Emotional Barriers to Peace: Emotions and Public Opinion of Jewish Israelis About the Peace Process in the Middle East

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It is well-established today that the psychological barrier is one of the most prominent factors operating against efforts to promote peace. However, most studies along these lines have concentrated on the cognitive barriers and neglected the emotional ones. Hence, the main goal of this study is to create a deeper understanding of how emotions (e.g., fear, anger, and hatred) directed toward an adversary serve as a barrier to potential public support for peaceful resolution of a conflict. To that end, an experimental survey was conducted among a representative nationwide sample of Jewish Israelis (N = 501) in the week prior to the Annapolis Peace Summit. Negative emotions were stimulated, and different variables reflecting support for peace or violence were measured. Results obtained via paths analysis using structural equation modeling have drawn a comprehensive map of the distinct impact of each emotion on specific aspects of public opinion toward the peace process.

Citizens who are living in societies involved in intractable conflicts are frequently exposed to violent events and negative messages that give rise to negative emotions. Yet, citizens vary in the way that these occurrences affect their political positions about negotiations, and this variation goes above and beyond the fundamental differences in their ideological stances.

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The premise that underlies this work is that specific emotions mediate the effect of general beliefs, sentiments, and contemporary events on concrete political positions in regard to peace negotiations.

Countless theoretical texts (e.g., Long & Brecke, 2003; Petersen, 2002; Staub, 2005; Volkan, 1997) and a few empirical investigations (e.g., see Maoz & McCauley, 2005, 2008) have been conducted in an attempt to point to the centrality of negative emotions as a force that motivates and sustains conflicts between societies and countries. Yet, few of these works examined the specific influence of discrete emotions on public opinion about the peace process or empirically demonstrated the general process that leads to these unique effects.

Hence, this work addresses two complementary goals. On the concrete level, it follows recent trends in social (e.g., Roseman, 2002) and political psychology (e.g., Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007), aimed at describing the unique role of discrete emotional phenomena in shaping an individual’s political positions about a peace process. From a broader perspective, it theoretically presents and empirically tests the general process by which long-term ideologies—emotions, specific events, and emotional reactions interact to shape political response tendencies to conflict-related events.

To address these two goals, the associations between intergroup emotions and specific political positions were tested among Jewish Israelis on the eve of an important peace summit in the Middle East. Two models were used to test the effects of emotions on two types of public opinion (outcome) variables: (a) factors that are catalysts of the peace process (hereafter, “peace catalysts”)—namely, support for compromises, support for reconciliation in a post-peace era, support for risk-taking in negotiation, and openness to new positive information about the opponent; and (b) factors responsible for direct or structural violence when peace talks fail to reach agreement (hereafter, “violence facilitators”)—namely, outgroup blame attribution, support for militant actions, and support for stopping ongoing negotiations with the opponent (for similar typology, see Cohrs & Boehnke, 2008).

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

Emotions are flexible response sequences that transform a substantive event into a motivation to respond to it in a particular manner (Frijda, 1986; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; Zajonc, 1998). In recent years, there has been growing interest in the concept of group-based emotions, which refers to emotions felt by individuals as a result of their membership in a certain group (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993; Smith &
Mackie, 2008). Intergroup emotions, which are tested in this research, are emotions that are felt as a result of belonging to a group (i.e., group-based), and are targeted at another group as a homogeneous entity (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007).

The General Process: Interrelations Between Long- and Short-Term Emotional Phenomena

Emotions do not evolve in a vacuum. Particularly (but not only) in long-term conflicts, they are affected by previous thoughts, beliefs, and events. It has been previously suggested (Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, in press) that the unique framing of an event (Mintz & Geva, 1997; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004), in conjunction with the standing ideology about the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007; Long & Brecke, 2003) and preexisting emotional sentiments about the opponent (Halperin & Gross, in press; Halperin et al., in press), shape (directly or via cognitive appraisal) the emotional reaction to a certain event. These factors, in turn, affect political response tendencies to the event itself (see Figure 1). Given that the roles of framing and ideology have been extensively discussed in this regard, I now focus on the role of long-term emotions in this process.

FIGURE 1 A general theoretical model: framing, emotions, ideology, and public opinion about the peace process.
It is interesting to note that, although most psychologists who study emotions experimentally focus on phenomena measured in very short periods of time (i.e., seconds or minutes), scholars who study intergroup conflicts treat emotions as enduring for months and years (e.g., Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007; de Rivera & Paez, 2007). In this work, I hope to illuminate the interrelations between these two approaches, and concentrate mainly on the role played by long-term emotional sentiments in shaping immediate emotional reactions (although reversed causality is also possible).

