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Anger, Hatred, and the Quest for Peace: Anger Can Be Constructive in the Absence of Hatred

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Abstract
Anger is often viewed as a destructive force in intergroup conflicts because of its links to aggressive behavior. The authors hypothesized, however, that anger should have constructive effects in those with low levels of hatred toward the out-group. Using experimental designs with subsamples of nationwide representative surveys, the authors conducted two studies within the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Study 1 showed that inducing anger toward Palestinians several weeks before the Annapolis summit increased support for making compromises in upcoming negotiations among those with low levels of hatred but decreased support for compromise among those with high levels of hatred. Study 2 showed that, even when a strong anger induction was used just days before the summit, the anger induction led to increased support for compromise among those low in hatred, but not among those high in hatred. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for informing a psychological understanding of conflicts.

Keywords
emotion, intergroup conflict, anger, hatred, attribution

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Intractable intergroup conflicts—such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict—arguably represent one of the greatest threats we face as a species. Such conflicts are inherently psychological, but it has only been in recent decades that psychologists have applied their methods to analyze these conflicts, aiming to identify possible points of intervention. In the current article, we focus on the affective dimension of intergroup conflicts. In particular, we examine short- and long-term affective factors in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

**Emotion in Intergroup Conflicts**

Emotions play a central role in intergroup conflicts (Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera 2007; Horowitz 1985; Petersen 2002), partly because they influence people’s beliefs and attitudes about the proper reaction to events related to a conflict (for a recent review, see Halperin, Sharvit, and Gross 2011). For example, studies show that emotions such as fear and anger can contribute to political attitude formation concerning aggressive reactions to terror attacks (Cheung-Blunden and Blunden 2008; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Lerner et al. 2003; Skitka et al. 2006) and that these emotions as well as others such as hope, hatred, and empathy influence people’s positions about negotiation, peace agreements, and reconciliation (Halperin forthcoming; Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoeffer 2009; Maoz and McCauley 2005; Tam et al. 2007).

A wide range of emotions are relevant to intergroup conflict. However, anger is one of the most powerful and prevalent (Bar-Tal 2007; Halperin and Gross forthcoming). According to appraisal theories of emotion (Roseman 1984; Scherer, Schorr, and Johnstone 2001), anger is elicited when the out-group’s actions are perceived as unjust and as deviating from acceptable norms. According to these theories, people who feel angry believe that urgent action is needed to correct the perceived wrongdoing and may believe that their group is capable of initiating such corrective action (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000). This often leads to a tendency to confront (Berkowitz 1993; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000), hit, kill, or attack the anger-evoking target (Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz 1994). And indeed, studies of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and the Basque country have demonstrated that anger toward the opponent may constitute a significant emotional barrier to negotiation, compromise, and forgiveness (Paez 2007; Tam et al. 2007).

Yet, contrary to the view that anger uniformly promotes aggression and violence (Averill 1982), anger can sometimes lead to constructive action (Fischer and Roseman 2007; Halperin 2008) and can thereby potentially contribute to a peaceful resolution of intergroup conflicts. Empirical findings demonstrate that under certain circumstances, anger increases support for constructive actions such as long-term reconciliation (Fischer and Roseman 2007) and support for risk-taking in negotiations (e.g., compromises) to achieve peace (Halperin 2010; Reifen, Halperin, and Federico 2009).

One way to explain these mixed results is to see anger as an approach emotion (Harmon-Jones 2003) whose specific manifestations (i.e., constructive vs.
destructive) may vary across individuals and circumstances. This argument relies upon the distinction between general emotional goals and more specific attributions and response tendencies (Roseman 1984; Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz 1994). That is, in line with appraisal theories, individuals who feel anger toward the out-group will appraise the out-group’s behavior as unjust and, if the ingroup’s relative power is high, these angry individuals will develop a similar emotional goal—they will wish to correct the behavior of the out-group. Yet, appraisal theories do not make any strong claims about the specific attributions associated with anger. In other words, anger is targeted at specific actions taken by individuals or groups but does not necessarily imply any negative internal characteristics of these groups or individuals. Hence, “angry” people may differ in the way they translate that general goal into specific response tendencies. While some angry individuals gravitate toward achieving the required improvement using aggressive means, others with similar levels of anger may channel the anger into more constructive solutions such as education, negotiation, and even compromises.

