the personal level, participation in meetings with Arabs was related to low levels of hope. Studies that investigated organized Jewish-Arab encounters have very often reported that Jewish participants were greatly surprised with the strong feelings and far-reaching demands for change expressed by the Arab participants (Hertz-Lazarowitz, Zelniker, Stephan, & Stephan, 2004). We assume that the high level of grievance and demand that emerge in some of those meetings on the part of the Arab group members negatively affect the personal optimism and hope of the Israeli group members.

The results also show that the experience of living with a family member who survived the Holocaust is negatively related to collective fear. This is a somewhat surprising result because it is generally assumed that the second generation of Holocaust survivors are prone to more anxiety and fear, although there is also a line of research that shows more complex results (van Ijzendoorn, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Sagi-Schwartz, 2003). According to this line of research, the experience of living beyond the Holocaust can be seen in some cases as increasing resilience. It is possible that, in our case, the participants who lived with Holocaust survivors became more resilient in response to possible threatening events.
Army service in the occupied territories turned out to be negatively related to personal fear, meaning that those who served there experienced less personal fear. On the other hand, this population also experienced less personal and collective hope. It is possible that the contact with the Palestinians strengthened and inoculated the soldiers against fear but also showed them that achieving peace is very difficult and may even be unrealistic; therefore, the hope was reduced. It is also possible that this long, stressful, and eroding experience reduced the soldiers’ sensitivity to any kind of emotions (positive or negative) that are related to the conflict.

Being hurt by terror or having a family member hurt by it decreased the level of both personal and collective hope. It is documented that victims of terror tend to exhibit hawkish views and object to peace negotiations (Bar-Tal, 2007a). Yet, of no less interest is the finding according to which no significant relations were found between personal experience with terror attacks and personal or collective fear. This can be explained, to some extent, by resilience factors or by the gain in coping resources that in some situations evolve among war veterans and victims of terror attacks (Hobfoll et al., 2006).

In general, the findings show that perceptions of the rival, collective memory, and life experiences join together to affect different aspects of fear and hope in the context of conflict. Scholars of emotions (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1994) usually refer to events and cognitive appraisals as the most central antecedents of emotions. The findings of this work confirm this but suggest that the conflict situation should be viewed as a unique context in which events are evaluated through the prism of memory and with reference to prevalent, socially construed, and circulated perceptions of the rival.

This line of study is of special importance because fear and hope play a major role in the psyche of society members, thus determining people’s behavior to a large extent. Fear sensitizes people to threatening cues, causes overestimation of danger, adherence to known situations, and avoidance of uncertain ones (Bar-Tal, 2001; Clore et al., 1994; LeDoux, 1995). It also mobilizes society members to act on behalf of society to cope with the threat, to act against the enemy, and defend their country. Fear thus tends to limit society members’ perspective by binding the present to past experiences related to the conflict, and by building expectations for the future exclusively on the basis of the past. Society members then have difficulty freeing themselves from the domination of fear to construct hope for peace.

Hope for peace includes a yearning for relief from the terrible situation of intractable conflict and the active wish for conflict resolution. It is based on realistic and concrete goals and enables the generation of pragmatic ways to achieve such goals. Hope liberates people from fixed—and fixating—beliefs about the irreconcilability of the conflict to find creative ways to resolve it.
It enables them to imagine a future that is different from the past and present and motivates them to change their situation by means of actions that were long unthinkable such as negotiating with the enemy, making compromises, seeing the enemy as human beings who are also victims of the conflict, and so on. Without hope for peace, it is impossible to successfully embark on the road to peace.

In sum, this study sheds light on some of the determinants of collective and personal fear and hope, suggesting the importance of collective memory, delegitimization of the rival, and personal experiences. Additional research could examine potential ways to moderate the impact of memory and negative perceptions of the rival, on present feelings, and decision-making processes concerning peace and war.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Eran Halperin is a post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Psychology and the Stanford Center for Conflict and Negotiation at Stanford University. He has a bachelor's degree in Political Science and Psychology and a master's degree and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Haifa, Israel. His research interests include political–psychological aspects of conflicts, emotions in conflicts and politics, and political aspects of hostile attitudes toward minorities.

Daniel Bar-Tal is professor of social psychology at the School of Education, Tel-Aviv University, Israel. His research interest is in political and social psychology studying socio-psychological foundations of intractable conflicts and peace making. He has published over 15 books and over 150 articles and chapters in major social and political psychological journals and books. He served as a President of the International Society of Political Psychology and received various awards for his work.

Rafi Nets-Zehngut is a doctoral candidate (final year) in the Political Science Department at Tel-Aviv University, Israel; last year a fellow at Yale University; and currently a fellow at Columbia University. His research interests focus on conflicts: mostly collective memory of conflicts and also reconciliation and healing. He has been and is involved in various local
and international activities and research projects that deal with peace and co-existence.

Erga Drori is a doctoral candidate in the Psychology Department at Tel-Aviv University, Israel.

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