Early theorists in the psychological study of emotions (e.g., Arnold, 1960), as well as more recent ones (e.g., Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1994) have referred to concepts like emotional sentiment or chronic emotion. In this view, whereas emotion is an acute reaction to stimuli, emotional sentiment is a chronic emotional phenomenon that represents a highly emotional standing disposition toward a person, group, or symbol (Halperin et al., in press). In response to specific events, the long-term, deep-rooted emotions will negatively bias the immediate emotional response (Halperin & Gross, in press). Hence, it is expected that the enduring emotional sentiment will be associated with its corresponding short-term emotion (e.g., long-term anger would lead to anger reaction). In addition, it is expected that each emotion will mediate the effect of its corresponding sentiment on attitudes toward the peace process (see Figure 1).

The Role of Discrete Emotions in Shaping Public Opinion about Peace

Different scholars point to different sets of intergroup emotions as the foundation stones of the emotional repertoire of societies in conflict. Among others, intergroup emotions like humiliation (Lindner, 2000), shame (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007), and guilt (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008) are frequently mentioned. This study focuses on three other intergroup emotions—fear, anger, and hatred—which, in my view, constitute the most prevalent and influential emotional factors within the context of conflict (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007; Halperin, 2008). In the following section, I define each of these three emotional phenomena and briefly review their fundamental components and characteristics. Research hypotheses that follow relate to how each of the three emotions described produce distinctive effects on public opinion factors.

Fear is defined as a primary aversive emotion that arises in situations of perceived threat and danger to the organism (the person) or his or her environment, and enables them to adaptively respond to these situations (Gray, 1987; LeDoux, 1996). Fear is the emotional outcome of the subjective balance between perceived threat and estimated coping capabilities.
(Roseman, 1984). Behaviorally, it is usually associated with the avoidance of taking risks and the willingness to create a safer environment (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut, & Almog, 2008).

Accordingly, in the context of conflicts, studies have pointed to close relations between fear and high-risk assessments (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), low support for risk-taking (Rydell et al., 2008), and low support for military action (Huddy et al., 2007; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006). Although most previous studies have not found clear association between fear and support for negotiation (Reifen-Tagar, Federico, & Halperin, in press) or compromises (Maoz & McCauley, 2005), it can be assumed that fearful individuals will not be supportive of compromise that involves perceived security risk. On the other hand, fearful individuals tend to support protective political actions, and would not necessarily object to non-risky compromises during negotiation (e.g., symbolic compromise). Therefore, it has been hypothesized that fear will be negatively related to support for taking risks in negotiations, initiating military actions, and compromises that inherently include security risks (Hypothesis 1).

Hatred is a secondary, extreme, and continuous emotion that is directed at a particular individual or group and denounces them fundamentally and all-inclusively (Opotow & McClelland, 2007; Sternberg, 2003). In most cases, ingroup members appraise the outgroup behavior as stemming from a deep-rooted, permanent, evil character (Ben-Zeev, 1992); and, as a result, hatred is associated with high levels of delegitimization and dehumanization of the hated outgroup (Haslam, 2006). Behaviorally, hatred is associated with the aspiration to harm the outgroup as much as possible, and it can lead people to desire total elimination of the hated outgroup (Halperin, 2008).

Surprisingly, most studies that have dealt with emotions and public opinion about conflicts did not include a hatred variable in them. Yet, it is reasonable to assume that hatred, insofar as it entails fundamentally negating the opponent’s basic character, might lead to lower openness to new, positive information about the opponent. In turn, that very same feature within hatred will presumably be related to opposition to negotiation and compromise, and surely increase resistance to reconciliation as well (Staub, 2005). In addition, the inherent emotional goal of hatred—hurting the hated object as much as possible—might lead to increasing support for military actions in reaction to any failure of the negotiation process (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefer, 2009). Hence, it has been hypothesized that hatred would be negatively related to willingness to learn new, positive knowledge about the opponent; negatively related to support
for negotiation, compromise, and reconciliation; and positively related to the support for indiscriminant military actions (*Hypothesis 2*).

*Anger* is evoked in events in which the individual perceives the actions of the others as unjust, unfair, or as a deviation from acceptable societal norms (Averill, 1982). On the other hand, it involves appraisals of relative strength and high coping potential (Mackie et al., 2000). Fischer and Roseman (2007) have recently suggested that the integration of these two characteristics leads individuals experiencing anger to initiate actions aimed at correcting or improving the situations or the relationships between the parties (see also Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006; Reifen-Tagar et al., in press). These general emotional goals are concretely expressed either in aggressive behavior (Berkowitz, 1993) or, alternatively, in more moderate attempts to reconcile and change the source of anger or the nature of the interaction (Halperin, 2008).

