Emotion and Emotion Regulation in Intergroup Conflict

An Appraisal-Based Framework

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“The sheer passion expended in pursuing ethnic conflict calls out for an explanation that does justice to the realm of feelings . . . A bloody phenomenon cannot be explained by a bloodless theory.”

(Horowitz, 1985, p. 140)

Scholars who study international relations and ethnic conflicts have long recognized the central role played by emotions in conflict escalation, de-escalation, and resolution (Horowitz, 1985; Lindner, 2006; Petersen, 2002). This suggests that psychological research has much to contribute to the understanding of large-scale protracted conflicts, which are the ones typically addressed in the international relations literature. Surprisingly, however, psychologists have devoted relatively little attention to the role of emotion and emotion regulation in such intense conflicts.

Our goal in this chapter is to present a general framework for examining emotion and emotion regulation in intergroup conflict situations. Our focus is on intense intractable conflicts. However, given the paucity of psychological research on the role of emotions in such conflicts, we draw upon findings from the broader domain of emotions and intergroup relations. We begin our chapter by defining key concepts in the study of emotion, emotion regulation and the psychology of intergroup conflicts. We then introduce a conceptual framework for examining how emotion and emotion regulation affect individuals’ beliefs, attitudes and behaviors regarding the conflict. Next, based on a review of the literature, we apply our
framework to three stages of intergroup conflicts—conflict outbreak, de-escalation, and reconciliation. We conclude by discussing ideas for future research.

BASIC DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

Emotions

Despite spectacular growth in the field of emotion (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & Barrett, 2008), a consensual definition of the concept is still elusive. Part of the difficulty here is that there are fundamental disagreements regarding the theoretical boundaries of the field. Because the term “emotion” is drawn from common usage, there remains disagreement about the phenomena that require explanation (e.g., emotional words, emotional experience, emotional expressions, or emotional behavior; see Frijda, 2004; Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2006).

In this chapter, we adopt William James’s (1884) classical perspective on emotions as response tendencies. According to this view, emotions are flexible response sequences (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1984) that are called forth whenever an individual evaluates a situation as offering important challenges or opportunities (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). In other words, emotions transform a substantive event into a motivation to respond to it in a particular manner (Zajonc, 1998).

Core components of emotion include subjective feelings, bodily changes, facial expressions, and other physiological reactions. These components help to distinguish emotions from other phenomena such as attitudes or beliefs (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). However, our perspective on emotions highlights the role of two additional components—cognitive appraisals and response tendencies—which we see as central to the understanding of the role of emotions in intergroup conflicts.

Recognition of the symbiotic relations between emotion and cognition has led to extensive research on the cognitive aspects of discrete emotions (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 2004; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). It is now well established that in most situations, emotions include a comprehensive evaluation of the emotion-eliciting stimulus (which may be conscious or unconscious). Despite differences in terminology, it is possible to identify several appraisal dimensions that are common in the writings of most scholars. These include pleasantness, anticipated effort, attentional activity, certainty, perceived obstacles, responsibility attribution (to the self, other, or situation), and relative strength (controllability).

In addition to the appraisal component, Arnold (1960) suggested that each emotion is related to a specific action tendency. More recently, Frijda (1986) identified specific types of action readiness that characterize 17 discrete emotions. Roseman (1984) and Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz (1994) have distinguished between actions, action tendencies, and emotional goals. While general motives or goals are inherent components of each emotion, and thus can be predicted by specific emotions, the transformation of these motives into context-specific response tendencies and actual behavior depends on numerous external factors and is therefore quite flexible (Frijda, Knipps, & ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, 2002). The classic example is of this pluripotentiality is seen with fear, which is related to the general motive...
of creating a safer environment, but can take the form of either fight or flight response tendencies, depending on the situation.

**Emotions, Moods, Sentiments, and Group-Based Emotions**

Emotions represent just one of several types of affective responses (Gross, 2007). For our purposes in this chapter, it is important to distinguish among emotions, sentiments, and moods. As we have seen, emotions are multicomponential responses to specific events. Sentiments, by contrast, are enduring configurations of emotions (Arnold, 1960; Ekman, 1992; Frijda, 1986). According to this view, an emotional sentiment is a temporally stable emotional disposition toward a person, group, or symbol (Halperin, 2008b). Emotional sentiments differ from moods in that moods typically do not have well-defined objects, whereas emotional sentiments do.