Hatred, Anger, and Support for Compromises in Intergroup Conflict

Given the centrality of anger in intergroup conflicts, it is of vital importance that we understand the underlying mechanisms that determine when anger will lead to constructive or destructive response tendencies. It can be argued that the crucial factor is the appraisal regarding whether the target group can or cannot change. This factor is highly associated with the kind of attribution (internal vs. external) that people make for specific negative behaviors of the out-group (Heider 1958). We presume that, for those who attribute the objectionable behavior of the out-group to immutable characteristics of the group, a destructive reaction is probable, but for those who attribute that behavior to situational or contextual factors, a constructive reaction would be more probable. In other words, for individuals who believe that out-group members are capable of changing their ways for the good, a constructive reaction to anger is possible.

A recent study, based on appraisal theories, shows that hatred is the affective phenomenon that encapsulates the idea of stable negative characteristics in the out-group and the belief in the out-group’s inability to undergo positive change (see study 2 in Halperin 2008). Hatred is one of the most powerful emotional sentiments, mainly in the context of intergroup conflicts (Ben-Zeev 1992; Opotow and McClelland 2007; Sternberg 2003). It is an extreme and continuous affective phenomenon that is directed at a particular individual or group and denounces them fundamentally and all inclusively (Sternberg 2003). Behaviorally, hatred is associated with the aspiration to harm the out-group, and in extreme cases, it can lead people to desire the destruction of the out-group (Halperin 2008).

In our view, enduring emotional sentiments such as hatred are capable of influencing the way in which emotions (such as anger) are expressed. We argue that
the magnitude of the long-term hatred felt toward the anger-evoking group can determine whether the anger is associated with destructive or constructive response tendencies (see also Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2009). Given that hatred involves the belief that an out-group is evil by nature and will never change (Halperin 2008), individuals with high levels of hatred are expected to perceive an anger-evoking action of the out-group (e.g., provocation and aggression) as resulting from stable characteristics of the out-group. Furthermore, they may see an aggressive response as the most reasonable solution. But in individuals with low levels of hatred, other paths of correction, such as negotiation, education, and compromise, may be perceived as equally beneficial and much less costly than an aggressive one.

The Current Investigation

To examine the role of hatred in moderating the effect of anger on support for compromises (political expressions of constructive anger), we conducted two studies among Jewish-Israelis within the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The goal of the studies was to test the hypothesis that anger would lead to different political action tendencies among individuals with different levels of hatred. In study 1, which was carried out three weeks prior to the Annapolis peace summit in the Middle East, we premeasured existing levels of hatred toward Palestinians, then induced intergroup anger, and assessed support for compromises in the upcoming negotiations. In study 2, we replicated the method and design of study 1 in closer proximity to the summit and with a more concrete anger-evoking manipulation.

Before proceeding with a detailed description of manipulations and measures, we wish to draw attention to the ethical dimension of these studies by noting the steps we took to minimize any potential complications of inducing anger in this important, real-world context. First, study 1 was carefully examined and approved by the research ethics committees of the relevant institutions (as was study 2). Second, all scenarios used in our manipulations were versions of what was readily available in the mainstream Israeli media during this period. In this way, we ensured that participants were not exposed to new information or even new interpretations about the state of negotiations or about the Palestinians. Finally, at the end of the interview, the participants were elaborately debriefed about the goals and rationale of the study and the importance of using this type of manipulation in such a study. Furthermore, during the debriefing, participants were exposed to additional, alternative interpretations for the same events. They were also told that all of the different framings of events were a result of subjective evaluations and that one interpretation should by no means be considered as superior to the others.

To appreciate the context for the current studies, it bears noting that, since the early 1990s, several attempts have been made to resolve the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East. Most notable were the Madrid Conference in 1991, the Oslo Accord (first agreement signed in September 1993) and the Camp David summit in 2000. The failure of the summit in 2000 led to the outbreak of the
Al-Aqsa Intifada—the second Palestinian uprising. In addition to enormous losses in human lives on both sides, these events led to wide despair regarding the peace process among Palestinians as well as among Israeli citizens. This very same despair was the basis for the Israeli decision, led by the then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, to unilaterally disengage from the Gaza Strip and from northern Samaria in 2005. After more than six years of a dead-end peace process, widespread mutual violence, lack of hope, and extensive negative intergroup emotions between Palestinians and Israelis, the Annapolis Summit, initiated by the American President George W. Bush on November 27-28, 2007, seemed at the time to be an important opportunity for both sides to set the peace process in motion again. Hence, the period preceding the summit constituted an unusually appropriate setting for examining the questions addressed in the current studies.