In line with its characteristics, previous studies have consistently found a clear and direct association between anger and outgroup blame attribution (Small, Lerner, & Fischhoff, 2006). Other studies have pointed to the relation between anger and an objection to negotiation, compromise, reconciliation, and forgiveness (Tam, Hewstone, Cairns, Maio, & Kenworthy, 2007). Yet, extensive research on hatred and anger recently conducted by Halperin (2008) suggested that previous results regarding the negative influence of anger on support for compromise and negotiation may have been somewhat misleading because a hatred variable was not included in these studies. In other words, it is assumed that if the effects of hatred had been accounted for, anger's effects on objections to compromise and negotiation would not have been significant.

The nature of anger as an approach emotion aimed at correcting the situation has received expression in studies that found a positive relation between anger and optimistic views (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003), low risk perception (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Rydell et al., 2008), and support for military actions (Huddy et al., 2007; Skitka et al., 2006). I put forward the argument that, under certain circumstances, these seemingly negative consequences associated with anger could ultimately be beneficial for the peace process. The rationale behind this argument is that an appraisal of relative strength associated with anger could, at times, enhance openness and the willingness to take risk during negotiations (Reifen-Tagar et al., in press). Hence, it has been hypothesized that, on the one hand, anger toward the opponent would be positively related to outgroup blame attribution; and, on the other hand, when controlling for hatred, anger would be related to a greater willingness to take risks in negotiation and an increased openness to positive information about the opponent (*Hypothesis 3*).
Throughout the years, and mainly since the early 1990s, several attempts have been made to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Most notable were the Madrid Conference in 1991, the Oslo Accord (first agreement signed in September 1993), and the Camp David summit in 2000. The failure of the summit in 2000 led to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada—the second Palestinian uprising. These events, which involved enormous losses of human life for Israelis and Palestinians, also caused citizens on both sides to experience widespread despair regarding the peace process. This very same despair was the basis for the Israeli decision, led by then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, to unilaterally disengage from the Gaza Strip and from northern Samaria in 2005.

On November 27 through 28, after more than 6 years of a dead-end peace process, widespread mutual violence, lack of hope, and extensive negative intergroup emotions between Palestinians and Israelis, the Annapolis Summit was initiated by U.S. President George W. Bush. At the time, the summit seemed to be an important opportunity for both sides to set the peace process in motion again. Hence, the period preceding the summit constitutes an optimal setting for examining the questions asked within this study.

THIS EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

General Description

To examine both the general model and the concrete research hypotheses, an experimental, nationwide survey was conducted among a representative sample of Jews in Israel 1 week prior to the beginning of the Annapolis Summit. The survey sought to examine the general process related to the manner in which emotions directed toward Palestinians influence public opinion about the peace process. The experimental survey helped replicate a very common societal process whereby negative information about contemporary political events stimulates different emotions among individuals holding different ideological and emotional dispositions. In turn, these emotions give rise to specific political positions about the current political negotiations.

A survey manipulation was used (Sniderman, 1996) in which the three tested emotions (fear, hatred, and anger) were stimulated by general, negative frames regarding the sequence of events that had preceded
the opening of the summit.\(^1\) Following the presentation of the manipulations, emotional responses directed at Palestinians and various factors of support or opposition to the peace process were measured.\(^2\)

**METHOD**

Sampling and Participants

Interviews were conducted by an experienced and computerized survey institute in Israel (the Machshov Institute). At the onset of the interview, oral informed consent was obtained. A random sampling within stratified subgroups was used to obtain a representative sample of Jews living in Israel at the time of the surveys. Following Hagendoorn and Sniderman (2001), the representative nature of the sample was preserved within each of the experimental groups. A total of 501 interviews were completed and analyzed, and the overall response rate was 44%. In general, the sample provided a representative distribution of the Israeli population in terms of gender, age, place of residence, and voting behavior (see the Central Bureau of Statistics at http:www.cbs.gov.il/ts/databank/series). It consisted of 248 men (49.5%) and 253 women (50.5%). Almost one half (46.3%) of the respondents considered themselves moderately or strongly rightist, 23.2% said they were centrist, and 18.4% said they were leftist (12.1% chose not to provide this information).

\(^1\)Despite the acknowledgment of the relative advantages of an experimental design that would have induced discrete emotions and not general negativity, such a design is very difficult to formulate (see Geva, Mosher, & Redd, 2004). It is even more difficult in the context of long-term conflict in which long-term, negative emotions and attitudes toward the opponent are deeply rooted within every individual. The inevitable consequence is that the emotional reaction experienced by each individual in response to conflict-related events is, on the one hand, within the general spectrum of negativity but, on the other hand, is strongly associated with each individual’s long-term ideology and sentiments. As a result, we can expect to find distinct influences of different emotions on public attitudes, but we cannot necessarily expect to find that similar stimulation will induce similar emotions among all participants. Therefore, each of the negative frames was general enough to encompass cognitive appraisals that are associated with all three tested emotions, assuming that the differentiation between the roles of each emotion would become clear, based on advanced statistical data analyses.