In recent years, there has been growing interest in the concept of group-based emotions, which refers to emotions that are felt by individuals as a result of their membership in or identification with a certain group or society (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993; Smith & Mackie, 2008). Accordingly, research has shown that individuals may experience emotions not only in response to personal life events and activities, but also in response to events that affect other members of a group with which they identify (Mackie et al., 2000; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordin, 2003). Group-based emotions are personal experiences that can be targeted at events, individuals or social groups. In the later case, they are defined as intergroup emotions, that is, emotions that are felt as a result of the felt belongingness to a certain group, and targeted at another group (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007).

On the societal level of analysis, when intergroup emotions are shared and felt simultaneously by large numbers of individuals in a certain society, they are defined as collective emotions (Bar-Tal, 2001; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). De Rivera (1992) introduced a related concept, emotional climate. He suggested that emotional climate is not the aggregate of the emotional experiences of individual society members, but rather a characteristic of the society that maintains its identity and unity. Although most of the current chapter focuses on the individual, not the societal level of analysis, it is worth noting that individual experiences of emotions occur within a certain societal context. Hence, the collective configuration of emotions—or emotional climate—is important to the understanding of the role of individualistic emotions in the context of intergroup conflicts (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007).

**Emotion Regulation**

In recent years, scholars in the emerging field of emotion regulation have taken up the issue of how emotions may be altered or influenced. Typically, their focus has been individuals and interpersonal relations (Gross, 2007). This approach is grounded in previous work on psychological defenses (Freud, 1926/1959), stress and coping (Lazarus, 1966), attachment (Bowlby, 1969), and self-regulation (Mischel,
Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). We would argue that some of the insights that have been gained from studies of emotion regulation may be applied to the intergroup context.

At the individual level, emotion regulation refers to processes that are engaged when individuals try to influence the type or amount of emotion they (or others) experience, when they (or others) have them, and how they (or others) experience and express these emotions (Gross, 1998). Emotion regulation may be automatic or controlled, conscious or unconscious, and may have its effects at one or more points in the emotion generative process. Emotion regulation may change the degree to which emotion response components cohere as the emotion unfolds, such as when large changes in emotion experience and physiological responding occur in the absence of facial behavior.

The current literature points out five families of emotion regulation processes: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation (Gross, 1998). These families are distinguished by the point in the emotion-generative process at which they have their primary impact (Gross & Thompson, 2007). For example, the “situation selection” strategy occurs very early in the process and involves actions that make it more (or less) likely that one will end up in situations that are expected to give rise to desirable (or undesirable) emotions. In contrast, the “response modulation” strategy occurs late in the emotion-generative process, after response tendencies have been initiated. Despite the importance of all other regulatory strategies, our focus in this chapter is on processes of cognitive change. The main reason for this selection is the expected applicability of this strategy to large-scale intergroup conflicts. In particular, we focus on attempts to reappraise the ongoing events in order to up- or downregulate certain intergroup emotions.

**Intractable Intergroup Conflicts**

Social conflicts are usually defined as situations where “two or more persons or groups manifest the belief that they have incompatible objectives” (Kriesberg, 2007, p. 2; Mitchell, 1981; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). From a psychological perspective, the appearance of a belief regarding contradictory goals or interests is always a dual-stage process. The first stage involves subjective evaluations regarding the in-group’s goals, the other group’s goals and the interaction between them. In the second stage, the evaluation is expressed in a motivation and readiness to act in a certain way. Hence, cognitive appraisals and response tendencies, both embedded within the structure of emotions, are an integral part of the most basic definition of conflict, attesting to their importance.

Different scholars refer to different stages of conflicts (Mitchell, 1981). Kriesberg (2007) provided a recent notable example, which described the three main stages for each conflict: (1) the emergence, outbreak or manifestation of the conflict; (2) the escalation of the conflict; and (3) its de-escalation and settlement. Other scholars have recently discussed another important stage of conflict, namely reconciliation (Gibson, 2006). In the present chapter, we examine the role of emotion and emotion regulation in three stages of intergroup conflict: conflict outbreak and escalation, conflict de-escalation and reconciliation.
The current chapter adopts a bottom-up perspective, according to which, emotions, attitudes and actions of individuals and groups influence the course of the conflict. This psychology of the “people” is even more important in intractable conflicts than in other contexts, because intractable conflicts are so often violent and protracted, demand extensive investment, play a central role in the lives of the involved societies, and are perceived as total, irresolvable and being zero-sum (Bar-Tal, 1998; Kriesberg, 1993). According to Bar-Tal (2007), societies that are involved in these kinds of conflicts develop a unique psychological repertoire, which includes a system of conflict-related societal beliefs (i.e., “ethos of conflict”), a biased collective memory of the history of the conflict, and a highly negative “collective emotional orientation” toward the opponent (Bar-Tal & Halperin, this volume).