### Study 1: Does Hatred Moderate the Link Between Anger and Support for Compromises?

The primary goal of study 1 was to evaluate our hypothesis that anger would be associated with different response tendencies depending on the level of long-term hatred directed at the out-group. Using a representative nationwide experimental survey conducted in Israel, we measured existing levels of long-term hatred toward the Palestinians, induced momentary anger targeted at the same group, and then assessed the effects of that anger on support for compromises in the face of upcoming peace talks. Following the framework presented in the introduction, we hypothesized that anger that occurs in conjunction with high levels of long-term hatred would lead to a decrease in support for making compromises for peace, whereas anger that occurs in conjunction with low levels of long-term hatred would lead to an increase in support for compromises for peace.

### Method

**Participants.** Participants were 262 Israeli Jewish citizens (132 females and 130 males). These participants were a subsample from a nationwide sample that had voluntarily participated in a phone survey conducted in Israel three weeks prior to the Annapolis peace summit in November 2007. A random sampling within stratified subgroups was used to obtain the current sample, which was a representative sample of Jews living in Israel at that time. The context of the summit enabled examination of our hypotheses in terms of a real opportunity for progress toward peace. Almost half (47.2 percent) of the respondents considered themselves moderately or strongly rightist; 30.3 percent said they were centrist; and 22.5 percent self-identified as left-wing.

**Procedure.** Oral informed consent was obtained at the onset of the interview. After a few unrelated “warm-up” questions, we began by asking participants to rate their general level of hatred toward Palestinians (see detailed description of the
measure below). Then a series of thirty general distracter questions were presented. In the next stage, participants were randomly assigned to an experimental ($N = 120$) or a control ($N = 142$) group. Both groups were exposed to what participants believed was a newspaper article describing in very general terms the sequence of the Israeli–Palestinian presummit negotiations. While the control group’s article was neutral, the experimental group’s article was aimed at inducing anger toward the Palestinians (see below). Following the manipulation, participants were asked to rate the level of anger they felt toward Palestinians while they were listening to the short article. To ensure the specificity of the intervention, namely, that the manipulation induced anger and not general negative affect, participants also rated their level of fear in response to the scenario. In the next stage, participants were asked to describe their level of support for compromises during the upcoming negotiation in the Annapolis summit. Finally, all participants were debriefed about the goals of the study and the purposes and the nature of the manipulation.

**Anger manipulation.** The neutral and anger-inducing articles were presented as editorials from Israel’s most popular daily newspaper. Both versions of the article included two paragraphs and had similar structures and word counts. The first paragraph described some objective facts about the summit and was identical in both versions. The second paragraph provided a general overview of the presummit negotiations that was either neutral (control condition) or anger-inducing (anger condition). The anger-inducing condition presented alleged quotes from a high-ranking Israeli negotiator that corresponded to typical anger-arousing stimuli (Lazarus 1991; Roseman 1984). For example, in the anger-inducing condition, the negotiator described the Palestinians’ general behavior throughout the negotiations as unjust and unfair: "The behavior of the Palestinian delegation during negotiations is unfair and does not meet with accepted diplomatic standards of trustworthy negotiation."

**Measures.** To measure the long-term sentiment of hatred, participants were asked, prior to the manipulation, to rate on a 6-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all and 6 = a lot) their general feeling of hatred toward Palestinians unrelated to any specific events, statements, or actions. To measure emotional response of anger toward Palestinians, participants were asked to rate on a 6-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all and 6 = a lot) their feelings toward Palestinians when they were listening to the article that was read to them by the interviewer. Following Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000), three items were used to measure anger (angry, irritated, and furious; $\alpha = .82$). To test for the possibility that the anger-inducing article engendered a variety of negative affect, three items were also used to measure fear (afraid, anxious, and worried; $\alpha = .90$). Finally, to measure support for compromises in the upcoming negotiations, participants answered three items that each represented a unique aspect of potential Israeli compromise within the upcoming negotiations. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate to what extent (1 = not at all and 6 = very much) they supported each of the following three key compromises: territorial compromise, symbolic compromise about the status of Jerusalem, and...
compromise about the status of Palestinian refugees. Although one aspect of compromise does not necessarily reflect on the other, we created a composite by averaging responses across all three compromise items, to create as broad an index as possible of support for compromise, ($\alpha = .57$).