\(^2\)To minimize ethical problems, the information used for manipulations was based on quotes from Israeli popular newspapers during the days of the study. In this way, I ensured that the participants were not exposed to any new information or even to new interpretations about the state of negotiations or about the Palestinians. In addition, at the end of the interview, the participants were elaborately debriefed about the goals, rationales, and, primarily, the reasons for using the manipulation in this study.
Procedure and Instruments

In the first stage of the study (pre-manipulation), participants were asked to rate their level of support for a set of scales that dealt with their long-standing attitudes, beliefs, and emotions about the conflict, in general, and the Palestinians, in particular. The order of the questions throughout the entire questionnaire was counterbalanced, and there was no effect of order.

Independent variables—Long-term emotional sentiments and ideology. To capture long-term emotional sentiments, participants were asked to consider their general feeling when they think of Palestinians, unrelated to any specific event. Accordingly, they were asked to indicate their feelings on a series of eight, 6-point rating scales. These items concerned group-based hatred (hostility and hatred; \( \alpha = .82 \)), anger (angry, irritated, and revolted; \( \alpha = .86 \)), and fear (afraid, anxious, and worried; \( \alpha = .86 \)).

The latent structure and the distinctiveness of the three emotional sentiments were assessed in confirmatory factor analysis using AMOS 6 software. Previous scholars (e.g., White, 1996) had not differentiated between anger and hatred. Hence, the fit measures of three different (but nested) models were compared: the one-emotion model (i.e., the paths between all three emotional sentiments were constrained to one, indicating identical concepts), the two-emotion model (i.e., the path between anger and hatred was constrained to one), and the three-emotion model (i.e., measurement model without being constrained). Examination of fit indexes (see Table 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>( \chi^2 )</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>IFI</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>( \Delta \chi^2 )</th>
<th>( \Delta df )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Three emotion</td>
<td>82.09*</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two emotion</td>
<td>136.87*</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(anger–hatred and fear)</td>
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<tr>
<td>One emotion</td>
<td>154.04*</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three-emotion model versus two-emotion model</td>
<td>54.78*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Three-emotion model versus one-emotion model</td>
<td>71.95*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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Note. \( N = 501 \). CFI = comparative fit index; IFI = incremental fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation.

*\( p < .01 \).
revealed that the hypothesized model, in which three different emotional sentiments were represented as independent entities, fit the data with greater reliability than the other models (see Hu & Bentler, 1999).

To isolate the effect of emotions from that of conflict-related ideology, one of the most detailed scales for such an ideology—the ethos of conflict measure—was used. The ethos of conflict scale has previously been validated within the Israeli arena (Oren, Bar-Tal, & David, 2004), and it consists of 17 items (e.g., “The Jews have an exclusive claim to the land of Israel as it has been their homeland for generations”), which, in this survey, yielded a satisfactory internal reliability of $\alpha = .73$.3

**Sociopolitical background variables.** Self-evaluation of income compared to the average in Israel (1 = much below average to 5 = much above average), as well as educational attainment (1 = elementary, 2 = high school, 3 = post high school [non-university or college], 4 = university or college student, and 5 = university or college degree), self-definition of political ideology (1 = extreme left or dovish to 5 = extreme right or hawkish), and self-definition regarding level of religiosity (1 = secular, 2 = traditional, 3 = religious, and 4 = very religious).

After providing background data, participants were randomly assigned to three groups: two relatively equal-sized experimental groups ($N = 120$ in each group) and one larger control group ($N = 141$).4 A fictitious newspaper article containing a description of the pre-summit negotiations was read to the participants. The article was described as an editorial article recently published in Israel’s most popular daily newspaper. The first paragraph of the article was similar in all three groups, and contained a short description of the current status of the Israeli–Palestinian talks 1 week before the Annapolis Summit.

Whereas the members of the control group were not exposed to any additional information, two different negative frames were used to induce negative emotions among the two experimental group members. The negative frames dealt with various reasons for the difficulties within the negotiations, and were presented as an unofficial leak conveyed to the reporter by a highly reliable and senior source within the Israeli team. The frames that were used for each of the two experimental groups were based on a few of the most central appraisals, well-known as correlates of

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3A detailed wording of the ethos of conflict scale in English, Hebrew, Arabic, and Russian is available on request from the author.

4Another experimental condition ($N = 120$) was conducted, but the results obtained by this group’s members have not been included in this work.
negative emotions (e.g., unjust behavior, high threat, and internal attribution–evil character):

1. “Palestinian character and future threat”—deep-rooted permanent evil character and harming motivations of the adversary, which would lead to continued threats and attacks: “The failure to achieve any positive results in negotiations stems from the rude and disagreeable behavior of the Palestinians, which is deep-rooted within the generally devious and unreliable Arab character and culture. According to this source, it seems that the main goals of Palestinians are to do as much harm to Israel as possible and, hence, the Israeli side is not very optimistic about the future of the general process.”