The role that the emotional component of this repertoire plays in maintaining the conflict is central to the current framework. The nature of long-term, intractable conflicts creates a fertile ground for the continuation and aggregation of emotions beyond the immediate time frame. Some major conflict-related events, which may be accompanied by repeated dissemination of specific information about the conflict, may produce stable group-based emotional sentiments toward the opponent and the conflict. As a result, stable negative intergroup emotions such as fear, anger and hatred become an inherent part of the standing psychological context of individuals in such conflicts (Kelman, 1997). The interaction between these emotional sentiments and the emotions that arise in response to conflict-related events, as well as their joint influence on attitudes and actions, stands at the center of our proposed appraisal-based framework.

**EMOTIONS AND EMOTION REGULATION IN INTERGROUP CONFLICT: AN APPRAISAL-BASED FRAMEWORK**

Despite increased interest in the role of emotion in conflicts, we are aware of no comprehensive framework for understanding how emotions influence individual and collective beliefs, attitudes and behaviors regarding war and peace. In the following section, we introduce a new appraisal-based framework that captures key aspects of this process, and may therefore be useful as a theoretical platform for future empirical work in the field. The first part of our appraisal-based framework (bold circles in Figure 3.1) describes the sequence of processes by which emotional sentiments and emotions contribute to the formation of specific attitudinal and behavioral responses to conflict related events.

The process begins with the occurrence of a new event and/or appearance of new information related to the conflict and/or recollection of a past conflict related event. The event or information can be negative (e.g., war, terror attack, and rejection of a peace offer) or positive (e.g., a peace gesture and willingness to compromise), but it must be appraised as meaningful. Although events can be experienced personally, in most cases they are experienced directly by few group members and transmitted to other group members through the mediation of leaders, the mass media or other individuals. In these cases, if individuals identify with the same
group as the directly exposed individuals, they would experience group-based emotions (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993).

Such short-term events will elicit individual and group-based emotions and the ensuing political response tendencies, depending on the manner in which they are appraised. For example, a violent act committed by out-group members toward the in-group that is appraised as unjust and is accompanied by the evaluation of the in-group as strong would induce anger (Halperin, 2008a; Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007). Hence, the subjective appraisal of an event is a crucial factor in determining the kind of emotion that will result from the event.

According to the proposed framework, in the context of long-term conflicts, the appraisal of events is influenced by three main factors. First, the event may be framed in a certain way, and this framing influences individuals’ appraisal of the event (Halperin, 2008b). Different frames for the same event may lead to different cognitive appraisals, which, in turn, will lead to different emotional responses (Gross, 2008). For example, if a military action by the opponent is framed as a defensive response to previous militant actions by one’s own side, it may elicit fear or possibly sadness. But if framed as an aggressive action with no justified causes, it may lead to extreme anger or even hatred.

Second, the appraisal of the event will be influenced by a relatively wide range of nonaffective factors. An extensive review of these factors is beyond the scope of the current chapter, but a nonexhaustive list of them would include personality factors (e.g., authoritarianism, need for structure, and implicit theories), adherence...
to moral values, socio-economic status, and long-term ideology about the conflict and the opponent (Halperin, 2008b; Sharvit, Halperin, & Rosler, 2008).

Finally, and most relevant, our appraisal-based framework assumes that long-term emotional sentiments will bias the cognitive appraisals of specific events. This premise is based upon the appraisal tendency framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000), according to which each emotion activates a cognitive predisposition to interpret events in line with the central appraisal dimensions that triggered the emotion. For example, long-term external threat to the group will make society members more attuned to threatening cues and will lead to higher appraised danger that will elicit, in turn, more frequent fear responses (Bar-Tal et al., 2007).

We suggest that the occurrence of a new event, integrated with these three groups of factors, will shape the cognitive appraisal of the event, which will provide the basis for the development of corresponding discrete emotions. In turn, these discrete emotions, and particularly the emotional goals and response tendencies embedded within them, will dictate the behavioral and political responses to the event (Halperin, 2008b).

The first part of the proposed framework considers the central role of discrete emotions in determining reactions to conflict related events. In the second part of the framework (striped lines boxes in Figure 3.1) we describe two possible paths for the regulation of these emotions in the context of intergroup conflicts through their various phases. It is worth noting that, to the best of our knowledge, strategies of emotion regulation have never been empirically tested in the context of intergroup relations and conflict resolution. Hence, this part of the framework is speculative and requires empirical validation.