**Results and Discussion**

**Gender differences.** Previous studies have found that, while men are more prone to anger, women tend to experience and report higher levels of fear (e.g., Lerner et al. 2003). Hence, we tested for gender differences in all of our emotional measures. Surprisingly, we did not find effects for gender on either hatred ($p = .19$) or anger ($p = .67$). Yet, in line with previous studies, females ($M = 3.55, SD = 1.63$) reported greater fear than males ($M = 3.12, SD = 1.66$), $t(260) = 2.10, p = .04$. Most importantly, gender did not moderate the effect of the manipulation on levels of anger toward the Palestinians ($p = .42$).

**Manipulation checks.** To examine whether our manipulation of intergroup anger was effective, two separate independent sample $t$-tests were conducted. The results of the first test showed that participants in the anger condition expressed higher levels of anger toward Palestinians ($M = 3.37, SD = 1.57$) than participants in the control condition ($M = 2.87, SD = 1.56$), $t(260) = 2.58, p < .05$. The experimental condition X long-term hatred interaction on levels of anger was not significant, $F(261) = .01, p = ns$, suggesting that the experimental manipulation induced anger equally among low- and high-hatred individuals. Next, we conducted a second $t$-test to confirm that the manipulation induced discrete anger and not general negative affect, and hence tested for differences in levels of fear between the groups. As expected, the results showed no significant differences in fear between the experimental ($M = 3.37, SD = 1.64$) and control groups ($M = 3.31, SD = 1.68$), $t(260) = .33, ns$. To ensure that we could use long-term hatred as a moderator, we compared the two experimental conditions on this variable. The results showed no differences in levels of hatred between the two conditions ($t(259) = -.50, ns$), suggesting that random assignment to conditions was effective.

**Anger, hatred, and support for compromise.** To test our hypothesis that the association between anger and support for compromises in negotiation would be moderated by levels of long-term hatred, we standardized hatred scores, dummy coded the anger condition as 1 and the control condition as 0, and computed an interaction term by multiplying the two. Next, we regressed support for compromises on condition (anger vs. control), hatred, and their interaction. Neither the experimental manipulation $t(259) = -.15, ns$ nor long-term hatred $t(259) = -1.29, ns$ was associated with support for compromises. However, as predicted, the interaction between hatred and anger was significant $t(259) = -3.04, \beta = -.24, p < .01$.

To interpret this interaction, we tested simple slopes at 1 SD below the mean level of hatred (i.e., the moderator) and at 1 SD above the mean (Aiken and West 1991; Jaccard, Wan, and Turrisi 1990). As shown in figure 1, at 1 SD below the mean of hatred, the experimental manipulation led to additional support for
compromises $t(259) = 2.27, \beta = .19, p < .05$, while at 1 SD above the mean level of hatred, it lead to decrease in support of compromise $t(259) = -2.04, \beta = -.17, p < .05$. In other words, as hypothesized, the induction of anger among individuals who held low levels of long-term hatred, increased their support for compromise, while the same experimental stimulus yielded the opposite reaction among those who had high levels of hatred toward the out-group. The pattern of results held true even when political affiliation, gender, and other sociodemographic variables were controlled for.

These findings support our hypothesis that anger can in some cases increase support for compromises, while in other cases it can impede it. Specifically, for participants with high levels of hatred toward the out-group, anger served to decrease willingness to compromise; while for those participants with low levels of hatred toward the out-group, anger served to increase willingness to compromise. These findings show that individuals respond differently to an anger-related stimulus.

Figure 1. Support for compromise in study 1 by experimental condition ("anger" vs. "control") and levels of long-term hatred (at ± 1 SD).
associated with a conflict related event (i.e., peace talks) based on their differential levels of long-term sentiment (in this case, hatred) toward the opponent. Importantly, these findings provide a real-life example of the positive impact anger can, under the right circumstances, have on support for compromises.

The interaction effect draws attention to the absence of a significant effect of long-term hatred on support for compromises among participants in the control condition. One interpretation for this finding might be that the control condition is best thought of as an abstract context, and all people (haters or not) in the abstract support peace, and hence at least to some extent also support compromises (see Bar-Tal 2007). Where one sees a difference as a function of hatred is when people get angry.