2. “Unjust behavior”—unfair and illegitimate behavior of the adversary that might lead to the failure of the negotiations: “The behavior of the Palestinian delegation during negotiations is unfair and does not meet with accepted diplomatic standards of trustworthy negotiation. According to the anonymous Israeli source, while the Israeli delegation is very flexible and willing to offer wide compromises, the Palestinians show low flexibility and frequently change their minds about compromises they had previously made.”

**Mediating variables: Emotional reaction.** Fear, hatred, and anger were assessed using the same items that were used to measure the long-term sentiments of these equivalent emotions. Yet, this time, the participants were asked to “indicate their feelings toward the Palestinians when they were listening to the article.” Looking at the entire sample, the internal reliabilities for all three emotions were high: hatred (hostility and hatred; \( \alpha = .81 \)), anger (angry, irritated, and revolted; \( \alpha = .80 \)), and fear (afraid, anxious, and worried; \( \alpha = .87 \)). The latent structure and the distinctiveness of the three emotions were assessed in confirmatory factor analysis in a similar procedure to the one described with regard to the emotional sentiments (see Table 2).

**Dependent variables: Measurements of support or opposition for the peace process.** Peace catalysts were assessed using four different measures:

1. Support for compromises: Two items were used to measure support for compromises. Following Maoz and McCauley (2005), differentiation was made between support for tangible territorial compromise that inherently includes some security threat (“support for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and evacuation of all settlements”) and symbolic compromise (“support for declaring the Arab neighborhoods and villages in Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state”).
2. Reconciliation: A single-item factor, support for normalization or reconciliation, concentrated on Israeli–Palestinian relations in a post-formal peace era (see Tam et al., 2007): “Which of the following situations do you support as the post-conflict phase?” (a) total separation between societies, (b) “cold peace”—open borders without social and economic relations, or (c) “warm peace”—wide social and economic relations.

3. Risk-taking for peace: Another item captured the level of support for taking risks within the course of negotiations: “To what extent do you support risks taken by the Israeli delegation to achieve peace” (1 = not at all to 6 = very much).

4. Openness: Two items (α = .79) were used to reflect the openness of individuals to new, positive information about Palestinians: “To what extent (1 = not at all to 6 = very much) would you be interested in (a) watching TV movies that present the Palestinian culture, character, and habits in a positive way; or (b) reading books that deal with the Palestinian point of view regarding the conflict?”

Violence facilitators, if talks failed, were assessed using three scales. In all three, the participants were asked to rate their level of support for a certain action or theme in case the current wave of talks failed to achieve an agreement:

1. Militant action: Following Huddy et al. (2007), the support for military actions scale was composed of two items: “support for initiating a large military operation of the Israeli army” and “support for using severe military actions, even if it meant harming innocent civilians” (α = .74).

2. Outgroup blame attribution: One item dealt with blame attribution: “Based on your acquaintance with the parties, which of them will be...
most guilty if the negotiations fail?” (1 = mostly the Israeli side, 2 = equal blame for both sides, and 3 = mostly the Palestinian side).

3. Stopping negotiation: Another single-item scale was used to measure level of support for stopping the negotiations: “What is your opinion regarding the continuance of negotiations with the Palestinians in the future?” (1 = support for talks with moderates and extremists, 2 = support for talks only with moderates, and 3 = objection to any kind of future talks).

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

An in-depth inquiry into Jewish Israeli attitudes regarding peace catalysts shows that only 25.6% of the entire sample expressed support for the suggested territorial compromise ($M = 2.44$, $SD = 1.71$). However, more Israelis (49.6%) were supportive of the symbolic compromise ($M = 3.27$, $SD = 1.93$). Only 27.8% of Israelis were supportive of warm peace with full social and economic relations in a post-peace agreement era. Accordingly, Jewish Israelis also displayed low interest in acquiring new positive information about Palestinians ($M = 2.74$, $SD = 1.57$). The descriptive results regarding the violence facilitators are quite mixed. On the one hand, only a minority of Israelis (37.7%) pointed to exclusive Palestinian blame for future failure of the negotiations, and an even smaller group (27.4%) called for the immediate halt to negotiations in case of current failure. On the other hand, however, the support for Israeli military actions in case of failure of the negotiations was quite high ($M = 3.55$, $SD = 1.66$).

Main Analyses

To examine the proposed theoretical framework, two structural models were advanced using AMOS 6 software (Arbuckle, 2005). Due to the large number of variables, one framing manipulation (“Palestinian character” [see Figure 2] or “unjust behavior” [see Figure 3]) and only one set of dependent variables (“catalysts of peace” [Figure 2] or “violence facilitators” [Figure 3]) were included in each of the models. The large number of parameters also led to path modeling with indexes as indicators.