As noted, prior work on emotion regulation at the individual level has focused on several strategies that may be used to regulate emotions (Gross, 1998). We believe that the most relevant strategy in the context of protracted intergroup conflicts is emotion regulation through cognitive change and, more specifically, reappraisal. Reappraisal involves changing a situation's meaning in a way that alters its emotional impact (Gross, 2002). The most direct way to create cognitive change is to ask individuals to reappraise, consider alternative perspectives or rethink their interpretation of events or information (Ochsner & Gross, 2008). Although this procedure was quite successful in reducing negative emotions in individual and inter-personal settings, it is not as clearly applicable to the context of intergroup conflict. The main reason is that the psychological repertoire of the conflict is often so deeply entrenched (Bar-Tal, 2007) that individuals are unlikely to be willing to change it upon request. Hence, we would argue that creating cognitive change in such a context is most likely to be achieved by using indirect ways. In particular, we believe that it is important to distinguish between two types of reappraisal: online reappraisal and prospective reappraisal.

Online reappraisal refers to “the attempt to change emotion that starts and continuously operates while the emotion-triggering event unfolds” (Sheppes & Meiran, 2007, p. 1518). In the context of intergroup conflict, this process pertains to cognitive change that may be caused by altering the manner in which events are presented to the public or framed. This process can begin only after the occurrence of an event, and would be effective mainly if the process of reappraisal
begins very soon after the triggering event (Sheppes & Meiran, 2007). Hence, the dissemination of a desired interpretation or frame of the event to the public should start immediately after the occurrence of the event. Such a frame should highlight specific appraisals that correspond with emotions that serve constructive purposes while avoiding the use of appraisals that are associated with destructive emotions. For example, in order to upregulate group-based guilt in response to the failure of a peace summit, the media reports may immediately highlight the in-group’s responsibility for the failure, since appraisal of in-group responsibility is important for the emotional experience of group-based guilt (Wohl et al., 2006).

But successful regulation of emotions in long-term conflicts should not begin only after the appearance of a triggering event. Previous findings have demonstrated the effectiveness of reappraisal when it is initiated in advance of emotion-triggering events (Gross & Levenson, 1997). Therefore, our framework introduces a new strategy of emotion regulation through cognitive change, namely prospective reappraisal. The logic underlying prospective reappraisal is that significant changes in the long-term emotional sentiments and beliefs of members of groups that are involved intergroup conflicts will alter their appraisals and resulting emotional reactions to specific events. Specifically, the reduction of negative intergroup sentiments or the moderation of long-term negative beliefs prior to the events can alter the manner in which individuals will eventually interpret the events. For example, the manner in which individuals appraise a new peace proposal by the opponent may be highly dependent on the levels of long-term hatred they feel toward that opponent. Hence, reducing levels of long-term hatred may create a fertile ground for more constructive emotional responses to positive as well as negative conflict-related events. This strategy is highly suitable to the unique context of intergroup conflict, because it overcomes the difficulties in “real time” regulation of emotions among large populations.

An additional advantage of prospective reappraisal is its ability to affect the type of response tendencies that will arise once an emotion is elicited. In other words, prospective reappraisal may bring about both quantitative (e.g., lower levels of fear) or qualitative (e.g., “flight” instead of “fight” response tendencies to fear) change in the experienced emotion. This strategy of emotion regulation seems more applicable (e.g., through educational channels), yet changing such long-term emotions and beliefs may be very difficult (Bar-Tal & Halperin, this volume).

APPLYING THE MODEL IN DIFFERENT STAGES OF THE CONFLICT

Our appraisal-based framework captures the four-step process of event → emotional-response → emotion regulation → political-position/behavior. We believe that this framework may usefully be applied to three major stages of intergroup conflicts: conflict outbreak and escalation, conflict de-escalation, and reconciliation. In the following sections, we review findings from research conducted in different conflicts in order to highlight the roles played by emotion and emotion regulation at each conflict phase. We divide the discussion of each stage into two parts. The
first part focuses on the role of emotions in a given stage, and is descriptive in its nature. The second part considers how online and prospective reappraisal may be used to diminish conflict, and takes a normative approach.

It should be noted that most empirical studies to date have focused solely on the specific link between emotions and political positions/behavior regarding the conflict, and have not incorporated other aspects of the model (e.g., appraisals and emotion regulation). Hence, since our aim is to propose a model that is broader than the ones previously tested, we use our comprehensive framework to evaluate previous empirical studies and to generate predictions for future investigations.

**Conflict Outbreak and Escalation**

This stage refers to the manifestation or transformation of latent disagreements into a violent conflict. It involves decision-making processes by leaders, which, in democratic societies, must be backed up by public support. This kind of support is essential due to the high risk and potential sacrifices required from the people involved. The degree to which society members support various courses of aggressive collective action may largely depend on their emotions.