To assess the boundary conditions of the effects demonstrated in study 1, we examined whether we would still find that anger leads to more constructive responses if we (1) used a more specific anger induction, concentrating on the issues at hand, and referring specifically to negative Palestinian behaviors, and (2) used an anger induction a few days, rather than three weeks, before the peace summit. The importance of the proximity to the summit stems from the fact that very close to the event, the public sphere is saturated with negative intergroup emotions that could influence the way people respond to negative stimuli in spite of their level of long-term hatred.

Study 2: Hatred, Out-Group–Specific Anger, and Peace Inclinations

Given the theory-consistent but counterintuitive results in study 1, we sought to examine the constructive effects of anger in a tenser psychopolitical context and using more concrete content as an anger-evoking manipulation. To this end, we conducted another experiment days before the Annapolis peace summit (and thus two weeks after study 1). In study 2, we used a new participant sample and a revised version of the anger induction with the same study design. The revised version of the anger manipulation aimed to be more context-specific and explicitly mentioned real Palestinian actions. We assumed that the high temporal proximity to the summit and the more “vivid” nature of the manipulation would enable us to assess the role of anger in a setting that is very similar to a real-life one.

Method

Participants. Participants were 262 Israeli Jewish citizens (127 females and 134 males). We used a different subsample of participants from another experimental phone survey similar in its structure to the one described in study 1. A random sampling within stratified subgroups was used to obtain a representative sample of Jews living in Israel at the time of the surveys. About 49 percent considered themselves as moderately or strongly rightist, 23 percent said they were centrist, and 28 percent reported themselves to be left-wing.
**Procedure.** Our study design and measures were identical to those used in study 1. The key difference between the two studies, as noted, was the timing and the content of the anger manipulation. As before, we measured levels of long-term hatred toward Palestinians prior to the manipulation, induced intergroup anger using anger-related appraisals, and then measured levels of anger, fear, and support for compromises. Finally, we debriefed participants.

**Anger manipulation.** Participants were randomly assigned either to the anger-evoking experimental group ($N = 141$) or to the control group ($N = 120$). Both groups were exposed to a two-paragraph editorial article that was ostensibly published in Israel’s most popular newspaper. The article presented to the control group was identical to the one used in study 1, but the article presented to the experimental group had a different second paragraph, which focused on specific actions of the Palestinians in the presummit negotiations.

According to that paragraph, “an official source within the Israeli delegation had said that the Palestinians repeatedly tricked and manipulated the Israeli delegation . . . in addition, according to the same source, despite Israel’s generosity and willingness to compromise, the Palestinians did not offer any new compromises on their end.”

**Measures.** All measures were identical to those used in study 1. As in study 1, the three-item scales of anger (angry, irritated, and furious; $\alpha = .82$) and fear (afraid, anxious, and worried; $\alpha = .87$) showed good internal consistency. The reliability of the support for compromises scale ($\alpha = .82$) was also reasonable.

**Results and Discussion**

**Gender differences.** Similar to the results of study 1, we did not find effects for gender on either hatred ($p = .89$) or anger ($p = .55$). We again found higher levels of fear among females ($M = 3.66$, $SD = 1.63$) than among males ($M = 3.21$, $SD = 1.50$), $t(259) = 2.29, p = .02$. As in the first study, gender did not moderate the effect of the manipulation on levels of anger toward the Palestinians ($p = .44$).

**Manipulation check.** An independent sample $t$-test showed that the level of anger within the anger group ($M = 3.56$, $SD = 1.57$) was significantly higher than that found in the control group ($M = 2.86$, $SD = 1.57$), $t(259) = 3.61, p < .001$. Again, these results were similar for all levels of hatred, that is, the experimental condition X long-term hatred interaction on levels of anger was not significant, $F(261) = 1.87, p = ns$. Also as expected, no significant differences were found in levels of fear between the experimental ($M = 3.58$, $SD = 1.45$) and control groups ($M = 3.31$, $SD = 1.68$), $t(259) = 1.41, p = ns$. In addition, no significant differences were found between groups in levels of long-term hatred, $t(259) = 1.41, p = ns$, once again suggesting successful randomization.

**Anger, hatred, and support for compromise.** Following standardization of the hatred scores and dummy coding of the experimental conditions ($0 = control$, $1 = anger$ condition), we multiplied the two to create an interaction term. Then, the three-
item support for compromise scale was regressed on condition (anger vs. control), hatred, and their interaction. The regression equation revealed a similar pattern to the one observed in study 1. Neither the experimental condition $t(259) = .25, ns$ nor long-term hatred $t(259) = .49, ns$ significantly predicted support for compromises, but the hypothesized association between their interaction and support for compromises was significant $t(259) = -2.27, \beta = -.19, p < .05$.