5Throughout the entire results section, when using the term support, I refer to answers 4 through 6 on a scale ranging from 1 to 6 (i.e., 4 = somewhat support, 5 = support, and 6 = strongly support).
Manipulation checks. At the preliminary stage, to examine whether manipulations were effective, independent-sample t tests were conducted on their related cognitive appraisals. Based on Halperin (2008), two items were used as manipulation checks in the “peace catalysts” model.

FIGURE 2 Structural equation model (standardized significant $p < .01$ coefficients are reported) for predicting catalysts of peace ($N = 261$).

FIGURE 3 Structural equation model (standardized significant $p < .01$ coefficients are reported) for predicting violence facilitators ($N = 261$).
(see Figure 2). As hypothesized, participants in the “Palestinian character condition” (frame) appraised the Palestinian character as more stable and evil (M = 4.00, SD = 1.80) and the Palestinian motivations as more harmful and threatening (M = 4.46, SD = 1.53) compared to the appraisals of participants in the control condition: character (M = 3.65, SD = 1.83) and intentions (M = 4.17, SD = 1.72). In both cases, the differences were marginally significant (p < .10).

Also based on Halperin (2008), a single item was used as a manipulation check in the model for predicting “violence facilitators” (see Figure 3). In that model, participants in the “unjust condition” (frame) appraised the Palestinian behavior as significantly more unfair and wrong (M = 4.48, SD = 1.46) than participants in the control condition (M = 3.67, SD = 1.73), \( t(246) = 4.01, p < .001 \).

The results of the manipulation checks led to further examination of potential interactions. The analyses showed that the framing manipulations affected appraisals of individuals with different ideologies about the conflict differently, meaning that the Framing Manipulation × Ideology interaction was significant in both models.\(^6\) Despite the main effects presented earlier, the effects of both manipulations were more substantial among individuals with hawkish–rightist ideology (i.e., high ethos) than among those with dovish–leftists ideology (i.e., low ethos). Hence, in both models, the ideology measure and the manipulation frame were combined in an interaction term. In both models, the integration of the interaction variable into the model eliminated the exclusive main effects of its components (i.e., manipulation and ethos of conflict). Hence, although they were taken into account within the data analysis, these variables appear as part of the overall interaction, but do not appear in the model independently.

**Correlations between outcome variables.** Although outcome variables in each of the models are broadly defined under the same category (i.e., peace catalysts or violence facilitators) and probably have some overarching qualities, correlation results and exploratory factor analyses revealed that they represent distinct factors. As a matter of fact, not even one of the correlations between pairs of outcome variables within each of the models exceeded the level of \( r = .25 \).

\(^6\)The Palestinian character manipulation increased the level of agreement with its corresponding appraisal among high-ethos (hawkish) individuals (\( t = -1.67, p < .05 \)) but not among low-ethos (dovish) individuals (\( t = 0.73, p = ns \)). The unjust behavior manipulation worked for both groups, but its effect on the hawkish group (\( t = -4.30, p < .001 \)) was substantially higher than the effect on the dovish group (\( t = -1.96, p < .05 \)).
More specifically, within the peace catalysts model, significant correlations were found between realistic compromise and reconciliation ($r = .25, p < .001$), symbolic and realistic compromise ($r = .25, p < .001$), openness and realistic compromise ($r = .24, p < .001$), and openness and reconciliation ($r = .16, p < .05$); and between support in taking risks and realistic compromise ($r = .25, p < .001$), reconciliation ($r = .17, p < .01$), and symbolic compromise ($r = .14, p < .05$). Within the violence facilitator model, all pairs of outcome variables had positive, but low, correlations: support for militant actions and blame attribution ($r = .13, p < .05$), support for militant actions and stopping negotiations ($r = .20, p < .001$), and blame attribution and stopping negotiation ($r = .15, p < .05$).

Assessment of the General Models

As mentioned, in both models, the Framing Manipulation × Ideology interaction was specified as an exogenous variable, predicting their corresponding subjective appraisals, which, in turn, predicted the three emotions (see Figures 2 and 3). Following the theoretical model, the emotional sentiments were added to the models as additional predictors of the emotions. Finally, the three emotions were specified as predictors of the various dependent variables. Hence, emotions were expected to fully account for the relations among framings, appraisals, emotional sentiments, and attitudes toward peace talks.

Figure 2 presents a model for predicting the catalyst of peace variables using the “Palestinian character” manipulation. Figure 3 presents a model for predicting violence facilitators using the “unjust behavior” manipulation. Despite the significance of the chi-square, which can be attributed to the sample size (see Hu & Bentler, 1999), both models fit the data quite well: peace catalysts model—$\chi^2(46, N = 261) = 101.00, p < .00$; normed fit index (NFI) = .94; incremental fit index (IFI) = .97; comparative fit index (CFI) = .96; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .07; and violence facilitators model—$\chi^2(29, N = 261) = 75.5, p < .00$; NFI = .94; IFI = .96; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .06.