**Emotions and the Outbreak/Escalation of Conflicts**

The emotion that has been most frequently studied with respect to this stage of the conflict is anger. Anger is evoked by events in which the individual perceives the actions of others as unjust, unfair or as deviating from acceptable societal norms (Averill, 1982). In addition, it involves appraisals of relative strength and high coping potential (Mackie et al., 2000). The integration of these two characteristics often creates a tendency to confront (Berkowitz, 1993; Mackie et al., 2000), hit, kill or attack the anger evoking target (Roseman et al., 1994).

In line with its characteristics, previous studies conducted in the context of real-world conflicts have consistently found a clear and direct association between anger and attribution of blame to the out-group (Halperin, 2008a; Small, Lerner, & Fischhoff, 2006). Other studies found that individuals who feel angry appraise future military attacks as less risky (Lerner & Keltner, 2001) and forecast more positive consequences of such attacks (Huddy et al., 2007). Accordingly, studies conducted in the United States following the 9/11 attacks found that angry individuals were highly supportive of an American military response in Iraq and elsewhere (Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 2008; Huddy et al., 2007; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006). This type of reaction is exactly the kind that promotes escalation of conflicts.

Fortunately, in most cases, anger is not the only emotion triggered by the opponent's provocations, aggressive statements or military actions. Other emotional reactions, such as fear, may tone down the response tendencies of anger. Fear arises in situations of perceived threat and danger to individuals and/or their environment or society, and enables adaptive responses (Gray, 1989). Fear is associated with an appraisal of low strength and low control over the situation (Roseman, 1984), as well as increased risk estimates and pessimistic predictions (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Behaviorally, fear is related to avoidance tendencies and a desire to
create a safe environment (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1994). Therefore, at this stage of the conflict, fear may discourage group members from engaging in violent military activities, due to elevated risk estimates and avoidance tendencies. Indeed, several studies have found that fear reactions among Americans to the 9/11 terror attacks increased estimated risks of terrorism and war (Huddy et al., 2007; Lerner et al., 2003) and decreased support for military activities and the war in Iraq (Huddy et al., 2007).

As suggested by our proposed theoretical model, short-term emotions develop in a context of more enduring emotional sentiments toward the out-group. The most destructive emotional sentiment that influences beliefs, attitudes and behaviors at the stage of conflict outbreak is hatred. Hatred is a secondary, extreme, negative emotion (Royzman, McCauley, & Rosin, 2005; Sternberg & Sternberg, 2008) with a potentially destructive impact on intergroup relations (Halperin, 2008a; Petersen, 2002; Volkan, 1997). It is directed at a particular individual or group and denounces them fundamentally and all inclusively (Sternberg, 2003). In most cases, hatred involves appraisal of the behavior of an out-group as stemming from a deep-rooted, permanent evil character. As a result, hatred is associated with very low expectations for positive change, and with high levels of despair.

The evaluation of short-term conflict-related events through the lens of hatred automatically increases support for initiating violent actions and for escalating the conflict (Staub, 2005). If one is convinced of the destructive intentions of the out-group and feels total despair regarding the likelihood of the out-group changing its ways, the violent alternative may seem as the only reasonable one. A recent study conducted in Israel at the eve of the Annapolis peace summit in 2007 found that above and beyond any other emotion, sentimental hatred increased the tendency of Israelis to support extreme military action toward Palestinians (Halperin, 2008b).

Corresponding with the proposed framework, we suggest that the level of long-term hatred may also influence the behavioral manifestations of anger. Anger that occurs in the presence of high levels of hatred will most likely bring about an extreme aggressive reaction. In contrast, anger that occurs in the presence of low levels of hatred may lead to more constructive approach tendencies (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). If one believes that the opponent group can change its behavior and that its intentions are defensive or innocent (i.e., low levels of hatred), the “high strength” appraisal embedded in anger may create a tendency to engage in constructive problem solving and crisis management, instead of the more common violent reaction (Halperin, 2008a, 2008b).

**Emotion Regulation and the Outbreak/Escalation of Conflicts**  If one wish to avoid escalation of the conflict, emotion regulation should play a crucial role in the stage of decision making regarding possible offensive actions. Strategies of online reappraisal can be used in order to up-regulate levels of reactive fear and down regulate anger. For these purposes, the framing of events and the assessments of possible responses to them should highlight the high risks involved in initiating military action. This should be done by emphasizing the strengths of the opponent and the weaknesses of one’s own side. In addition, the
conveyed message should be as balanced as possible regarding the responsibility of both sides to the situation. Such information may reduce the levels of appraised unfairness and injustice and therefore reduce levels of anger.