To interpret this interaction (see Figure 2), we used the same technique as in study 1 (Aiken and West 1991; Jaccard, Wan, and Turrisi 1990). The regression analysis at 1 SD above and 1 SD below the mean of hatred revealed a significant effect of the experimental condition on support for compromises among those who held low levels of hatred toward Palestinians $t(259) = 1.94, \beta = .17, p < .05$. That is, those with low hatred showed increased support for compromise even with a stronger anger induction and even on the eve of the Annapolis negotiation. The effect of the experimental condition on support for compromises among those high in levels of hatred, while in the right direction, was not significant $t(259) = 1.50, \beta = -.13, p = .13$. Thus, results from both studies show that anger induction among individuals with low levels of hatred increases support of compromises for peace. Again, these patterns of results held true even when controlling for participant’s political affiliation, gender, and other sociodemographic variables.

Study 2 addressed several possible limitations of our first study. Specifically, using a more context-specific anger-induction just a few days prior to the peace summit, we again found that levels of hatred moderated the effect of anger on conciliatory attitudes. Taken together, the two studies show that long-term hatred moderates the effect of anger on conciliatory attitudes in intergroup conflict. More specifically, anger toward the out-group that occurs in the context of low levels of hatred toward this group will increase support for compromises, whereas anger toward the out-group that occurs in the context of high levels of hatred toward this group will tend to decrease support for compromises.

**General Discussion**

Negative emotions play an important role in intergroup conflicts, particularly in conflicts that are considered intractable by the parties who are involved. In particular, anger is central in these conflicts, mainly because these conflicts are saturated with belligerent actions, provocative statements, and mutual insults. However, it has not been clear what role anger plays in such conflicts. Most previous empirical studies show anger to be an aggression catalyst (e.g., Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Lerner et al. 2003; Skitka et al. 2006) and a psychological barrier to peace (Paez 2007; Tam et al. 2007). Yet, other studies show that anger can play a constructive role in intergroup relations (e.g., by increasing the perceived out-groups’ heterogeneity, Ackerman et al. 2006), as well as in intergroup conflicts (e.g., by increasing support for long-term reconciliation, Fischer and Roseman 2007 and support for risk taking in negotiations, Halperin forthcoming; Reifen et al. 2009).
These mixed findings led us to investigate the circumstances under which anger might prove beneficial to the peace process. We argued that, in line with its typical appraisals, anger would boost the motivation to correct wrongdoing. Yet, for those who believe in the possibility of change in the other group, anger would be expected to motivate support for conciliatory actions; while for those who do not, it might motivate support for militaristic and decidedly nonconciliatory actions. Given that previous studies pointed toward very close association between long-term hatred and that particular belief, we proposed that levels of long-term hatred toward an out-group would moderate the effect of anger on political response tendencies. The results from the two studies supported our hypothesis.

Theoretical and Applied Implications

The framework presented in the current research highlights the interrelations between long-term emotional sentiments, emotions, and political attitudes toward the peace process. It also emphasizes the central role played by cognitive
appraisals, not just in determining the kind of emotion that will occur in response to a conflict-related event but also in influencing the specific response tendency that will be developed as a result of that emotion. It seems that although experimentalists have made great strides in manipulating short-term anger responses, a fuller understanding of emotion—particularly as it applies to real-world situations such as long-term conflicts—requires that we put anger back in context. In situations of protracted conflict like the one going on in the Middle East, this context importantly involves the long-term sentiment of hatred as well as other ingredients of the psychological repertoire (e.g., collective memory and ethos of conflict) that were not assessed in the current research.

In more practical terms, Halperin, Gross, and Sharvit (2010) have suggested that, given the vast influence of emotions on people’s positions and behavior in long-term conflict, strategies of emotion regulation (Gross 1998, 2007) can be used to reduce tensions in such conflicts. The current results point toward a new path of intervention that can be useful in conflict situations. Specifically, prospective emotion regulation, in which steps are taken to reduce levels of hatred prior to conflict-related event, may be able to alter the nature of the behavioral response to the event. In a sense, in the case of the current investigation, since anger constitutes the engine for action and long-term hatred can dictate the nature of that action, interventions that affect long-term hatred prior to an event would probably be more useful than attempts to limit the magnitude of anger during or right after that event. Hence, it seems that what we may need to focus on is altering the relative constructiveness of the emotional response. That is, we may need to aim not to affect the magnitude of the experienced emotion but to alter the specific response tendencies elicited by the emotion (see Halperin, Sharvit, and Gross 2010 for an elaborated discussion of qualitative emotion regulation).