Most important, despite some minor exceptions, both models show similar patterns related to the process involving emotions. First, both models reveal that the interaction between ideology and how an event is framed (i.e., the manipulation) is a powerful predictor of cognitive appraisals. Further, cognitive appraisals are significant predictors of all three emotions. Second, with only a few exceptions, the results of both models show that

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7For simplification, error terms have been omitted from the figures.
specific emotional reactions mediate the effects of an event’s framing, ideology, and emotional sentiment regarding specific negotiation positions.

Finally, as shown here for the first time, in both models, all three emotional sentiments significantly contributed to the development of their equivalent emotions (e.g., sentimental fear led to fear). It is interesting to note that no cross-effects of one kind of emotional sentiment on another kind of emotion were discovered. What follows is that above and beyond the effects of the specific content of the event or its framing, the emotional reaction of each individual is shaped by his or her longstanding, discrete emotional sentiment toward the outgroup.

**Alternative models.** The main goal of the examination of alternative models was to validate the exact role of emotions within the general process—namely, to demonstrate that emotions affect specific political positions about the process, and not vice versa. For that purpose, various models with inversed causal relations were advanced. The fit measures of the two most important ones are presented in Table 3. In Alternative Model 1, emotions were specified as dependent variables, and the political positions about the process (i.e., peace catalysts and violence facilitators) were specified as mediators. In a second alternative model (Alternative Model 2), the Framing Manipulation × Ideology interaction directly influenced emotions, which, in turn, affected appraisals and political positions. As Table 3

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**TABLE 3**

Alternative Models: Fit Indexes and Model Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>IFI</th>
<th>NFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>EVIC</th>
<th>AIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peace catalysts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tested model</td>
<td>101.00</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>247.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative model 1</td>
<td>142.46</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>270.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative model 2</td>
<td>250.51</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>400.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violence facilitators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tested model</td>
<td>75.51*</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>171.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative model 1</td>
<td>112.25*</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>214.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative model 2</td>
<td>132.15*</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>226.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. $N = 261$. AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion; CFI = comparative fit index; EVIC = Expected Value Information Criterion; IFI = incremental fit index; NFI = normed fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation.

*p < .01.

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8It is worth noting that additional alternative models that controlled for the effects of socio-political variables were also advanced, but due to the negligible effect of these factors and to simplify the presentation of the results, they were not included in the final models.
illustrates, all fit measures of the hypothesized models were better than their parallels in the alternative models. For the purpose of comparing the models, I used two additional fit measures—Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Expected Value Information Criterion (EVIC)—that are commonly used to compare non-nested models that include the same set of variables (Browne & Cudeck, 1989; Kumar & Sharma, 1999). As can be seen in Table 3, AIC and EVIC are lower in the hypothesized models compared to both alternative models, indicating that these models fit the data better than the others.

Unique Emotional Effects on Political Positions

As predicted, the results reveal that each emotion has a distinctive effect on specific public opinion factors. The analysis of the peace catalysts model (see Figure 2) showed that fear was the only emotion that had a significant (and negative) effect on support for territorial (security-related) compromise and a negative effect on support for taking risks in negotiations (Hypothesis 1). On the other hand, support for symbolic compromise was reduced by hatred. Hatred was also the only emotional predictor that led to a (non-)willingness to reconcile with the Palestinians and a low level of openness to positive information about the Palestinians (Hypothesis 2). Finally, the results show that, at least while controlling for the effects of other negative emotions, anger induces willingness to take risks in negotiation, as well as openness to new, positive information about the opponent (Hypothesis 3).

Similarly, the results of the violence facilitators model (see Figure 3) also point at a unique role for each emotion in predicting violence inducers. As expected (Hypothesis 3), anger was the exclusive predictor of blame attribution. Also in line with Hypothesis 2, hatred toward Palestinians was the only emotional antecedent of the demand to immediately stop the negotiations and the most prominent predictor of initiating indiscriminant militant actions toward Palestinians. Finally, counter to the hypotheses, fear induced support for initiating militant actions against Palestinians, whereas anger did not lead to direct support for such a tendency. Further statistical analysis omitting hatred from the equation showed that anger does influence the militant tendencies, but this relation is qualified by hatred.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

The main goal of this work was to contribute to the understanding of the role of emotions in conflicts, in general, and their role in delaying or encouraging a peace process, in particular. Based on a general theoretical
framework related to the manner in which diverse emotions affect public attitudes about peace differently (see Halperin et al., in press), this work uses an experimental survey methodology conducted on the eve of a real-time event to point to the distinct role played by each of the three tested emotions—fear, hatred, and anger—within the context of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process.