Strategies of prospective reappraisal should focus on attempts to reduce levels of long-term hatred toward the opponent and despair about the situation. These attempts should emphasize humanness and heterogeneity of the out-group as well as the ability of individuals and groups to change their characteristics, moral-values, positions, and behavior (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). In addition, strategies of perspective taking can be used, in order to increase understanding regarding the motives and goals of the adversary (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). We propose that such long-term processes, disseminated through education channels, cultural products and other societal mechanisms, will alter the behavioral manifestations of reactive negative emotions, which are themselves natural and legitimate responses to offensive acts or provocations.

De-escalation of the Conflict

This stage involves attempts to achieve some sort of conflict resolution or even a formal peace agreement. In most cases de-escalation is a nonlinear, long and difficult process. It involves breaking such well-established taboos as negotiating with enemies, who had been formerly considered “murderers” or “terrorists.” In addition, it requires a difficult process of compromises on important interests or even ideological beliefs. Public views play a central role in inhibiting or encouraging these processes.

Emotions and De-escalation As a result of the drawn-out nature of this process, long-term emotional sentiments play a pivotal role. Two contradictory and powerful sentiments dominate this process—fear and hope (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006). Any step toward peaceful resolution of intergroup conflicts requires willingness to take risks. Therefore, the emotional sentiment of fear, which hinders the willingness to take risks, is frequently considered as the most significant barrier to resolution.

In contrast to the restraining role of reactive fear at the escalation stage, once violent conflict is already in motion, sentimental fear may stabilize the violent situation and prevent mutual attempts to negotiate. More specifically, research suggests that experiences of threat and fear increase conservatism, prejudice, ethnocentrism, and intolerance (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Due to recurring experiences of threat and danger resulting from the conflict, society members may become over-sensitized to cues that signal danger and exist in a state of constant readiness to defend themselves (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006).

The other important sentiment in the stage of conflict de-escalation is hope. Hope involves expectation and aspiration for a positive goal, as well as positive feelings about the anticipated outcome (Staats & Stassen, 1985). Hope facilitates goal-setting, planning, use of imagery, creativity, cognitive flexibility, mental exploration of novel situations, and even risk taking (Breznitz, 1986; Snyder, 1994).
Consequently, hope allows members of groups that are involved in violent conflicts to imagine a future that is different from the past and to come up with creative solutions to the disputes at the core of the conflict (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006). The belief that peaceful resolution of the conflict is possible is an essential step toward taking risks and compromising. Indeed, a study conducted in Northern Ireland found that hope was positively related to the dissipation of the desire to retaliate, which, in turn, was positively related to willingness to forgive the adversary (Moeschberger, Dixon, Niens, & Cairns, 2005). Regarding the negative emotions, it would be rather tempting to suggest that emotions like anger or hatred, which contribute to the outbreak and escalation of conflicts, also play a role in the continuation and maintenance of the conflict. As far as hatred is concerned, this prediction has proven valid. One recent study found that individuals who experienced short-term episodes of hatred in times of negotiations in the Middle-East tended to reject any positive information about the opponent, and oppose continuation of negotiations, compromise and reconciliation (Halperin, 2008b).

In the case of anger, however, research presents a mixed picture regarding its role in efforts to de-escalate conflicts. At this stage, anger may result from perceived regression in the willingness of the other side to achieve peace or from violent actions of extremists during negotiations. Studies conducted in Northern Ireland and in Spain regarding the conflict in the Basque country have demonstrated that anger toward the opponent may constitute a significant emotional barrier in the face of potential compromises, consistent with its role at the escalation stage (Paez, 2007; Tam et al., 2007). Yet in other cases, anger appears to increase support for risk-taking in negotiations, and consequently may contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Halperin, 2008b; Reifen, Halperin, & Federico, 2008). We suggest that anger always activates an approach tendency, but the nature of the actual response (i.e., constructive versus destructive) may be determined by concomitant levels of sentimental fear, hatred and hope.

Another important category of emotions that may contribute to processes of de-escalation of conflicts are moral emotions targeted at the in-group (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). During the process of negotiation toward conflict resolution, certain events or new information about the in-group’s actions (e.g., attacks against noncombatants) may bring about severe threat to the positive self image of group members. Such threat may give rise to group-based moral emotions, which are defined as emotional reactions to a behavior that is appraised as violating basic moral values in which one believes (for a recent review see Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). The most frequently studied moral emotions in the context of conflicts are group-based guilt and shame.