**Limitations and Future Directions**

The current investigation focused on the effect of one emotional sentiment (hatred) on response tendencies to one emotion (anger). This same framework should be tested in future research at various stages of intergroup conflict and using different emotional sentiments and experienced emotions. That is, the current research highlighted the pluripotentiality of anger, but the same patterns are relevant for other emotions as well—for example, fear that can lead to either “fight” or “flight” political response tendencies. Assuming that emotions such as fear and anger are an integral part of every intergroup conflict, a regulatory strategy that will alter their specific political response tendencies will change their basic essence in that unique context.

Moreover, the nature of that response might determine whether covert disagreements between two groups will escalate and transform into overt, violent conflicts. Finding a regulatory strategy capable of altering the specific response tendencies relevant to fear would be an important step. As in the current research, we suggest that focusing on affecting the long-term sentiments preceding the experience of fear might be a promising place to start.
Another limitation of the current study is our focus on one side of the conflict without a proper examination of the other party—Palestinians in the case of the current work. Despite the obvious procedural difficulties in conducting parallel studies within two societies involved in intractable conflict, such a study could strengthen the external validity of the findings. While conducting such research, it would be wise to devote some attention to differences in the power balance between the parties and to their effect on the patterns of results. Previous studies have found that stronger individuals are more prone to anger, prevail more in conflict situations, and consider themselves entitled to better treatment (Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides 2009). Yet, one notable question is: What would be the implications of anger experienced by the weaker party in the conflict? In other words, is constructive anger feasible among the weaker party in a conflict or is it only the privilege of the strong party? Is it at all possible for the weak (and in many cases the oppressed) side to consider constructive steps toward the strong side following a provocation? We assume that such a pattern is possible but also that it will be less probable compared to its prevalence among the members of the stronger group.

Some years ago, John Bowlby (1973) posited the existence of two discrete kinds of anger: an anger of hope and an anger of despair. While the latter resembles rage and is often maladaptive, the former is constructive and intended to bring about positive change. We believe that our findings regarding anger lend support to Bowlby’s distinction. Depending on the context of anger, the impulse it creates can be either destructive or constructive to positive change. Therefore, one of the biggest challenges to research in the field of conflict resolution is to reveal ways to intervene to stimulate the shift from an anger of despair to an anger of hope.

The current results suggest that one of the most effective ways to stimulate the transformation from anger of despair to anger of hope would be to reduce levels of long-term hatred. Without a doubt, the reduction of hatred is one of the most challenging missions facing those who study conflicts. We have recently revealed one potentially useful path of intervention (Russell et al. 2010). Our preliminary evidence suggests that implicit theories about the malleability of groups (Dweck, Chiu, and Hong 1995; Rydell et al. 2007) may play an important role in the attempt to reduce hatred. According to this framework, people differ in their implicit beliefs about groups. An “entity theory” holds that groups have inherent and unchangeable qualities, whereas an “incremental theory” holds that groups can undergo change. Several previous studies have found that the general belief in the capacity of people or groups to change their characteristics (i.e., an incremental theory) is associated with lower levels of negative stereotypes and prejudice toward specific out-groups (Levy, Stroessner, and Dweck 1998; Levy, Chiu, and Hong 2006; Rydell et al. 2007). On this basis, we used well-established manipulations of implicit theories to show that inducing an incremental theory can be useful in reducing levels of hatred in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Yet, despite the encouraging results, there is still a long way to go in the continuous endeavor to overcome intergroup hatred.
Authors’ Note
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Note
1. Following previous scholars, we distinguish between emotional sentiments, which are temporally stable cognitive and emotional dispositions toward a person, group, or symbol and emotions, which are transient changes in experiential, behavioral, and physiological responses (Arnold 1960; Ekman 1992; Frijda 1986). A recent study by Halperin and Gross (forthcoming) demonstrated the close relations between these two affective phenomena in the context of long-term conflict.

References