According to the results, fear was found to be the only emotional antecedent fostering an opposition to taking risks during negotiations. This factor can be a crucial obstacle to any progress toward peace, which inherently requires mutual risk-taking. In addition, fear reduced the support for making territorial compromises that might lead to security problems. However, it should be noted that, although “fearful” individuals do oppose compromises that may increase future risks, they do not oppose other types of compromise (e.g., symbolic ones). Therefore, in future studies, it would be interesting to examine the effect of fear on compromises that are perceived as risk reducers.

Not surprisingly, hatred was found to be a major emotional barrier to peace. It is the only emotion that reduces support for symbolic compromise, reconciliation, and even stands as an obstacle to every attempt to acquire positive knowledge about the Palestinians. In addition, hatred leads to the support for halting negotiations and, when coupled with fear, induces support for military action. These results accurately correspond with the fundamental characteristics of hatred that attribute a stable negative character to the outgroup and negate any possible change or improvement in their behavior (Halperin, 2008; Sternberg, 2003).

According to the results, anger is the most complicated and ambiguous emotion. The advanced models show that, on the one hand, anger is the only emotion that leads to the belief that the Palestinians are entirely responsible for a failed talk. On the other hand, anger is also the only negative emotion that induces support for taking risks in negotiations and openness to positive knowledge about the opponent. Further analysis showed that when not controlling for hatred, anger would also induce support for militant actions and aggressive behavior.

Corresponding with the findings of previous work (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Reifen-Tagar et al., in press), these results strengthen the notion that anger is related to a corrective emotional goal, and the aggressive behavior is only one of various alternative ways to correct the perceived unjust or unfair situation. In that sense, the results further highlight the differentiation between the psychological nature and the political implications of anger and hatred (for elaboration, see Halperin, 2008). These differences can be explained by the distinction commonly made between emotions that are directed at an object, like hatred, and emotions that are directed to specific
actions, like anger (Ben-Zeev, 1992). Accordingly, contrary to those who experience hatred, in most cases, individuals who experience anger wish to improve the situation and do not necessarily want to destroy the adversary. Thus, individuals experiencing anger maintain two very different, but not mutually exclusive, positions. On the one hand, they blame the opponent. On the other hand, they concomitantly are willing to offer the opponent a means to change their ways. Individuals who are dominated by anger feel that they are strong enough to bring about correction and change even if it means taking some risks (Mackie et al., 2000). Under certain circumstances, such motivation will turn anger into a substantial barrier for peace; but, in other situations, anger has the potential to become a peace facilitator.

From a broad perspective, the results of this work show that to genuinely understand the determinants and trends regarding public opinion about peace, the long-term psychological (cognitive and emotional) context must be taken into account. The ideology regarding the conflict has substantially influenced the potential impact of different framings on the subjective cognitive appraisals. Further, the long-term sentimental emotions were found to be the most significant predictors of emotional reactions leading up to the peace summit.

In addition, results show that even in a long-term conflict, attitudes toward peace can be quite easily influenced by unique framings of the events. In turn, framings affect cognitive appraisals and subsequent emotions that arise as a result. Understanding the role of framing in determining affective responses, as well as the unique influence of each emotion, can offer practical advantages for decision makers and other practitioners in the realm of conflict resolution and peace-making.

An important limitation of this study is its sole reliance on self-reports about emotional experiences, particularly when the participants are asked to report on negative emotions, like hatred, which often have a negative stigma attached. That being said, this strategy enables a real-time examination of reported emotional experiences in response to real political events. In addition, it captures the lay theories of the participants about the nature and the essence of each and every emotional phenomenon. Along with the vast development of in-lab physiological measures of emotions, social scientists should continue using large-scale, real-life, self-report measures at least as a complementary method.

Generally speaking, the entire line of research that deals with psychological barriers to conflict resolution is based on the notion that, in addition to the “hard” issues in dispute, there are psychological dynamics and processes characterizing groups involved in long-term conflicts that prevent them from achieving peace (Bar-Tal & Halperin, in press; Ross & Ward, 1995).
This work shows that emotions play an important role in that process, and that any attempt to draw a comprehensive map of these barriers should take human emotions into account.

It should be stressed that identification of the barriers by itself is not satisfactory; and, hence, extensive research is still required to address the ways to overcome these barriers. Increasing scholarly attempts in the domain of emotion regulation, concentrating on different strategies to influence which emotions people feel and how they experience or express them (Gross, 2007), can be used as a proper theoretical platform for future research aimed at identifying means to overcome the emotional barriers to peace (for elaboration, see Halperin et al., in press).

To conclude, there is no doubt that further work using similar or different methods in different conflict zones is needed to further validate these results across time, cultures, and contexts. In addition, future studies should include a larger variety of cognitive appraisals and emotions, and should include behavioral and physiological measures in the same design. Yet, this work covers relatively new ground and provides some interesting insights for scholars, as well as for practitioners. Hopefully, these insights will be used in the future by supporters of peace and not by peace spoilers.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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