Group-based guilt is associated with an appraisal that one’s in-group is responsible for actions that violate norms or values to which the group is committed (Branscombe, 2004). Guilt is focused on the wrongdoing itself and not on the characteristics of the violator (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). Consequently, it motivates group members to rectify the wrongdoing and to compensate the victims (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003).
Numerous studies conducted in the contexts of various conflicts (e.g., Bosnia, South-Africa, and Middle-East) have demonstrated that individuals who recognize their own group’s responsibility for the harm caused to the opponents and experience collective guilt, are motivated to compensate and offer reparations to the victims of their own group’s actions (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown, González, Zagefka, & Cehajic, 2008; Klandermans, Werner, & van Doorn, 2008; Pagano & Huo, 2007; Sharvit et al., 2008; Wohl et al., 2006). As such, guilt may contribute to improving the relations between opponent groups and facilitate the process of conflict resolution.

Group-based shame is also associated with an appraisal of improper behavior on the part of in-group members (Lazarus, 1999). Yet unlike guilt, shame implies that the wrongdoing reflects on the general character of the perpetrators (Tangney et al., 1992). Consequently, the response tendencies associated with shame are targeted toward the self (Goldberg, 1991). Therefore, the contribution of shame to the peaceful resolution of the conflicts is less clear. Although evidence exists for positive effects of shame on constructive political tendencies (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008), in most cases shame only leads to a desire to distance the in-group from the shame-invoking situation (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Sharvit et al., 2008).

De-escalation and Emotion Regulation In order to facilitate conflict de-escalation and resolution, online efforts should be made to upregulate group-based guilt, while avoiding the up-regulation of shame. For these purposes, knowledge of the in-group’s wrongdoings (e.g., torture, oppression, and killing of innocents) should be disseminated to the public on a frequent basis, in order to give rise to perceptions of threat to the group’s positive image and induce appraisals of collective responsibility for the wrongdoings. This information should be framed in a way that does not reflect negatively on the appraised dispositions of group members. In other words, in order to give rise to group-based guilt and not shame, group members must believe that they have the ability to change their behavior and improve their image by turning to the path of peace.

Prospective emotion regulation efforts at this stage should focus on down-regulation of long-term fear. Previous research has shown that in early stages of intergroup conflict (i.e., the escalation stage), emphasizing the relative strength of the in-group may reduce levels of fear and lead to confrontation tendencies (Mackie et al., 2000). We suggest that during the de-escalation stage, the same regulatory process (i.e., highlighting in-group strengths and out-group weaknesses) may reduce the fear of risk-taking in attempts to achieve peace, and hence increase support for negotiations with the opponent and for compromises.

The long-term efforts to reduce fear should be accompanied by consistent attempts to establish sentiments of hope about the future of the conflict. Inducing hope in long-term conflicts poses a considerable challenge mainly because many members of the societies involved in these conflicts have never experienced a peaceful situation, and hence cannot imagine the benefits of peace. Therefore, efforts to induce hope should highlight realistic and concrete goals and allow the generation of pragmatic means of achieving such goals (Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut, &
Almog, 2008). A nonexhaustive list of possible means of stimulating such a process may include frequent presentation of positive changes that took place in other similar conflicts around the world, emphasizing incremental theories about changeability in groups’ characteristics and behaviors (Rydell, Hugenberg, Ray, & Mackie, 2007) and highlighting the moderate segments within the opponent group.

Reconciliation

The end of violence and even formal resolution of the conflict do not necessarily result in genuinely peaceful relations among the parties (Kriesberg, 1998; Lederach, 1997). Often, a longer process of reconciliation is required in order to allow stable, peaceful relations between the groups. Reconciliation involves a deep psychological and cultural transformation that goes beyond a formal resolution of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2008; Kelman, 1997; Lederach, 1997). Such process requires perspective change, as well as change in everyday activities of group members.

Emotions and Reconciliation

The two most prominent emotions in the stage of reconciliation are forgiveness and empathy. Forgiveness is usually defined as an emotional process that involves letting go of past anger and resentment (Baumeister, Exline, & Sommer, 1998; Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000). Accordingly, two studies conducted among Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland revealed that anger toward the opponent group was negatively related to willingness to forgive (Tam et al., 2007; Tam et al., 2008a, 2008b). What follows is that a process aimed at promoting forgiveness should involve acknowledgment of mutual responsibility for atrocities committed during the conflict and increasing the understanding of the out-group’s past motives and interests.

Another emotional process that is important for reconciliation is empathy, which is an other-oriented emotional state that stems from the perceived affective state of others and is congruent with their perceived welfare (Batson, Ahmad, Lishner, & Tsang, 2005). Behaviorally, empathy induces a desire to help others and do justice to them (Zhou, Valiente, & Eisenberg, 2003). Several studies conducted in the postconflict settings of Northern Ireland (Moeschberger et al., 2005; Tam et al., 2008b) and Bosnia (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008) reveal a positive relationship between empathy and willingness to forgive the opponents. Another study conducted in Israel found that empathy felt by Arab children toward Jewish children was negatively related to support for violence (Shechtman & Basheer, 2005). Nadler and Liviatan (2006) suggested that exposure to expressions of empathy by an adversary may also facilitate willingness to reconcile.

Emotion Regulation and Reconciliation

One may consider the entire process of reconciliation as a process of regulation of intergroup emotions that follows the formal resolution of the conflict. Throughout this process both parties to the conflict face the tremendous challenge of down regulating such long-term negative emotions as fear, hatred and anger, which have gradually built up and aggregated over years of conflict. We suggest that the process of reconciliation inherently involves emotion regulation through reappraisal of past events. In other
words, contrary to the two previous stages of the conflict, which were characterized by emotional reactions to new conflict related events, the main challenge of the stage of reconciliation is to create conditions that allow constructive coping with recollections of past atrocities committed by both parties.

For these purposes, most regulatory efforts in the stage of reconciliation should focus on long-term (prospective) attempts to increase empathy toward the out-group. It appears that the dynamic of reducing intergroup hatred has much in common with inducing intergroup empathy. Hence, very similar to the strategy of reducing hatred, the central route to intergroup empathy involves efforts to encourage members of each side to adopt the perspective of the other side (Davis, 1994) and to imagine how the opponents feel (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997).

A recent study conducted among Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland (Tam et al., 2008a) found that the opportunity to create intergroup friendships was a major antecedent of perspective taking and empathy. These results and the more general findings regarding the positive effect of contact on intergroup relations (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) stress the need to institutionalize occasions for intergroup contact at this stage of the conflict beyond sporadic, random intergroup encounters.

Another recent study conducted in two different postconflict contexts—indigenous–nonindigenous relations in Chile and the mid-1990s war in Bosnia—found that reminders of in-group responsibility for past wrongdoings, combined with re-humanization of the previously de-humanized out-group, significantly elevated levels of out-group empathy (Cehajic, Brown, & González, 2008). We suggest that regulation of the abovementioned antecedents of empathy is a long and difficult educational process that should include a coordinated effort of NGOs, academia, formal education systems and even the mass-media.

**DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

Intractable intergroup conflicts are saturated with negative emotions such as anger and fear. They also involve high levels of negative sentiments such as hatred and despair. These negative emotions and sentiments powerfully influence the manner in which ongoing events are appraised and the responses to them. Hence, any comprehensive psychological explanation to the development and potential resolution of such conflicts must take into account the central role of emotions in these processes.

In this chapter we have introduced a new conceptual framework for the role of emotions and emotion regulation in intergroup conflict. According to the descriptive part of the model, framing processes, long-term sentiments toward the out-group and deep rooted beliefs about the conflict and the out-group shape group members’ appraisals of conflict-related events. These appraisals, in turn, give rise to emotions, which widely influence individuals’ political and behavioral responses to events.

From a prescriptive perspective, we have proposed two different paths of emotion regulation that may mitigate the impact of destructive emotions in intergroup conflicts while intensifying the effect of constructive emotions, thus
contributing to processes of conflict resolution and reconciliation. The incorporation of emotion regulation theory introduces a new perspective to the study of emotions in conflict. The main assumption underlying this perspective is that the potent effect of emotions in intergroup conflicts can and should be utilized for purposes of building viable peace and reconciliation. As described in the chapter, sensitive regulation of emotions among group members can greatly contribute to this important but difficult process.

Despite important developments in recent years, the study of emotions in conflict is still in its initial stages. Further theoretical work is needed in order to elaborate key aspects of the proposed framework. In addition, specific predictions of the proposed framework should be empirically tested in different contexts and conflicts around the world. These future efforts should be based upon a theoretical and empirical integration of all relevant sub-fields, namely, the study of international conflicts, the study of emotions and the study of emotion regulation.

The framework we introduced paves the route toward such integration and suggests several directions for future studies. First, further research may identify the specific roles of discrete emotions in different stages of conflicts. This research must address the unique interaction between long-term and short-term emotions and their confluence on conflict related political processes. Yet, such efforts will not be satisfactory unless they are followed by attempts to discover means of regulating these emotions in the unique context of conflict. In a way, one of the most important challenges of our field would be to identify ways in which large-scale strategies of emotion regulation might transform the destructive power of intergroup emotions in conflicts into a more constructive one.

REFERENCES


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